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The Reagan and Bush administrations promised drastic decreases in social 
welfare expenditures. This was to be accomplished by reducing federal funds, the 
backbone of social welfare funding, as well as loosening of federal restrictions or 
mandates where eligibility and services were concerned. This study uses descriptive 
analysis to explore the Medicaid and Women, Infant, and Children’s (WIC) programs in 
North Carolina between 1980 and 1992 to assess the impact of health care delivery to the 
state’s poor. 
Examining one state’s response to punitive fiscal and ideological assaults on the 
poor allows insight into the politics of American federalism as it impacts poverty policy. 
Even though the WIC program includes the middle class, it, along with Medicaid were 
vulnerable to budgets cuts. In North Carolina, WIC was spared much of the attack 
suffered by the Medicaid program. While state Medicaid witnessed budgetary increases, 
explained largely by market driven raises in health care costs, program recipient levels 
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declined. A brief exploration of the state’s political culture aids in understanding how 
Medicaid, administered largely on the state and local level, sacrificed its poor, while 
WIC, whose base is clearly national, was left in tact. 
The role of race and gender in the effects of health care delivery is significant in 
North Carolina. Data reveals the uncertain state of well-being that African American 
women and children hold in the state. This population, in particular, is least able to 
withstand threats like those delivered between 1980 and 1992. Poverty programs are 
among the most vulnerable when federal and state forces join to reduce benefits to the 
poor. Future social welfare policies seem intent of continuing the social welfare spending 
trends of the Reagan and Bush administrations. 
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The provision of health care to the indigent as a feature of the American welfare 
state has been the subject of debate among academicians, politicians, and pubic 
administrators since the national government's entry into social welfare. The controversy 
involving the degree to which the health care "safety net" should be extended has been 
highlighted by dichotomous ideological positions regarding the status of the poor in 
America. That this discussion continues unabated suggests that these political and policy 
schisms will persist in thwarting efforts aimed at bringing indigent health care into a 
forum which adequately addresses the impact of economic inequities. 
The budgetary deficits and political conservatism which characterize the 1980's 
and early 1990's have brought a special focus onto the provision of health care among the 
nation's indigent. When coupled with the simultaneous rise in health care costs, this 
basic need has been placed out of the reach of millions of middle-income Americans. 
Meanwhile, the poor who remain dependent on state aid to deliver their medical needs 
come under heavy scrutiny. 
The scenario becomes further complicated by New Federalism embraced by 
Presidents Reagan and Bush. In a severe attempt to curb the domestic budget, Reagan 
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began an all out assault on the nation's poverty programs in 1981. Examinations of their 
budget proposals, policy statements and program implementation, indicated that state 
administered programs receiving federal funding would need to seek new budgetary 
sources or administrative reorientation to continue current levels of service delivery. This 
reprioritization took place under the Reagan Administration, while George Bush's 
ascension into the White House brought domestic policies which differed little from those 
of his predecessor. 
The emphasis on state and locally centered programs characteristic of New 
Federalism led to shrinking grants-in-aid to the states. This was based, among other 
things, in the rationale of restoring autonomy to the lower tiers of government. How 
financially strapped states were to continue the same levels of service is at the crux of this 
dilemma. Federal as well as state administrative guidelines aimed towards 
accommodating reduced budgets were the vehicles used to effect these fiscal realities. 
Statement of the Problem 
This study looks specifically at North Carolina to address those issues related to 
the delivery of health care to the indigent. Primary points that are considered center 
around the following : a) Federally financed programs which allow a practical analysis of 
the national budget regarding this aspect of social welfare; b) State administered 
programs that reveal the options and responses which characterize the state's behavior 
when faced with declining revenues and rising costs; and, c) programs which have a 
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disproportional impact on the poor. With this final point, the maintenance of the social 
welfare safety net as a valid political objective is open to scrutiny. 
This research has to do with the consideration of factors which might shed light 
on this important subject. The research question stated simply is: 
What impact did the Reagan and Bush administrations have on the Medicaid and Women 
Infants and Children's programs as each provided health care to North Carolina indigent 
populations? 
Definition of Concepts 
A number of definitions and justifications help to further clarify the intentions of 
this project. The selection of programs which bear heavy federal funding and state 
administration include two of the largest health care enactments, Medicaid and Women 
Infants and Children (WIC). Medicaid is that policy enacted in 1966 under Title XIX of 
the Social Security Act which provides medical services to low income persons. It is 
administered by the Department of Health and Human Services and correspondent state 
agencies. Funding arrangements follow a state and federal matching formula. WIC is 
administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and was authorized in 1966 in Title 
XVII of the Child Nutrition Act. Its funding falls largely in the federal realm, but states 
are expected to contribute to the program's administrative costs. WIC is a supplemental 
food program geared specifically to "serve as an adjunct to good health during critical 
times of growth and development...and to improve the health status of these persons".1 
1
 U.S. Code, vol. 7, sec. 246 (1971). 
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The provision of health care to the poor requires some explanation. The absence 
of legislative objectives in the authorizations of both programs leaves an uncomfortable 
void where program assessment is concerned. Technically, as long as Medicaid and WIC 
are operating, there may be little discussion as to how each is meeting the needs of their 
targeted populations. This void in standards is all the more problematic when political 
foes take office and seek to impose administrative permutations to loosely defined 
procedures. While it may be argued that legislative intent is clear, the scarcity of any 
minimums or even goals to be reached leaves these and poverty programs like them prey 
to the political whims of the day. 
By legislative definition these enactments authorize care to low-income persons. 
In the case of WIC and Medicaid the demonstration of poor health is not required of 
recipients2. Legislative designs are instead aimed towards reducing infant and maternal 
mortality rates by allowing them to fall more in line with the concepts promoted by 
preventative health care. Medicaid and WIC are clearly among the top federally funded 
health care programs.3 That indigence is a precondition for receiving benefits speaks to 
their attractiveness for examination in this study. 
The objectives of Medicaid and WIC passed in 1966, and in subsequent 
amendments, provide clear procedural criteria on which to base a state's performance. 
These criteria identify targeted populations as well as services to be rendered under each 
2 WIC applicants must submit to a hematocrit test though poor health is not a precondition for program 
enrollment. 
3George J. Gordon, Public Administration in America. 4th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 91. 
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program. If providing quality health care to all of the nation's poor is the objective, the 
likely case is that WIC and Medicaid never completely fulfill their purposes. An analysis 
of how well they performed during the period under study, though, should shed insights 
into how reductions in the federal social welfare budget and subsequent administrative 
rule changes effected the services offered by these policies. 
The years chosen for concentration, 1980-1992, cover the periods when both 
presidents spoke adamantly about reducing the national government's role in state and 
local affairs. In addition, Ronald Reagan's rhetoric and legislative agenda during the early 
1980's demonstrated his willingness and later Congress' capitulation to decreased 
spending for the nation's poor. 
The decision to base this study in North Carolina is twofold. The first has to do 
with the low per capita income among North Carolinians. The presence of a substantial 
indigent population brings special significance to any analysis of programs which have an 
economic bearing on the poor. Secondly, North Carolina's high infant mortality rate 
during the 1980's fueled questions regarding the state's own policy priorities to provide 
indigent health care. Finally, the researcher's interest and proximity to the data make 
North Carolina the likely choice. 
Significance of Study 
This study's validity seems more overdue than obvious. An aspect of the human 
condition as vital as the health of its citizens deserves a high priority in social science 
scholarship. That these programs service disproportionate numbers of women and 
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children of color draws a special attention to the vulnerability of these already "at risk" 
populations when program budgets and service are threatened. This scholarship also aims 
to provide a microcosm through which comparisons with other states are encouraged. 
Most important, however, is the opportunity to know how the federal health care policies 
of Reagan and Bush affected the poor in situations similar to those in North Carolina. 
Methodology 
The methods used to answer questions about North Carolina's programs were 
descriptive analysis of comparative data. To begin, an in-depth discussion of American 
social welfare was undertaken. This included a description of the national government's 
entry into poor relief as well as the alteration of the relationship between state and 
national governments to implement policy. Ideology plays heavily when constructing the 
balance between state and national governments, especially where poor relief is the issue. 
This project shows how the mode of federalism employed varies depending upon policy 
objectives, fiscal realities and the political climate. In this vein, Ronald Reagan's New 
Federalism is discussed at length. Those conservative ideologies and policy schemes, 
such as devolution, which played heavily into the shaping of presidential mandates were 
used to lay the conceptual frame necessary to study Medicaid and WIC. 
A brief narrative on the main features of each of the programs along with 
legislative intent and objectives provided the early focus of this exercise. Attention was 
next directed to the 1980-1992 federal implementation of these programs. Here policy 
statements, legislative initiatives, and congressional responses offered insights into the 
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federal agenda for both policies. The extent to which legislative mandates and objectives 
meshed with administrative policy offered early clues as to how states may have worked 
under fiscal strains similar to those experienced by federal administrators. 
This section continues with a discussion of federal food aid. Unlike the more 
traditional grant and service driven welfare efforts, food aid stands apart. Its' proponents 
are in many cases among the most conservative and it enjoys an administrative base in the 
Department of Agricultures, away from the mainstream poverty programs. These 
differences coupled with a centralized federalism model to make the Women Infant and 
Children's program unique enough to explain its fiscal survival - a survival that Medicaid 
was unable to attain. 
At this juncture a portrait of the relationship between morbidity, mortality and 
poverty in North Carolina underscores the need for comprehensive health care, especially 
among the state's indigent populations. Race and gender intersect as risk factors among 
poor North Carolinians to increase the likelihood of substandard health. Regions of the 
state where African Americans are concentrated were analyzed for a preponderance of 
poor health indicators. 
The study resumes by determining how North Carolina responded to the federal 
restructuring of Medicaid. The state comes into sharper focus here with a description of 
those factors which speak to the need for comprehensive medical care. These are 
specifically the medical conditions facing the poor in North Carolina. The actual delivery 
of health care to the state's indigent will do the most to unveil the effects of restrictive 
federal policy. 
8 
Following this is the inspection of the state's delivery of the WIC program. Unlike 
Medicaid, Women, Infants and Children has an administrative apparatus which is much 
less dependent on state discretion. Funding is federal and as such operates in a mode 
somewhat independent of state and local political and administrative officials. 
Comparing WIC's survival to that of the Medicaid program sheds light on the New 
Federalism treatment of the more centrally administered social welfare projects. 
The most obvious limitation of this study lies with the researchers ability to 
suggest anything more than a correlative existence between the phenomena being studied, 
the federal budget and North Carolina indigent health care. Even so, this demonstrates 
that policy initiatives by national officials guarantees some impact on state and local 
legislative and administrative behavior. Additionally, while every attempt was made to 
search and report any external factors which might have impacted health care, this study's 
aim was not geared towards the consideration of all factors which may have affected the 
status of health care in the United States or in North Carolina. State conditions 
uninfluenced by federal mandates and budgets include drug epidemics and economic 
recession. These are all areas which may have had serious impact on the poor in North 
Carolina but were treated peripherally, and were not the focus of this project. 
Review of the Literature 
A number of sources have emerged and been tapped as possible data collection 
options. Questions regarding the state of national health care priorities, including grants 
to the states, regulations, and health statistics were available in the federal government's 
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Health Care Finance Agency (HCFA) publications. Documents from Health and Human 
Services such as Health Statistics and Vital Health Statistics series were excellent 
sources for national, regional and state evaluations of specific programs. HCFA 
documents were also useful sources for data on budgetary allocations to the states. 
North Carolina's legislative record has proceedings and committee reports which 
were useful in documenting the General Assembly's activity where WIC and Medicaid 
were concerned. A number of documents in the state's Health Department gave 
guidelines for program implementation as well as options for local governments who 
administer public health. The state's Vital Statistics Department is a source which allows 
the scrutiny of North Carolina's Medicaid and WIC program to take place. It is here that 
all of the state's health statistics are stored. Looking at independent variables such as 
income, age, gender, and race, allowed conclusions to be drawn regarding the 
effectiveness of indigent health care delivered in the state during the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations. 
A lengthy review of the literature was beneficial in offering further clarity to this 
study. The literature review has been roughly divided into three sections. An 
examination of those works which relate primarily to the federal aspect of this domestic 
policy follows a review of books and articles describing Medicaid and the Women Infants 
and Children Program. The final third of the literature review looks more specifically at 
North Carolina policies as they relate to health care issues for the indigent. 
A number of works facilitated a better understanding of the Reagan social welfare 
plan. These included explanations of the former president's policy initiatives as well as 
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the ideology which informed those strategies. John L. Palmer and Isabel Sawhill edited 
The Reagan Record which offers a comprehensive view of Reagan's first term policy 
statements and legislative initiatives in a number of areas.4 This analysis includes 
budgetary requests, Congressional responses and the administrative discretion which led 
to the reformation of a number of policies affecting the nation's poor. 
Also of interest in the same volume was the section having to do with federalism. 
As its title suggests, "Federalism and the States: An Experiment in Decentralization", 
this chapter discusses Reagan's philosophical position on the subject of national-state 
relations. The author, George Peterson, the Public Finance Director of the Urban 
Institute, detailed how the president was able to enact the fiscal switch from the national 
government onto the state governments, particularly with respect to many domestic 
programs. Medicaid and WIC were just two of the programs mentioned in this section.5 
Similar insights were gleaned from the book The Social Contract Revisited: Aims 
and Outcomes of President Reagan's Social Welfare Policy where useful discussions are 
offered on administrative policies, welfare dependency, and budget cuts during Reagan's 
first term. Martin Anderson, then senior fellow at the Hoover Institute and former 
administrative assistant for Reagan's policy development office, gave a defense of the 
misconceptions associated with the aims of the administration on social policy.6 
4 John Palmer and Isabel Sawhill, eds., The Reagan Record (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing 
Company, 1984), 177-213. 
5 Ibid., 217-256. 
6 D. Lee Bawden, ed., The Social Contract Revisited: Aims and Outcomes of President Reagan's Social 
Welfare Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1984), 15-28. 
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By Reagan's second term in office several commentaries assessing his policies 
began to emerge. Consulting these publications gave the advantage of raising substantive 
questions on the effects of New Federalism on the nation's poor. In David Boaz's edited 
work, Assessing the Reagan Years. Kevin Hopkins rendered a scathing report on 
Reagan's inattention to the nation's "have-nots".7 Visions and Nightmares: America 
After Reagan as well, has a short section which services the purposes of this paper. Here 
the author, Robert Lekachman, gives an overall review of America's health care and 
welfare systems during the 1980’s. Interestingly, Lekachman places his observations in 
an historical context to offer a unique comparison between Reagan doctrine and 
ideological views posited during the early 1900's.8 
An interesting analysis by Sheldon Danziger and Daniel Feaster on "Income 
Transfers and Poverty in the 1980's" demonstrated regional poverty in the U.S. as well as 
Reagan's response to income transfers.9 This contribution is laden with statistics and 
predicts the increase in the poverty rates for women, African Americans and Southerners 
well into the next decade. 
Critical analysis of national data continued, though this time, with emphasis on 
ways that Reagan's design impacted health care. Sources for this type of appraisal include 
The Center for Popular Economics publication, Economic Report of the People. In it a 
7 David Boaz, ed., Reassessing the Reagan Years (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1988), 211-223. 
8Robert Leckachman, Visions and Nightmares: America After Reagan (New York: Macmillian 
Publishing Company, 1987). 
9 John M. Quigley and Daniel Rubinfeld, eds., American Domestic Priorities: An Economic Appraisal 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 89-114. 
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number of issues addressing the economic state of the American people are covered. This 
work is good at juxtaposing presidential policy with the economic realities of the 
majority. Of particular interest was the chapter, "Winners and Losers". Here a frame of 
analysis was provided to view the validity of the current health care system.10 This work 
is joined with Retreat From Safety: Reagan's Attack on America's Health. Joan 
Claybrook, this book's author, carries the discussion begun in the Economic Report of the 
People a step further as it predicts the impact of the poverty program allocations on the 
health of the indigent.11 
Of equal value were a number of journal articles which present similar 
opportunities to study and assess the federal treatment of Medicaid and WIC. Geraldine 
Dallek author of "Frozen Ice: Health Policy During Reagan Years" is published in an 
invaluable journal source, Health/P AC Bulletin.12 The Joint Center For Political Studies 
published "A Prescription For Better Health Care". In it there are clear mandates for 
spending reform as well as the costs of restrictive eligibility requirements. l3Both articles 
take a generalized view of America's disregard for the health of the poor. 
To see the link between Medicaid eligibility and Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) an article published by the Social Security Bulletin was most 
l0Center for Popular Economics, Economic Report of the People 
(Boston: South End Press), 21-93. 
uJoan Clavbrook. Retreat From Safety: Reagan's Attack on America's Health fNew York: Public 
Citizen, Inc., 1984). 
l2Geraldine Dallek, "Frozen Ice: Federal Health Care Policy During the Reagan Years," Health/PAC 
Bulletin (June 1988). 
13 Curtis Patton, "A Prescription for Better Health Care," Focus 15 (Feb. 1987): 3-4. 
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appropriate.14 Understanding the connection between social welfare agencies is a crucial 
aspect in assessing changes in program delivery to targeted populations. Implications 
involved with WIC eligibility are also considered in this work. 
Two articles published in the Journal of Public Health Policy allow a dual 
approach to understanding indigent health care during the Reagan years. One focus 
suggested by "How Reagan Administered Health Policy" is couched in the discussion of 
federal-state relationships.15 Here Morial argues that Reagan's philosophy of New 
Federalism is the sole explanation of why health policy unfolded as it did. The second 
consideration is found in "Selected Myths Guiding the Reagan Administration Health 
Policy". Here the author demonstrates how the administration based policy on false 
information.16 This to a large extent explains why the programs' objectives where 
indigent health care is concerned draws such heavy criticism. 
A sampling of articles on the fiscal aspects of health care was obtained from a 
summative report on the expenditures in public health through the 1980's. One such 
source is Ross Arnett's article, "National Health Expenditures".17 A complementary 
perspective was found in "Medicaid Eligibility, Benefits and Provider Payments: State 
14 Henrietta J. Duvall, "Utilization of Medicaid Services by AFDC," Social Security Bulletin 46 (June 
1983): 16-18. 
15 Ernest N. Morial, "New Federalism: How Reagan Administered Health Programs," Journal of Public 
Health Policy 4 (May 1983): 259-67. 
16 Vincente Navarro, "Selected Myths Guiding the Reagan Administration Health Policy," Journal of 
Public Health Policy 5 (Mar. 1984): 65-73. 
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ROSS Arnett, "National Health Expenditures," Health Care Financing Review 11 (Summer 1990): 1-41. 
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Preferences and Implications for National Goals". Thomas Reutzel in this 1989 
publication suggests options for consideration by the Bush administration.18 
George Bush's administration had comparatively little written on social welfare. 
Only a few publications provide insights into the Bush plan. One of these is "Saving the 
Welfare State: Reagan Railed Against Federal Involvement".19 Reading this article leads 
to an understanding of why the Bush Administration continued along much the same 
route as had Reagan on Medicaid and WIC implementation. 
As the literature review continues, a number of works describing the Medicaid 
and Women Infants and Children programs were utilized. Besides the initial search of the 
United States Code to uncover the precise legislative language and mandates used to 
convey program objectives, other sources became useful commentaries on each of these 
public policies. Legal Aspects of Health Care Reimbursement is one such example. This 
book gave detailed descriptions of each component of Medicaid policy as well as an 
update on specific legislative and fiscal requirements placed on the Medicaid program.20 
This work was invaluable in uncovering the current state of Medicaid legislation and 
objectives. 
l8Thomas Reutzel, "Medicaid Eligibility, Benefits and Provider Payments: State Preferences and 
Implications for National Goals," Health Policy 11 (June 1989): 209-26. 
19Julie Kosterlitz and W. John Moore, "Saving the Welfare State: Reagan Railed Against Federal 
Involvement," National Journal 20 (14 May 1988): 1276-8+. 
20Robert Buchannan and James D. Minor, Legal Aspects of Health Care Reimbursement (Maryland: 
Aspen Publishers, 1985). 
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In Medical Care. Medical Coverage. Fein places the Medicaid discussion within 
the moral/legal frame of equal protection.21 Given state and regional discrepancies, and 
funding formula options open to the states, the even distribution of adequate medical care 
for low income persons becomes shrouded in doubt. 
Medicaid in the Reagan Era is an Urban Institute publication which places the 
discussion of the 1980's Medicaid budget in a comparative context. Here is revealed the 
program status prior to the 1981 budget.22 
The Health Insurance Association of America in its annual publication Source 
Book of Health Insurance Data focuses on private health insurance. It does provide the 
latest available data on all forms of medical insurance in the country.23 Of concern to this 
study are those sections which give attention to the numbers of Medicaid recipients as 
well as the dollar benefits paid into this program. These figures are farther subdivided 
according to states. 
To see how the states adjusted to federal policy enactments two sources were 
useful. The first, Medicaid and Other Experiments in State Health Policy describes how 
Massachusetts moved to reform its Medicaid administration.24 The benefit in this work 
comes from understanding the bind that many states find themselves in when they tried to 
2lRashi Fein, Medical Care. Medical Coverage (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
22Randall R. Bovbjerg and John Holahan, Medicaid in the Reagan Era: Federal Policy and State Choices 
(Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1982). 
23 Health Insurance Association of America, Source Book of Health Insurance Data (New York: Health 
Insurance Institute, selected years). 
24Rosemary Kern and Susan R. Windham, Medicaid and Other State Experiments in Health Policy 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1986). 
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administer Medicaid. Massachusetts is a microcosm which suggests areas of flexibility 
available to a state which chooses to spearhead this type of reform. The costs, both 
political and fiscal, suggests why more states do not choose the reform option. The other 
work Evaluating State Medicaid Reforms is good in its provision of some basic tenets to 
be considered when looking at state Medicaid systems.25 Again, the reader is given a 
sense of the parameters set up by the national government for states to abide by as they 
administer programs. 
The good health of a state's citizens is often reflective of the willingness and 
ability of its political apparatus to initiate sound health care policies. Much is written on 
those factors which characterize state political culture. Topics ranging from federalism to 
state and local politics give serious consideration to both internal and external variables 
which ultimately decide how each state arrives at policy. 
Daniel Elazar is especially noteworthy as he creates three sets of characteristics 
which describe American states and then attempts to locate each state with one or more of 
these features. The three descriptions of American political culture are: moralistic, 
traditional, individualistic,26 Elazar categorizes states as each meets any one or 
combination of the characteristics assigned to a descriptor. North Carolina, in his 
scholarship, received a moralistic/traditionalistic designation. This interpretation depicts 
a state whose traditional culture works to maintain its older elite structures while its 
25Pamela L. Haynes, Evaluating State Medicaid Reforms (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985). 
26 Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View From the States. 3rd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 
1984), 135. 
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moralistic tendencies accepts the political and social reform necessary to keep those at the 
bottom rung out of absolute destitution. Elazar's placement of North Carolina in this way 
considers the state's history and location in the American southeast. 
Elazar is mentioned at this juncture of the project as a reference for an appraisal of 
North Carolina's political culture. His analysis offers a loose frame through which to 
view particulars about the state's position on social welfare issues. However, testing his 
or any other writers theories on North Carolina's political culture is not the aim of this 
research. 
A more in-depth discussion of North Carolina was obtained from Tar Heel 
Politics: Myths and Realities by Paul Luebke. Luebke accepts some of the premises set 
forth by Elazar but points out inherent contradictions the state faces when maintaining the 
status quo disrupts the social welfare function. Luebke argues: "It assumes that social 
ills are 'natural' phenomena reflecting people's inability to achieve; government ought not 
to disrupt that social order".27 
Unlike education issues which most state politicians acknowledge, health care is 
more "easily ignored and placed beyond the purview of government".28 North Carolina, 
however, demonstrates clear traditionalistic tendencies. For example, the state's university 
system draws heavily from the elite population and is among the nation's top funded 
27 Paul Luebke Tar Heel Politics: Mvths and Realities (Chapel Hill: University of Chapel Hill Press, 
1990), 188. 
28 Ibid., 189. 
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systems while the primary and secondary schools which services the state's average 
citizens has one of the nation's lowest expenditure bases. 
Luebke's contribution to the study of the state's political institutions and processes 
is a characterization he terms "modernizer". This, he contends, is a system motivated 
largely by economic growth. In this way the state is allowed to consider some of the 
more controversial state and local social issues such as civil rights. State elites, he 
argues, compromise in these areas to avoid the association with being hostile or 
backward. 
Articles examining Medicaid policy are equally revealing. The American Public 
Welfare Association published an early assessment of the Reagan budget with the aim of 
revealing federal and state barriers to the efficient administration of the Medicaid 
program.29 
The notion of states operating somewhat autonomously in the scenario of health 
care delivery is explored in "Effectiveness of State Mandates to Maintain Local 
Government Health Services for the Poor".30 This coupled with the special issue in the 
Journal of Health. Politics. Policy and Law on health policy for the disadvantaged gives 
an updated examination of the condition of indigent health care in the U.S.31 
29 "Federal Regulations as Barriers to a More Efficient Medicaid Program," American Public Welfare 
Association (8 May 1981): iv+. 
’“Richard E. Brown and Michael R.Cousineau, "Effectiveness of State Mandates to Maintain Local 
Government Health Services for the Poor," Journal of Public Health Policy 9 (Summer 1984): 223-36. 
’’"Special Issue on Health Policy and the Disadvantaged," Journal of Health. Politics. Policy and Law 15 
(Summer 1990): 259-69+. 
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With few exceptions the literature on North Carolina Medicaid and WIC come 
almost entirely from State Government documents. Two articles which take exception 
are "Infant Mortality in North Carolina"32 and "One State Curbs Costs of Medicaid, but 
Not Without Pain All Around".33 Both focus on state health care, fiscal costs and the 
human costs of inadequate health policy. 
The exposure of North Carolina as a leader in infant mortality throughout the 
eighties spurred a response from the state legislature and executive branches to study and 
make recommendations towards alleviating this condition. "Recommendations of the 
Infant Mortality Task Force" is one such report completed in 1988.34 Its findings confirm 
the importance of prenatal care and nutrition in raising the low birth weights often linked 
with infant mortality. The Women Infants and Children program is cited throughout this 
study as being critical in the formulations of comprehensive prenatal care. 
A plethora of congressional hearings have proven adequate sources for 
information on virtually every aspect of this research. Though too numerous to cite, a 
few examples demonstrate the utility of these sources. A U.S. House Committee report 
on Children's Health Issues was especially useful in assessing the impact and importance 
of the WIC program.35 The House Select Committee on Aging's report, "An Assault on 
32Richard R. Nugent, "Infant Mortality in North Carolina," Popular Government 54 (Summer 1988): 9- 
14. 
33Linda Demkovich, "One State Curbs Costs of Medicaid, But Not Without Pain All Around," National 
Journal 15 (17 Sept. 1983): 888-92. 
34 Recommendations of the Infant Mortality Task Force by Robert G. Dillard, M.D., chairman (Raleigh: 
North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Nov. 1988). 
35 House Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families, Continuing Jeopardy: Children and AIDS: 
A Staff Report. 100th Cong., 2d sess., Sept. 1988. 
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Medicare and Medicaid in the 1980's: The Legacy of an Administration"36 is another 
example of the types of works available through Congressional hearings and reports. 
A study conducted by the University of North Carolina in 1976 on the 
Supplemental Food program for Women Infants and Children offers a glance at the pre- 
1980 condition and priority given WIC by state administrators.37 
A preliminary dissertation review was a valuable aspect of this review of the 
literature. With this a much clearer picture of what work has been conducted in this area 
to date was obtained. While a number of scholars have examined the impact of social 
welfare policies on selected populations, research has not examined the 
intergovernmental workings of social welfare health policy. 
Finally, much was attained from reviewing works which offered a race/gender 
analysis of poverty. These contributions to the discipline are essential in that they 
describe the place of race, gender and class in both the administration of public policy as 
well as in the delivery of services. Most important, however, are the explanations offered 
on the social construction of images of African American women. A historical 
investigation combines with race and gender stereotypes to facilitate an understanding of 
the disdain which accompanies policy aimed toward these women. 
36 House, Select Committee on Aging, An Assault on Medicare and Medicaid in the 1980's: The Legacy 
of an Administration. 100th Cong., 2d sess., Oct. 1988. 
37 J.C. Edozien, B.R. Switzer and R.B. Bryan, "Medical Evaluations of the Supplemental Food Programs 
for Women, Infants and Children (WIC)," (Chapel Hill: Department of Nutrition, University of North 
Carolina, July 1976). 
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Chief among these are Disfigured Images: The Historical Assault on African 
American Women by Patricia Morton38. Slipping Through the Cracks: The Status of 
Black Women39 edited by Margaret C. Simms and Julianne M. Malveaux describes the 
ineffectiveness of a number of policies which serve Black women. Patricia Hill Collins in 
Black Feminist Thought40 is a defining work which differentiates between mainstream 
feminism and that which might better serve Black women. 
The literature and resources utilized allowed a logical, well-structured project to 
ensue. To this end, the outline of this project is as follows: 
Introduction 
I. Social Welfare within the Context of American Federalism 
A. States and Poor Relief 
B. American Federalism 
1. Centralized and Cooperative Federalism 
2. New Federalism 
C. 1980's Assault on Social Welfare 
II. The Federalization of Poverty 
A. Medicaid, Program Description 
B. Administrative Proposal and Legislative Responses 
C. WIC, Program Description 
D. History of Federal Food Aid 
E. WIC Successes 
38 Patricia Morton, Disfigured Images: The Historical Assault on African American Women (New York: 
Praeger, 1991). 
39Margaret C. Simms and Julianne M. Malveaux, eds., Slipping Through the Cracks: The Status of 
Black Women (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989). 
40 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge. Consciousness and the Politics of 
Empowerment. Perspectives on Gender, vol. 2 (New York: Routledge, 1990). 
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III. Mortality and Morbidity in North Carolina, 1980-1992 
A. State Demographics 
B. Role of Race and Class on Mortality and Morbidity 
C. Data Disaggregated by Region 
IV. North Carolina Medicaid, 1980-1992 




E. Provider Payments 
V. Women, Infants and Children 
A. North Carolina Nutrition Policy 
B. WIC Funding 
C. Program Participation 
D. WIC and Medicaid Coordinated 
VII. Summary and Conclusions 
CHAPTER 2 
SOCIAL WELFARE AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM 
Programs serving low-income Americans have consistently been the 
object of president Reagan's budget ax, suffering disproportionate share of 
proposed spending reductions. Although expenditures for all social 
welfare programs were trimmed by an average of 7 percent during the first 
three years of the Reagan administration, those targeted to the 
disadvantaged have been slashed far more deeply: cutbacks totaled 28 
percent in child nutrition programs, 13 percent in welfare and food stamps, 
17 percent in compensatory education and 60 percent in employment and 
training programs.... The Congressional Budget Offices estimate that the 
Reagan administration's spending cuts will take more than $20 billion 
away from households with annual incomes below $10,000 between 1982 
and 1985.1 
Social Welfare in Historical Perspective 
This assault on the poor is not new to the American political landscape. Ronald 
Reagan only articulated through policy initiatives the deep seated resentment many 
Americans havé toward the dole. Attitudes which promoted the 1980's social welfare 
drama are traceable to the American colonial period. Its most basic assumptions insist 
upon placing the poor into deserving and undeserving categories. They represent the 
1 Sar A. Levitan and Clifford M. Johnson, Beyond the Safety Net: Reviving the Promise of 
Opportunity in America (Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984), 152. 
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attempt to classify poor people by merit2. In any classification though, all types of poor 
people place below the rich. 
In its broadest application, the welfare state has been a feature of the United 
States economic structure since its beginning. While the concept of social welfare 
conjures images of assistance to the poor, in many ways it has been the economic elites 
who were the true benefactors of American welfare state. Competition for limited 
resources led way to economic, social, and political stratification based not so much on 
need, but rather on ones' standing in the community. Writers such as Charles Beard in An 
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution3 agree that the primary beneficiaries of the 
preferential and often subsidized treatment of government economic policies were and 
remain the wealthy. 
The rationale which justifies the hierarchy in welfare based on criteria which 
excludes need is bound to the most basic tenets of capitalist thought. There is inherent 
the notion that personal merit is measured in the accumulation of wealth. Given this, the 
society does well to protect its most favored citizens. In this view, those without are seen 
much like raw material - there strictly to benefit those who control wealth in the society. 
Writings associated with the Protestant work ethic articulate the foundation for policies 
which reward the rich and punish the poor. 
2 Michael B.Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 9. 
3 Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New 
York: Macmillan, 1935). 
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English Poor Laws are the philosophical foundations of American social welfare. 
These laws saw their manifestation in institutions ranging from the pauper and vagrancy 
statutes to the debtors prisons present at state and local levels4. Underlying these policies 
were negative personal characteristics assigned to those without adequate means of 
support. That ones' poverty was most likely related to some class related personality 
defect dominated public thinking. 
As American society transformed from rural to urban geography, strains were 
placed on the municipal governments. Mass European immigration coupled with 
migration of African-Americans into the cities created a population newly dependent on 
government for amenities once produced by small towns and farms. This was a time 
which also established the view seen today that is often associated with public welfare. 
Aid was not necessarily aimed at alleviating poverty, but rather at the transformation of 
those personal flaws which, it was believed, caused and perpetuated ones'poverty5. The 
economic, social, and political realities which played significantly in the scenario which 
determines position in the economic pecking order were seldom acknowledged. 
Poor relief enjoyed a brief hiatus from its purely punitive applications during two 
periods of the nation's history. The Great Depression and the Civil Rights era mark 
periods when public rhetoric about social welfare became almost humane. More 
importantly, however, was that the 1930s and 1960s marked the expansion of American 
4 For a discussion of early American social welfare policies see Edith Abbott. Public Assistance: 
American Principles and Policies fNew York: Russell and Russell, 1966). 
5 Walter I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America 
(New York: The Free Press, 1984), 98. 
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social welfare. The economic catastrophe which allowed for the creation of the New 
Deal policies were repeated during the Civil Rights Movement. In both cases social 
welfare policies were either created or enlarged by the national government. 
This federalization of welfare links with, in the case of the New Deal, mass 
unemployment and three decades later, the prospect of civil disorder6. In both periods, 
states were either unable or unwilling to expand social welfare to meet the needs of their 
local populations. 
The political culture of a state plays significantly in determining how granting aid 
will be calculated. That political exclusion often links with economic exclusion helps to 
explain the dilemma faced by the poor at the hands of state and local welfare agents. 
Explains Leckachman: 
Many federal programs responded to patterns of state and local discrimination. 
Grants to states and localities targeted specific groups - the poor, women, 
children, handicapped and the structurally unemployed. The extent to which these 
programs reflected national priority often suggested the likelihood of its1 being left 
in tact.7 
A political scenario which demands federal intervention into social welfare 
practices, a function heretofore assumed solely by state and local authorities, is basic to 
any discussion on social welfare policy. Under the two periods of expanded social 
welfare the federal government took the initiative in ways which benefitted the poor. 
There was an equally aggressive federal role under Ronald Reagan and George Bush. 
6 Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Regulating the PoorfNew York: Pantheon Books, 
7 Leckachman, 81. 
1971). 
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This time though, the federal aim was to constrict social welfare spending. Removing 
rather than granting money leaves much of the impetus for poverty program funding at 
the state level. With this it becomes possible to observe how political priorities line up in 
specific states. Questions arise as to how or if states with less money will care for their 
poor citizens. These considerations are crucial to understanding the symbiotic 
relationship which exists between national and state government policies in the operation 
of poor relief. 
Federalism 
Implicit in any study of federalism is the distinction between the roles occupied by 
each level of government. Dual federalism assumes a nearly equal partnership by state 
and national political actors. Generally speaking, each level operates in exclusivity. 
Much of early U.S. history was characterized by dual federalism. Early social welfare 
policy illustrates the separation of functions in that states and localities were entirely 
responsible for indigent care. 
In contrast, centralized or creative federalism allows all levels of government to 
operate, often simultaneously, in the same arena. In this case the national government 
seeks to impose its will over local policy. The grant-in-aid made this possible as states 
and localities received substantial monetary incentives to carry out specific federal 
initiatives. The two periods of social welfare expansion, mentioned earlier, demonstrate 
how the grant-in-aid fostered centralized federalism. 
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Lyndon Johnson was quite adept at using grants to impose his Great Society 
programs on the states and localities. A feature of centralized federalism practiced 
effectively by Johnson administrators was to bypass state and local policy makers and 
deliver funds directly to program heads. This type of relationship had the effect of 
increasing the number of grant programs from 160 to 498 between 1962 and 1978. Grant 
spending similarly increased from $7 billion in 1960 to $85 billion in 1978s. Using 
money as political leverage played well for national politicians anxious to impose an 
agenda on state and local governments. 
New federalism, as the name suggests, is the latest type of state and national 
relationship. Richard Nixon is given credit for introducing the concept but it was Ronald 
Reagan who really popularized the principles associated with new federalism. It is in 
many ways not a "new" concept at all but rather a revisitation of dual federalism. Richard 
Nixon, frustrated over the expansion of domestic programs under the Johnson 
administration promised to return authority to state and local leaders. His appeal to a 
conservative electorate, whom he dubbed "the silent majority", offered hope to 
Republicans that the political realignment he would effect would return the country to its' 
pre-Civil Rights state. 
Local political elites, angry with being cut out of decision making, attacked 
Johnson's War on Poverty programs as unsound, wasteful and questionable as its clientele 
consisted of poor people traditionally left out of the American political dialogue. Nixon's 
initial popularity allowed the Republican party to begin serious discussions about how the 
g 
Marilyn Gittell, State Politics and the New Federalism (New York: Longman Inc., 1986), 11. 
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budget priorities might be redirected away from the poverty programs which appeared to 
have dominated the 1960's. Nixon's political foibles, however, left his party and the fate 
of new federalism in question as he descended from the White House under the cloud of 
Watergate. 
What ensued was a Democratic president, Jimmy Carter, unable to move domestic 
agenda back into the prominent place that it had enjoyed under Lyndon Johnson's 
presidency. Carter proposed an expansion of welfare spending, national health insurance, 
public service employment, and low income assistance. While Congress did accept some 
of the Carter proposals, the desired effect which the administration hoped for was 
severely diminished. Carter's inability to instill confidence in the Congress for his 
proposal is well documented even though his reforms were hardly a departure from the 
dominant ideas about the poor in America. 
One year into the presidency Carter declared the welfare system a failure and 
promised to reveal a replacement system more effective in addressing the problem. His 
proposal, "Better Jobs and Income Program" (B.J.I.P.), sought to abolish the existing 
welfare program and to replace it with a two-tier system - jobs for those who could work 
and income maintenance for those who could not. The program was to cost the nation 
$2.8 billion dollars more than the current system, but would bring at least $2 billion 
dollars to state and local governments in the first year alone.9 
A plethora of factors have been advanced to explain Congress' rejection of the 
Carter plan. Conservatives found its public jobs creation aspect distasteful out of fear of 
9 Trattner, 328. 
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competition with the private sector. Liberals thought the employment requirements 
seemed too much like "workfare". This fed their nonsupport10. 
The "stagflation" which characterized the late 1970's also played significantly in 
any program initiatives which called for an expansive role by government. Finally, 
Carter's reticence to unite his party had a direct impact on his ability to move forward on 
major policy objectives. William Trattner made the following observation about the 
Carter presidency: 
...Yet he was aware of the conservative popular mood and he shared one of the 
major themes of public discourse during the 1979 bicentennial celebration-the 
idea that the nation had to accept a sense of limits to its power, its resources and 
its potential for economic growth. Carter proceeded therefore, with fiscal 
restraint prompting one writer to call him 'the most conservative Democrat since 
Grover Cleveland1.11 
New Federalism's Reconstruction of Social Welfare 
By 1980, when Ronald Reagan took office the electorate was ripe for a return to 
those concepts embraced in the new federalism articulated by Nixon. The popular 
mandate enjoyed by this president bolstered his willingness to declare an end to poverty 
in America. His ability to capitalize on the nation's cynicism with the poor supported his 
goal to effect a $75 billion reduction in federal spending for social programs by F Y 
1985.12 
10
 Ibid., 329. 
11 Ibid., 326. 
12 Palmer and Sawhill, 187. 
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Ronald Reagan philosophically rejected the assumptions made by the Great 
Society Programs. He dismantled all which supports a liberalizing view of the federal 
role in social responsibility. His stance assumed instead that the church, family and 
neighborhoods would handle social problems. The national governments role lay 
naturally in the maintenance of a strong defense to repel any external threat.13 
Speech which aimed at raising public suspicion on the honesty of people on 
welfare was an often used tactic.14 While Reagan vocalized these themes, he can only be 
given credit for reviving feelings already shared by many Americans. The popular stance 
replayed by Ronald Reagan was first pronounced by Franklin Roosevelt who said: "The 
federal government must and shall quit this business of relief. ...To dole out relief is to 
administer a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit." Whether concerns with the 
"human spirit" took precedence over budgetary considerations and the conservative 
abhorrence to relief giving guided policy is not certain.15 
A 1981 address to the nation on Economic Recovery sought to justify his request 
for close to $27 billion in cuts in public welfare. Ronald Reagan stated "...Benefits for 
the needy will be protected by the black market in food stamps, the abuse and fraud in 
Medicaid beneficiaries and providers cannot be tolerated..."16 In his 1982 State of the 
Union Address the president emphasized that "...available resources are going not to the 
13 Ibid., 2. 
14 Leckachman, 95. 
15 Palmer and Sawhill, 189. 
16 U.S. Presidents Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan. 
(Washington, D.C.: Federal Register. National Archives and Records Service, 1988-89), 833. 
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needy but to the greedy." He cited in the same message his intent to see over $63 billion 
saved in social programs over the next several years. The 1982 address also voiced 
concern about what he termed the "jungle" of federal categorical grants for social services 
and education. These he characterized as wasteful and inefficient and proposed to return 
$47 billion to the federal treasury from grants to state and local governments.17 
That the poors' political vulnerability is matched only by its economic 
vulnerability did not go unnoticed by conservatives eager to advance their cause. The 
1981 budget reductions featured $36 billion squeezed out of low-income Americans.18 
The people blamed for the failures of the social welfare programs were the recipients and 
to a lesser extent those who administered their programs. Reagan couched his anti¬ 
poverty rhetoric in a frame which offered protection for those "truly needy" by focusing 
on what he termed mismanagement, mistargeting, inefficiency and fraud.19 
Reagan was strident in his emphasis that a stronger economy, not public 
assistance, was the major factor in the reduction of poverty. While the nation's poor 
economic performance speaks at least partially to the validity of the role of strong 
economy in a capitalist system, there is compelling evidence which supports the 
important role of transfer programs in moving people out of poverty. For example, in 
1965 three types of programs removed significant numbers of people out of poverty. The 
17 Palmer and Sawhill, 177. 
18 Leckachman, 88. 
19 Martha Burt and Karen Pittman, Testing the Social Safety Net: The Impact of Changes in 
Support Programs During the Reagan Administration (Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1985), 2. 
social insurance programs20 like Unemployment Insurance; the in-kind programs, such as 
Food Stamps and Medicaid; and, the means tested programs like Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) allowed 23.5%, 16.4% and 3.3% respectively, out of 
indigence. By 1976 the effectiveness of these programs had increased by two-thirds.21 
It should be noted that the effectiveness of each category of program in its goal of 
raising living standards of its clientele relates directly to the political efficacy of those it 
serves. In this way programs take on a status of being classified as either upper or lower 
tier. Those occupying the upper tier generally address the interests of middle and 
working class Americans.22 Unemployment insurance, Medicare and the veterans 
benefits are examples of upper tier programs. For the most part these programs serve 
politically active electorates who threaten repercussions for inattention to their concerns. 
In contrast, are the social programs which occupy the lower tier. Food Stamps, Medicaid, 
and AFDC take their places here. While the scope of these means tested programs is 
significant, their constituents are among the most politically vulnerable in the country. 
Class and race are often the defining elements among their recipients and typically their 
ability to punish or reward politicians has, for a number of reasons, been limited. The 
Medicare and AFDC programs demonstrate this point in that only 8% of those served by 
20 Social insurance programs are available to every one who falls temporarily upon difficult times 
while public assistance has as its main objective the alleviation of poverty. For a discussion of the 
distinctions between social programs see Richard E. Wagner, To Promote the General Welfare (San 
Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1989), 9. 
21 Palmer and Sawhill, 116. 
22 Palmer and Sawhill, 189-192. 
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the upper tier program, Medicare are African American, while the AFDC program 
recipient base is almost half African American.23 
Beyond this are the realities associated with the welfare state in a capitalist 
economy. In Capitalism and the Welfare State. Gilbert offers perspectives which help to 
explain the 1980's political opposition to public assistance: 
...One view suggests the structural properties of a capitalist society place a stem 
limit on the extent to which income can be taxed for public expenditures on 
social welfare; it is held that beyond this unspecified, but meager limit, the growth 
of social welfare retard hospital investments in productive economic activities.24 
Described above is the essence of Reagan's supply side construction. At its heart 
were tactics geared towards bolstering what it considers the most productive sector of 
society - the top earners. Economist Sar Levitan explains, "President Reagan has ignored 
sound lessons by advancing a new agenda, one designed to enhance profits and prospects 
for the affluent while leaving the less fortunate to their own devices."25 
Supply siders anticipated that the safety net would shrink as a revived economy 
and the administrative "workfare" proposal came into fruition. The reality, however, was 
the explosion of the numbers of people needing public assistance and the inconsistent 
implementation of paltry workfare programs. 
Additionally, the administration took aim at the "overlapping" benefits going to 
the poor. Food Stamps, school lunch and Medicaid were targeted for mismanagement 
23 
Leckachman, 105. 
24 Neil Gilbert, Indigence. Capitalism and the Welfare State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1983), 148. 
25 Levitan and Johnson, 150. 
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and fraud. Categorical grants it was furthered argued, eroded state and local autonomy, a 
cornerstone in new federalism thinking. The President's strategy included: 1) tax cuts 
and defense build up; 2) reducing inflation; 3) cuts in grants-in-aid to states and 
localities for their programs serving the poor; 4) tax cuts designed to achieve growth not 
equity; and, 5) deregulation.26 
Personnel selections to make the changes consistent with administrative agenda 
interrupted many of the bureaucratic practices theretofore conducted. The Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) took charge with a top-down approach to policy 
proposal and implementation. Martin Anderson, assistant to Reagan for Policy 
Development during 1981 and 1982 described the White House purpose with respect to 
social welfare as follows: 
...The objective is not to eliminate programs. The objective is not to dump 
programs on the states and localities, forcing them to raise taxes to whatever 
extent they can in order to continue programs. The objective is to improve the 
operation of those social welfare programs, and to reduce their costs by returning 
responsibility and resources to a level of government more appropriate for these 
programs.27 
While the shift in authority to operate social welfare on state and local levels may 
have been welcomed by Reagan supporters, the means to effect such operations were, for 
most states, simply not available. Federal law created social welfare and as such these 
programs took the status of entitlements. Delivery of service is mandatory as was tested 
in a number of court cases where local and state officials attempted to deny various 
26 Palmer and Sawhill, 3-4. 
27 Martin Anderson, "Objectives of the Reagan Administrations Social Welfare Policy" in The 
Social Contract Revisited. Bawden, 25. 
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benefits to citizens who qualified for aid. Fiscal obstacles and court mandates combined 
with a variety of factors specific to each state in a way which promised to undermine the 
decentralization sought by the Reagan administration. 
Moreover, the recession in the early 1980's exacerbated for the poor the economic 
upheaval felt by the entire nation. Demands for aid soared throughout the decade. Robert 
Greenstein, then Director of the Budget and Policy Priorities in Washington D.C., blamed 
the increasing poverty rate on: 
~ economic troubles 
~ failure of AFDC benefits to keep pace with inflation 
~ the increasing feminization of poverty 
~ federal budget cuts in social programs28 
Characteristic of most lower tier programs is the disproportionate negative affect 
budget cuts have on specific populations. African Americans and women weigh heavily 
in this equation. The 1980 Census counted African-Americans as 12% of the population 
but over half of all AFDC recipients and nearly one-third of all Medicaid clients. 
African-American female headed households were even more vulnerable given the 
dominant place of children on the dole. Profiles of America's indigent guaranteed that the 
cuts proposed and implemented during Ronald Reagan's tenure in office would have an 
intense effect on poor, Black, and female citizens. 
28 Lawrence D. Maloney, "Is Welfare in America a Flop?" The Welfare Debate: The Reference 
Shelf 61:5 ed. Robert Emmet Long (New York: H.H. Wilson Co. 1989), 17. 
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The elderly were another group threatened by the 1980's restrictions on social 
spending. James Storey offers this commentary on the White House position of older 
Americans: 
... While the administration hoped that economic growth would benefit everyone, 
and a pledge was made to preserve the 'social1 safety net it did not have a social 
agenda that addressed specifically the issues of particular concern to the elderly.29 
The poor among the elderly faced even harder times. Approximately 25% of all 
Medicaid recipients are elderly but program expenditures for that population are close to 
75%30. As noted earlier, the safety net operates least effectively along the lower tier. 
Making matters worse was the successful urging of the president in 1981 to phase 
out the Health Service Corps. This program placed health care professionals in 
underserved areas in exchange for federally subsidized medical school tuition. By 1988 
forty scholarships were awarded compared with over 4300 in 1980. None were granted 
after 1988. It was projected that the primary health care provider shortage is affecting 
close to 13 million Americans.31 
To understand how the Republican administrations of the 1980's and early 90’s 
accomplished their domestic agenda points to a number of strategies. Besides his vow to 
curb the size and influence of the federal establishment and to effect drastic changes in 
welfare, he was successful in pairing subsidies for people able to work and tightening 
29 James Storey, Older Americans in the Reagan Era: Impacts of Federal Policy Changes 
(Washington D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1983), 22. 
30 Ibid., 17. 
31 Dana Hughes, Health of America's Children: Maternal and Child Data Book (Washington, 
D.C.: Children's Defense Fund, 1989), 76. 
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eligibility rules and benefit formulas for welfare programs in ways which affected those 
working just above the poverty level.32 
Compared with Jimmy Carter's 41%, Ronald Reagan in 1980 sailed into office 
with a 50.7% mandate. The only resistance to overcome was that found in the 
Democratic House of Representatives. The Republican controlled Senate provided a 
source of support. Reagan's legislative agenda in the early years of his administration - 
including his efforts to decentralize government- were aided immeasurably by this 
political dynamic.33 
"The war on poverty has been won", declared Martin Anderson. Writer Nick 
Kotz theorized, "Their approach was to make government assistance so scarce and 
unattractive - low benefits and unpaid labor - that potential recipients will have no choice 
but to get whatever work is available at whatever wage."34 To a large extent, the federal 
government was exercising a luxury made convenient by distance from the states and 
localities which administered these programs to the poor. 
Big city mayors, were, for the most part, skeptical about the impact of 
conservative policies on their indigent populations. The president then found a good deal 
of his support not among officials in the large urban centers but rather among their 
counterparts in the smaller municipalities. Local members of the National Association of 
32 Gurney Brekenfield, "Has Reaganomics Hurt the Poor?" in Reaganomics: The New Federalism 
The Reference Shelf, ed. Carl Lowe 55:5 (New York: The H.H. Wilson Co, 1984), 81. 
33 Richard S. Williamson, Reagan's Federalism: His Efforts to Decentralize Government (Boston: 
University Press of America, 1990), 54. 
Nick Kotz, "The War on the Poor" in Reaganomics: The New Federalism, ed. Carl Lowe, 99. 
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Counties (NACo) and the National Association of Towns and Townships (NATaT) 
shared some of the concerns expressed by mayors of large cities. They were, however, 
generally more willing to give this new conservative president support.35 
Devolution 
A cornerstone to Reagan and Bush's application of New Federalism is the 
principle of devolution. As the national government is downsized, functions are 
redirected or devolved to state and local governments. Reagan Budget Director, David 
Stockman, justified devolution. "We are overloaded at the national level. We simply 
can't make wise decisions on the thousands of issues that come before us."36 
The practice of devolution was manifested in those national policies which gave 
states and localities greater discretion in program implementation. This, most states 
found agreeable. San Diego, for example passed by voter referendum in 1983 a statute 
which mandated workfare for local AFDC, Food Stamp and Refugee Assistance 
recipients. Local elites satisfied voter demand for local control as well as seized the 
opportunity to articulate a conservative philosophy towards those on the dole.36 
Devolution, however, had its detractors. Primary among the criticisms was its 
fiscal costs. As policy decisions shift downward, so too, presumably do their 
expenditures. Certain programs within the social welfare safety net had become big ticket 
35 George Hale and Marion Lief Palley, The Politics of Federal Grants (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), 143-163. 
j6 Palmer and Sawhill, 221. 
36 Ibid., 226. 
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items in the federal budget and promised to remain expensive under state administration. 
State and local governments, throughout the decade, were faced with deficits 
compounded by inflation, structural unemployment and recession, all of which decreased 
the likelihood of the positive reception of fiscal devolution. The recession for instance 
placed major strains on states' ability to maintain their pre-1980 levels of service even 
where its effects were less serious. It appears that federal action in this area, may have 
prompted state restraint or legitimated cuts that many states wanted to, but were unable to 
make. 
Nick Kotz, in condemnation of devolution, considered Food Stamps an example 
of the most viable of the federal safety net programs. He maintained that prior to food 
stamps, little attention was paid to care for this segment of the population. Kotz used this 
policy to point out that late into the Food Stamp projects' operation hundreds of counties, 
including those with the worse poverty-related malnutrition, refused to operated 
programs. Given this, it seemed inevitable that a similar stance might be taken should 
any of the safety net programs be devolved to state and local governments.37 
Replacement is a term used to describe how states and localities used their own 
resources to account for those lost federal dollars. Overall, most states ended up 
replacing less than 10% of the monies cut.38 Two exceptions to this trend were North 
Carolina and Texas who increased state funds to keep pace with inflation during 1981- 
1983. This was due largely to each states' unspent categorical grant monies before 
37 Kotz, 97. 
38 Palmer and Sawhill, 242. 
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Reagan's block grants were awarded. Questions as to how these two southern states, both 
with relatively low per capita incomes, were able to accrue savings from any grant source 
during the economic woes of the late 1970's and early 1980's suggests a fiscal 
conservatism unmatched by most of the nation's states. 
The principle of devolution in the public sphere was demonstrated in the block 
grant system. The president needed a tool to facilitate the shift away from social 
spending. In this effort the block grant became important. Block grants combine several 
categorical grant programs (eliminating some) and reduce the funding as a means of de¬ 
emphasizing the priority attached to any single program. Categorical grants in contrast, 
have been shown to provide an incentive for states and localities to spend in areas they 
may not have prior to federal intervention. 
In most cases categorical grants come with very specific federal guidelines and 
mandates. Local and state autonomy is reduced to the administration of programs while 
policy direction takes place at the national level. During his first year in office Reagan 
met with over 1700 state and local officials in an effort to win support for his block grant 
proposals. To begin his presidency, Reagan asked that more than ninety categorical 
grants be consolidated into four block grants with a 20-25% reduction in federal funding. 
Presidential advisor Bob Carleson reiterated the argument that block grants, "were a 
model for moving... to return local authority, responsibility and tax resources to state 
governments... (and) it should be made clear that maximum authority and discretion in 
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the hands of state and local governments."39 Congress answered that administration 
proposal acceding to a 15% budget reduction in block grants.40 By the end of his first 
term in office there were twelve federal block grant programs - the most ever. 
Pertinent to this study was the president's proposal to consolidate Women Infants 
and Children (WIC) into a Maternal and Child Health block grant, even though this 
threatened the dislocation and possible upheaval of what had been considered a 
successful program. When that failed he proposed to turn WIC completely over to the 
states by 1984. This too was futile. 
In most cases the president failed to present a convincing case for consolidation. 
In some instances Congress had already debated and rejected the mergers then being 
presented by the president. Most of the opportunities which were politically tenable had 
already been collapsed in 198141 Only one additional block grant was added after 1981 - 
the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) which restructured the CETA block grant. 
Economists attribute considerable influence to categorical grants in stimulating 
state and local spending. One of Reagan's goals was to use categorical grants to reduce 
local and state spending. This, the administration advanced, be done by lowering 
matching rates, by eliminating the matching principle altogether, or by capping the size of 
the federal contribution. Spending beyond the ceiling would provide a disincentive for 
39 Robert B. Carleson, "Taming the Welfare Monster" in The Future Under President Reagan ed. 
Wayne Vales (Westport, Conn.: Arlington House Publishers, 1981), 110. 
40 Palmer and Sawhill, 210. 
4ITim Conlan, New Federalism: Intergovernmental Reform From Nixon to Reagan (Washington 
D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1988), 173. 
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further spending. In these situations any state initiatives would have to find funding 
outside of Washington.42 
The "Great Swap" 
Reagan's most ambitious proposal came in his 1982 State of the Union message. 
Dubbed the "Great Swap", the 1982 plan offered to relinquish to the states all financial 
assistance and policy making requirements for two welfare programs - AFDC and Food 
Stamps. In exchange the federal government would take complete control over Medicaid. 
Additionally, the federal government would take control for discretionary grants in aid to 
the states for education, training, health and other social services. True to the spirit of 
devolution and new federalism, states wishing to continue these service would have to 
locate their own funding sources. If adopted, this "swap and turnback" proposal, as it 
came to be known, assured the beginning of the end to federal involvement with social 
programs.43 
The task of the Great Swap's Medicaid administration was to combine the states 
costs of the program, $19 billion with the federal share, $22 billion to offer a uniform 
health care system to the nation's indigent.44 In this way those states operating below 
national standards would experience an upgrade while those with generously subsidized 
programs would presumably decline in service. 
42 Palmer and Sawhill, 231. 
43 Ibid., 210. 
44 Hale and Palley, 166. 
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The disparity which would naturally come between states able to make the fiscal 
adaptation to the conditions of the Great Swap and those unable were addressed by the 
federalism trust fund. Here states that gained from the swap would have their trust fund 
allocations reduced and those who lost would receive additional allotments to 
compensate.45 The OMB calculated the trust fund program costs to be about $30 billion 
and would be supported by a federal excise tax. Both the fund and the tax supporting it 
would be phased out by 1988.46 Interestingly, the plan was thwarted by the states before 
ever reaching the Congress. 
Questions and concerns surfaced quickly. States were leery of the federal 
governments unwillingness to help with Food Stamps and AFDC though they favored the 
takeover of Medicaid. While the administration countered that Medicaid expenses were 
out pacing AFDC and Food Stamps, some states found the opposite to be true. The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) confirmed the states' fears when it estimated that 
states would pay $1.5 billion more to assume welfare payments than they would save 
from the federalization of Medicaid.47 
Further, the administration proposal did not include a plan for the medically needy 
- those were people who had before been covered under state programs for low income 
families but who did not qualify for AFDC or Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 
Thirty-four states had such a program. Dropping these people would have automatically 
45 Conlan, 190. 
46 Ibid., 191. 
47 Congressional Budget Office, AFDC. Food Stamps and Medicaid Exchange. (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1982), 5. 
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shifted their medical costs to the states. The Great Swap may have appeared more 
palpable to the states had the medically needy been included.48 
The turn back aspect of the Reagan plan raised concerns among many local 
officials. Since significant numbers of social programs allow dialogue between local and 
national officials, losing those programs or seeing their administrations move to state 
bureaucracies was unattractive to many on the local level. The article "Meanwhile in 
Congress, The Long Knives are Out", describes how local pressure was applied to 
Congress members to defeat the presidents plan.49 
Any number or combination of factors might explain why the Great Swap never 
happened. Today's attention to all levels of government burdened with the rising costs of 
health care may leave many questioning the wisdom of the states insistence on 
maintaining current relationships. The economic conditions of the 1980s, though, go far 
toward shedding light onto dilemmas facing state politicians and bureaucrats. The 
recession threatened deficits. Under those conditions any plan which altered fiscal 
responsibility would need to be considered carefully. Worsening economic 
circumstances for individual citizens in the states suggested correctly the imminent strain 
on all of the social services, not simply Medicaid. Figure 1 graphs changes in recipiency 
levels for 3 of the largest social services programs, AFDC, Medicaid and Food Stamps, at 
the end of the 1970s decade. Figure 2 permits a comparison of the rising costs of these 
programs in during the same period. With the exception of Food Stamps, the cost 
48 Hale and Palley, 168. 
49 Meanwhile in Congress, the Long Knives are Out," National Journal 14 (27 Feb. 1982): 381. 
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Figure 1: National Program Recipients, 1977-81 
Figure 2: National Program Expenditures, 1977-81 
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escalations experienced by program budgets in no way resembles the incremental 
increases in recipiency. 
While Reaganomics promised, through trickle down, prosperity for all, the reality 
had not materialized for the have-nots. Even the most ardent among supply-siders feared 
the worse should the president's prophecy prove false. State governments, above all, 
sensed the economic disaster should they alone assume responsibility for the social 
welfare programs. Given this, both national and state organizations gave high priority to 
opposing the plan. Among these were the National Governors Association (NGA); the 
National Conference of Counties (NAC); and, the National Conference of State 
Legislators (NCSL). William Drier summed up the states position on the Great Swap as 
follows: 
~ concern over vagueness about how exactly funding levels would be affected 
~ feared effects of recession on state budgets 
~ concern about other states' ability to set too low AFDC standards 
~ foresaw difficulty raising taxes to cover costs of AFDC50 
What the Reagan Revolution lacked in political prowess it compensated for in 
ideology. While the effects of his efforts to redirect the course of American welfare 
policy are measurable, the zeal with which the president was able to see legislation and 
budget initiatives passed, waned. Congress heard the president during this first years in 
office but later found themselves responding to the explosion of people falling beneath 
50 William Drier, "An Analysis of Reagan's Plan to Decentralize AFDC to the States"(Ph.D. diss., 
University of Illinois at Chicago, 1984), ii. 
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the poverty standard. Whatever retribution conservative politics sought on the poor had 
its limits. The rhetoric against social welfare remained pitched into the mid-1980's but 
was beginning to reflect the emergency facing state and local officials straining to contain 
he growing numbers of people on the dole. By his second term, Reagan employed a 
"cautious strategy which foreclosed any serious discussion about future policy actions".51 
By the time George Bush assumed office in 1988, data had condemned the 
nation's leadership as callous toward those less fortunate. "A kinder gentler nation' 
reflects Bush's softened public attitude toward to poor. The public, it appeared, wanted 
an end to the swelling numbers of poverty stricken Americans. What was sought was an 
adherence to the basic assumptions articulated by the Republicans through the Reagan 
era, but delivered in methods less draconian than those conjured up by Ronald Reagan. 
Bush's attention to the domestic budget was lacking where initiative was concerned, 
reflecting instead more of a stay the course perspective. 
His policy direction in social welfare issues attempted to emulate Reagan, but his 
administration clearly lacked the interest or know how to affect these policies. In A 
Kinder Gentler Racism, Steven Shull had this to say about George Bush, 
...Compared to Reagan's desire for contraction, Bush gave little indication of what 
agenda direction he wanted, admitting he lacked the 'vision thing’. He offered 
little legislation, and although he seemed to react well to international problems, 
he seemed perplexed by matters outside the realm of foreign policy.52 
51
 Darrell M. West, Congress and Economic Policy making (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg 
Press, 1987), 29. 
52 Steven A. Shull, A Kinder Gentler Racism: The Reagan-Bush Civil Rights Legacy (New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 83. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE FEDERALIZATION OF POVERTY: 
MEDICAID AND THE WOMEN, INFANTS AND CHILDREN’S PROGRAM 
Medicaid 
Medicaid is a federal-state partnership entitlement program created in 1965. 
Established by Title XIX of the Social Security Act, its primary goal is to provide medical 
care to Americans living in poverty. Grants are made available to states on a matching 
basis and range from 50-80 percent above the state contribution depending upon each 
state's per capita income and scope of services. By design the formula sets higher rates 
for states with low per capita incomes. With the exception of Arizona, all states 
originally opted to fund and administer Medicaid. While Medicaid is housed in the 
Health and Human Services Department (HHS), its primary administration comes 
through its Baltimore appendage, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). 
Eligibility requirements for Medicaid recipients are linked with those for the 
AFDC and SSI (Supplemental Security Income)1 programs. Known as the "categorically 
needy", all clients of these two programs are automatically Medicaid eligible. States 
have the option of covering populations beyond AFDC and SSL To date, over half of the 
'Supplemental Security Income provides income on minimum standards for those unable to work. Many 
elderly and chronically ill patients qualify for SSI. 
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states extend their Medicaid eligibility to the "medically needy". These are people who 
qualify for coverage due to illness and the resultant medical indebtedness. Unlike the 
categorically needy this group of beneficiaries is not subject to the same means-tested 
criteria. The medically needy only need to demonstrate that their medical bills have 
lowered them to the Medicaid income threshold. 
For the most part Medicaid recipients must be poor. All poor people, however, do 
not receive Medicaid. Current estimates conclude that only about 47 percent of those in 
poverty received the benefits of this program.2 This number is likely larger during the 
time frame covered in this study. Also Medicaid is the principle program for the 
chronically ill. Over 46 percent of all program expenses go to care for those in nursing 
homes and mental institutions3 
While the levels of service varies widely between and often within the states, 
there are minimums which must be included in each program. These minimums and 
optional services often form the core of the quality of care offered in each state. Federal 
mandates which require more care have the effect of upgrading service delivery 
throughout the nation. Conversely, the removal of minimum standards by the national 
government has the predictable effect of lowering health care to recipients. Such was the 
case during the early 1980's. To date, the minimum required by the states includes 
2 Congressional Research Service, Medicaid Source Book: Background Data and Analysis (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 3. 
3 Robert A. Reischauer, The Impact of Social Welfare Policies in the United States (New York: The 
Conference Board Inc. 1982), 7. 
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1) hospital in-patient and outpatient care; 2) physician services; 3) laboratory and x-ray 
services; 4) home health care; 5) skilled nursing facilities; 6) clinic services; 7) medical 
transportation; and, 8) preventative and screening services for children. Optional services 
are included at the states discretion. Some of these are dental care, eyeglasses, 
prescription drugs, physical therapy, private day care and nursing and intermediate care 
facilities.4 
Medicaid operates by the vendor payment method where services contracted 
between the patient and provider are paid for by the government. Payments are usually 
made directly to providers - hospitals and physicians. The vendor payment nature of this 
program makes it especially susceptible to periods of severe inflation. During economic 
downturns it becomes almost impossible to predict or control program costs since most of 
its budget is determined by market influences. Moreover, the role of the medical industry 
in setting payment levels testifies to its favored status in health care policy making. Of the 
three actors - government, clients, and the medical industry, the last has exercised 
dominance in setting program costs. Leonard Beeghley observing this phenomenon 
notes, 
...In general, the rate structure protects income and profits of those in the medical 
industry. This is partly because of its political influence on reimbursement 
schedules and partly because those performing medical tasks also decide which 
services need to be offered...Thus, cost of the program is not determined by either 
the recipient or the federal government, but by medical practitioners - the same 
people who stand to profit.5 
* Congressional Research Service, Medicaid Source Book. 250-254. 
5 Leonard Beeghlev. Living Poorly in America (New York: Praeger, 1983), 65. 
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The entitlement nature of Medicaid also makes it subject to cost escalations. 
Because all AFDC and SSI beneficiaries automatically qualify for Medicaid, any swell in 
these programs will almost certainly increase with indigent health care. Since most states 
now must serve the categorically needy who apply for aid, economic downturns have 
directed millions to the nation's poverty programs. Federal and state officials unwilling 
or unable to extend coverage to all who qualify often exercised their option of tightening 
eligibility requirements for those applying for the dole. Many of these restrictions 
coincided with private employer cutbacks on health insurance. Those affected most 
dramatically were the lowest paid workers. 
The role of public health insurance for the indigent cannot be overstated. 
Without Medicaid and public health centers, millions would go uncared for. This has 
been the case since the 1980's during the most precipitous rise in health care costs. 
Statistics reveal that poor children are four times as likely to be solely dependent on 
Medicaid insurance than their counterparts in the middle class. Even with the early 
eighties cutbacks affecting eligibility, poor children from working parents were twice as 
likely to be Medicaid dependent6 
Restrictive eligibility was the primary culprit through the early eighties when 
children whose parents earned below $10,000 annually were one-third less likely to report 
excellent health. African American children under five were 25% less likely than all 
white children to be reported in excellent health.7 
6 Hughes, 49. 
7 Ibid., 32. 
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Rising health care costs and high unemployment joined with employer reticence 
to deny health care to millions of women who are overrepresented in both the low-wage 
sector as well as in the nation's lower tier poverty programs8. In 1985, 35 percent of all 
women between 15 and 44 years with incomes below 100 percent of the federal poverty 
level had no private health insurance compared with 11 percent of women in the same age 
category at or above 200 percent of federal poverty for whom there was no private 
insurance9. Medicaid, the obvious answer to this dilemma, by 1987 still left ineligible a 
female working head of household earning minimum wage in over half of the states10. 
For the indigent elderly, Medicaid essentially supplements premiums, co-payments and 
deductibles not covered by Medicare. The elderly who in 1991 made up about 17-18 
percent of all Medicaid patients absorbed significantly more of its resources. Figure 3 
illustrates the Medicaid recipient composition in 1991. 
Excluding the medically needy, AFDC and Medicaid serve essentially the same 
populations. Typically a family consists of three people, a mother and two children. 
Most live in metropolitan areas. The average Medicaid child is 8 years old and 36 
percent of the programs' children are under age 6. More than half of AFDC/Medicaid 
8 Among adults receiving AFDC over 80% are women; 56% of Medicaid adults are women; 62% of SSI; 
and over 70% of all public housing is comprised of women. Virgina Shapiro, "The Gender Basis of 
American Social Policy" in Linda Gordon, Women, the State and Welfare (Wisconsin: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1990), 46. 
9 Hughes, 49. 
10 House, Select Committee on Hunger, The Role of Federal Food Assistance Programs in Strategies to 
Reduce Infant Mortality. 100th Cong., 1st sess., 2 April 1987,75. 
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Figure 3: Medicaid Beneficiaries (22.1 million) 
mothers are under age 30. One-third are under 25." African-Americans and Hispanics 
are disproportionately represented. Whites covered at least one month between 1985 and 
1989 made up 8 percent of the Medicaid roll. For African-Americans and Hispanics it as 
29 and 24 percents, respectively12. 
Medicaid is structured and administered in a way which reflects aspects of both 
centralized and cooperative federalism. Centralized federalism has at its core national 
dominance. Lyndon Johnson judged correctly with his War on Poverty that states and 
" Tom Joe and Cheryl Rogers, Bv the Few. For the Few: The Reagan Welfare Legacy (Lexington, 
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), 24. 
12 Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, Health Insurance Coverage: 
1987-1990 (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. May 1992), 5. 
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localities were not, for whatever reasons, going to move effectively to address the nations 
poverty. The Civil Rights Movement, not withstanding, it was primarily Johnson's 
political arm twisting that produced many of the nation's largest poverty programs. 
Centralized federalism and the grant-in-aid gave the effects of penury a place in national 
debate. Medicaid took a prominent place among these federal incentives. Like most 
categorical grant programs, the national government laid out specific guidelines to be 
followed by states. 
The cooperative federalism features of Medicaid could be found in the discretion 
given to each state to design its own program within federal parameters. State and local 
administration of federal policy, may, depending on the scope of federal mandates and a 
states' own political priorities have effects unanticipated by federal authorities. A 
president and the Congress may create a hostile or favorable atmosphere for states as they 
adhere to the legislative intent of a policy. This was precisely the aim of the Reagan 
administration in restructuring poverty policy. 
Administrative Proposals and Legislative Responses 
Reagan's appeal to new federalism took advantage of the state and local appetite 
to control, as much as possible, programs affecting their populations. New federalism is 
really an ideological extension of cooperative federalism in that local authorities are 
permitted, if not encouraged, to exercise their prerogatives as independent political 
entities, free to act as they determine appropriate for their populations. Where expensive 
programs like Medicaid were concerned, the likelihood that states and localities with 
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severely limited revenues would maintain levels beyond federal appropriations was slim. 
The decrease in service delivery was imminent given the loosened control of federal 
authority. 
Ironically, Medicaid, a product of the executive design of centralized federalism 
was threatened under the executive design of new federalism. From this it is reasonable 
to assume that any policy which has its substance in the national executive is left 
vulnerable to whomever occupies the Oval Office. The role of Congress in maintaining 
the program's integrity is reflective of legislative effectiveness in overseeing the 
president's policy implementation. 
The states in this scenario are not politically impotent. Both cooperative and new 
federalism guarantee a heightened role for state political actors. Most of the program's 
administrative apparatus and all of the delivery mechanisms are controlled at this level. 
The 1980s, though, allowed states whose political culture was at odds with the 
antipoverty mandates to finally disassociate themselves with these policies. New 
federalist assumptions applied to programs such as Medicaid gave a wide berth to 
administrators eager to withhold benefits to potential recipients. How this played out 
among the states speaks to issues beyond fiscal resources and into particulars associated 
with each states political priorities. 
Restrictive welfare policies which characterized the early 1980's came on the 
heels of the tough economic specter of the seventies. In 1976, the total number of welfare 
recipients peaked but had dropped dramatically by 1979. Eligibility standards in the 
1970s were, relative to the previous decade, restrictive. Prices increased for the more 
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extensive services which were demanded by the federal programs. For example, days 
spent in the hospital increased 3.6 percent between 1975 and 1979 compared with the 
19.0 percent increase during the same period in intermediate care facilities used primarily 
by the elderly. For the most part, increases in the Medicaid budget during the late 1970's 
is attributable less to increases in the number recipients served and more to a greater 
intensity of services delivered and the dramatic rise in unit prices for health care 
services.13 
While the seventies experienced runaway inflation and high unemployment rates, 
this paled next to the widened gulf between the haves and have-nots during the next 
decade. Figure 4 illustrates how economic despair hit the bottom rung of society in 
tandem with escalated profits experienced by those earning in the top 10 percent. 
To contain costs Reagan proposed to limit federal spending. In 1981, he 
submitted a budget which reflected how far he would go to achieve the redirection away 
from social disbursements. Table 1 shows how the administration hoped to affect the 
WIC and Medicaid programs by FY 1985. 
13 Bovbjerg and Holahan, 13. 
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TABLE 1 
MEDICAID AND WIC BUDGET PROPOSALS UNDER REAGAN 
(in billions of dollars) 
Projected outlays Projected Enacted changes 
under pre-Reagan changes % of % of baseline 
policy baseline baseline 1981- 1981 
1976-1980 1984 
MEDICAID $24.9 -15.7 -2.8 
WIC $1.1 -63.9 +9.1 
Source: Palmer and Sawhill, 185. 
The attack on welfare during the 1980s utilized many strategies to pare down the 
dole. For Medicaid two variables need be considered: One is the status of alterations 
made in Medicaid's companion programs, AFDC14 and SSI. Fluctuations in the caseloads 
of these programs are almost always mirrored in Medicaid even though federal 
regulations allow Medicaid coverage to continue for up to 4 months after case termination 
of either AFDC or SSI. The second prime consideration are those changes which came 
directly to Medicaid. 
By far the most significant policy impacts on Medicaid were those resulting from 
the administrative proposals and federal budget of 1981. New federalism permeated the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Process (OBRA) of 1981. The president promised to 
give states additional leeway in pioneering efforts aimed at cost reduction in entitlement 
14 Most states use AFDC as a threshold for determining Medicaid eligibility. In the mid 1980's only 
eight states used a standard higher than AFDC to determine Medicaid. 
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programs - a necessary measure given his proposal for a 5 percent flat cap on growth for 
the federal share of the Medicaid program in 1982. Fiscal hardships for states was 
imminent if Congress accepted the proposal. Prior to this ambitious proposition, every 
dollar beyond budget spent by the states was matched by the federal government by 55 
cents. The 5 percent flat cap threatened to leave the burden of each additional dollar 
spent by the states entirely on that level. Governors showed disapproval and lobbied 
against states paying for the cap. Their argument was that states should not have to pay 
for the results of national economic policy which was largely responsible for the 
recession. They saw little use in having more flexibility for program implementation 
without funds needed to operate the entitlement.15 
Congress acted in 1981 to lower the federal share of Medicaid cost. The 1982 
budget was to be a 3 percent reduction in the federal Medicaid contribution; a 4 percent 
reduction in 1983; and 4.5 percent in 1984. States were encouraged to cutback on 
services as well as restructure administratively. 
OBRA 1981 as it affected the Medicaid program can be divided into three 
categories of reductions: those which affected eligibility criteria; those which changed 
service coverage; and, closely related to the quality of service delivered, those changes 
made in payments to health care providers. 
15 Bovbjerg, 8. 
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Eligibility 
~ These rule changes included disqualification of both AFDC and Medicaid children 
where both parents lived in the home. 
~ It also terminated medical insurance for working women with children on AFDC. 
Most also lost food stamps and housing eligibility. 
~ Thousands were removed due to the raise in the "tax" on earnings. Earnings were 
taxed at a 99 percent rate in 46 of 50 states. This meant that for each dollar earned 
recipients lost 99 cents in federal aid. 
~ States were allowed to stop payment for students between 18 and 21 years old who 
under old rules would have been eligible. 
~ States were given the option of covering pregnant women from the time the pregnancy 
was medically verified. Since AFDC was being denied to first time pregnant women for 
the first six months of pregnancy, many of these new mothers were also forced to wait 
for Medicaid coverage. 
~ Assets tests for medically needy groups could be varied. With this states could 
selectively target these optional populations for coverage. 
Service 
~ States employed "lock-in" strategies to curtail over utilizing patients by requiring co¬ 
payments, limiting the amount of prescription drugs, and paying only for generic drugs. 
Most states also limited physician choice to a few whose fees were more in keeping with 
the states plans for fiscal restraint. 
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~ About one half of the states placed limits on the length of hospital stays, banned non¬ 
emergency weekend admissions, and placed limits on the number of physician visits. 
~ OBRA 1981 dropped the requirement that states provide well-baby and prenatal clinics 
as well as immunization programs. Most states transferred these programs to the 
maternal block grants but these grants experienced a 33 percent drop in constant dollars 
between 1979 and 1984.16 
~ Carter's administration created the Mental Health Systems Act to bolster the 
community mental health centers in their treatment of the chronically mentally ill. 
Reagan's 1981 budget won reduction for this program and refocused attention instead on 
the alcohol, drug abuse and mental health block grant. The reduction of the nations 
mental health program by about 25 percent placed greater strain on Medicaid, as well as 
raised the likelihood of the inappropriate deinstitutionalizaton of the mentally ill. 
~ The reconciliation process also raised the co-payments for recipients (excluding 
children and pregnant women) and made numerous changes in the list of reimbursement 
expenses. More limited availability discourages providers from serving Medicaid 
patients. 
Provider Payment 
~ Similar to the lock-in strategy used on clients was the lock- out used on providers who 
gave too many services or poor quality care. 
16 General Accounting Office, report to Senate Committee on Finance, Medicaid Expansions: Coverage 
Improves But State Fiscal Problems Jeopardize Continued Progress , 101 st Cong., 2d sess., 1991, 19. 
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~ In-patient services account for about one-third of all provider payments. Two methods 
were used prior to 1981 to determine payment levels. Most common was "reasonable 
costs" which gave full payment to hospitals on costs retroactively determined. The 
alternative, "rate setting" makes institutions accept the states' budget rather than the other 
way around. OBRA 1981 favored the rate-setting scheme and all but eliminated 
"reasonable costs". States were encouraged to set rates being mindful of hospitals which 
serve large indigent populations. Five states, including North Carolina, made dramatic 
changes in their reimbursement schemes. 
~ Physicians were placed under the UCR (Usual Customary Reasonable) reimbursement 
rule. With this the state determined what it would pay for services. Physicians whose 
fees exceeded the UCR were not fully reimbursed for services. Like hospitals, the 
legislation had the effect of shrinking the number of physicians and institutions available 
to poor patients.17 
Other Measures 
~ The administration offered one percentage point of the 3 percent reduction in federal 
matching payment forgiven if a state could prove it saved at least that amount through 
reduction in fraud and abuse or third party recoveries (Medicare, Veterans Benefits or 
private insurers). This resulted in zealous fraud detection in some states and at the very 
least meticulous application screening in other jurisdictions. 
17 Bovbjerg, 45. 
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~ Bulk purchases of medical equipment through competitive bidding was encouraged by 
administrators. While this saved money it had the legally contested affect of diminishing 
the choice, hence quality of care available to Medicaid patients. 
In addition to budget reductions and rule changes aimed at Medicaid were OBRA 
regulations directed to the AFDC program. At least five changes passed in the 1981 
budget purged the rolls.18 The number of recipients between 1980 and 1981 rose by only 
269,000. While AFDC rose by a little over one quarter million, 442,000 lost benefits 
because of restrictive rule changes. Those added to the roll were the results of personal 
economic hard times, unlike those to come a few years later and plunge millions into 
structural poverty. More important was the paltry increase of 43,192 Medicaid clients 
between 1981 and 1982. By 1983 the Reagan administration had succeeded in reducing 
the Medicaid dole by almost 500,000 people. Spending, on the other hand, continued to 
climb from over $23 million in 1980 to close to $30 million by 198319. The decline in 
recipient numbers confirms the effect of inflated health care cost on the program. 
Nineteen eighty-two is the year which had the dubious reputation of experiencing 
both decreases in welfare spending and the precipitous rise in poverty rates to 15 percent, 
18 Joe and Rogers discuss those rule changes primarily responsible for the decrease in recipients during 
the early 1980's. 
19 Hughes, 70. 
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a seventeen year high. Approximately 34 million Americans lived below the poverty 
standard, one-third of whom worked at some point during the year20 
States were definitely beginning to feel the budgetary strain of delivering services 
to their indigent populations. Faced with pressure from the governors, Congress rejected 
administrative spending caps and passed instead open-ended federal matching grants at 
somewhat reduced rates. New federalist thinking dominated as national legislators gave 
states even more latitude to determine eligibility, establish payments and control costs - 
even if it did not provide more revenues. 
In 1982, thirty states succeeded in keeping Medicaid growth below the 9 percent 
"penalty mark" established by OBRA. These states received incentive rebates. For the 
twenty states unable to keep costs down there was the reduction in federal grants as well 
as the imposition of interest penalties. This punishment/reward system was designed to 
encourage frugality among states for the jointly funded programs. Administrative 
strategy paid off that year when Medicaid was reduced to 6 percent growth or about one- 
third below the growth rate between 1979 and 198121. 
By 1983, welfare and Medicaid rolls rose modestly, primarily in response to 
decreases in other federal health block grant programs.22 Medicaid's entitlement status 
welcomed the categorically needy when other formula based or capped programs denied 
20 Tom Joe, "Forgotten Americans: The Working Poor" in Emmett Long, ed., The Welfare Debate: The 
Reference Shelf 62:7 (New York: H.H. Wilson, 1990), 24. 
21 Palmer, 236. 
22 Madeline Kimmich, America's Children: Who Cares? Growing Needs and Declining Assistance in 
the Reagan Era (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1985), 20. 
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aide. Still, the effects of budget cuts and restrictive rules had the desired effect of keeping 
people off the dole. Between 1973 and 1983 the number of children living in poverty 
increased 44 percent. Medicaid enrollment, however, did not reflect this increase. As 
AFDC recipiency dropped 30 percent Medicaid dollars to these families decreased by 8 
percent23. 
Responses to Reagan's workfare option were mixed. Only about half of the states 
had by 1983 implemented the program and then only as a pilot in a few counties. Federal 
funding for jobs creation was hardly sufficient as an incentive to continue along this 
course24. 
By 1984, public commentary had begun to issue sharp criticism of the 
administration's social welfare handiwork. Congress responded negatively to the 1983 
budgetary proposals and again in 1984 for still additional cuts in the lower tier of the 
social safety net. In fact, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 mandated that states provide 
Medicaid coverage for children under 5 with family incomes below AFDC eligibility 
levels. The beginning of Reagan's second term did not necessarily soften his rhetoric 
against the poor. It seems, instead that Congress, pressured by state officials and growing 
poverty rates, were left little choice but to respond less harshly to national poverty policy. 
Michael Brown, author of Remaking the Welfare State observed the juxtaposition 
between Reagan's first and second terms in office: 
23 General Accounting Office, Medicaid Expansions..., 19. 
24 Palmer and Sawhill, 199. 
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The Reagan era was a time when Americans willingness to devote to the poor was 
tested. Initially the administration dismantled- but by his second term curtailment 
was less successful in fact some programs were marginally expanded- in the case 
of Medicaid benefits were returned in 1986 to those who had lost coverage under 
1981.25 
The damage to the poor during the early 1980's cannot be overstated. Restrictions 
were so effective at burdening those most unable to withstand the pressure that Congress 
spent much of the decade's remainder expanding Medicaid coverage. Reagan's scenario 
which envisioned an economy putting millions of poor people to work simply did not 
materialize. Many jobs were never produced and those which were created did so at 
impossibly low wages. American industry's shift away from manufacturing hegemony to 
a dominance in service industry, often at non-union conditions, footnotes the real 
decrease in income for many of Americans during the eighties. 
A 1984 House Ways and Means committee report confirmed that AFDC had been 
reduced by 11 -14 percent. A similar caseload reduction was reported in the Medicaid 
program. AFDC, Food Stamps and Medicaid represented $51 billion dollars in 
reductions during Reagan's first term. Together this comprised one-third of all federal 
program cuts even though these programs were only one-tenth of the federal budget.26 
Services to children, the majority of Medicaid recipients declined noticeably between 
1980 and 198427. 
25 Michael K. Brown, ed.. Remaking the Welfare State: Retrenchment and Social Policy in America and 
Europe (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 71. 
26 Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, "Popular Power and the Welfare State" in Remaking the 
Welfare State , ed. Michael K. Brown, 76. 
27 General Accounting Office, Medicaid Expansions..., 19. 
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By 1985, an estimated 5 million poor children were still not reached by Medicaid 
because of rules prohibiting both parents in the home. Medicaid served 10.9 million 
children under 21 years - more than 400,000 fewer than had been served in FY 197828. 
This persisted even after the Deficit Reduction Act was passed which allowed states to 
improve coverage. Marion Wright Edelman's testimony before a congressional hearing in 
1986 advanced caustic criticisms of the restrictive safety net policies of the early 1980s: 
By 1986, the combined impact of Medicaids restrictive categorical and 
financial eligibility standards reduced the proportion of the poor and near 
poor covered by the program to only 46 percent - down from 65 percent a 
decade earlier.29 
No official national data has been collected on immunization rates after 1985 
because the Reagan administration ended the U.S. Immunization Survey. Rates between 
1980 and 1985 indicate with most types of childhood immunizations, the rates for white 
children under 2 years old stayed the same or declined slightly. During the same period, 
non-white immunization rates dropped for 4 of the 6 vaccines.30 Each dollar spent to 
immunize a child can save $10 by reducing childhood illness and disability. A study on 
the impact of child immunizations between 1963 (the beginning of the federal 
immunization program) and 1982 "found that this effort yielded a net savings of $5.1 
billion in direct and indirect costs averted."31 
28
 House, hearing, "Role of Federal Food Assistance Programs in Strategies to Reduce Infant 
Mortality",75. 
29 Ibid., 73. 
30 Hughes, 63. 
31 Ibid., 69 
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OBRA 1986 allowed states to cover additional populations. Pregnant women and 
young children, and/or aged and disabled persons who met state established income 
standards as high as 100 percent of the federal poverty level were newly added. 
Governors fearing the mandatory inclusion of these populations, protested the inclusion 
of these new groups, as well as lowering new income standards. Also included in this 
legislation was the state option to cover pregnant women and children younger than five 
with incomes below federal poverty but above state AFDC levels. 
The next year's OBRA, 1987 expanded states options to cover pregnant women 
and children up to age one whose incomes fell below 185 percent of the federal poverty 
level. States could choose to impose a copayment for services to this population. Even 
with the removal of some eligibility barriers, by the time Reagan left office in 1988 the 
basic eligibility level for families with children in the median state was just under 44 
percent of the federal poverty level32 
Entitlements were strained yet still not meeting indigent needs. Between 1984 
and 1989 Medicaid expenditures increased by over 60 percent. Forty-nine governors 
appealed to Congress for a moratorium on Medicaid expansions believing that newly 
enacted mandates were responsible for the increases even though the primary and most 
recent legislation regarding women and children was relatively inexpensive. In contrast, 
services to the aged, blind and disabled accounted for a 73 percent expenditure increase 
and only a 3 percent recipient increase.33 
32
 Ibid., 71. 
33 General Accounting Office, Medicaid Expansions..., 4. 
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By 1990, the Congress had waived the assets tests on items such as homes, cars, 
and income-producing property. An optional provision prior to 1990 was made 
mandatory and all states were required to extend coverage to pregnant women and infants 
below the federal poverty level. This included people who had previously been excluded 
because their income fell between state AFDC and federal poverty thresholds34. 
George Bush's entry into the White House promised a maintenance of the social 
safety net somewhat "kinder and gentler" than his predecessor but in no way similar to 
those "liberal" Democrats who presided over these programs' creation. 
I also propose reforms in the Medicaid program to reduce spending growth 
between 1989 and 1990 to $1.7 billion or 5 percent rather than $3.3 billion 
or 9 percent that would occur under current law. These reforms reinstate 
successful incentives employed in the early 1980's...35 
Bush's stay-the-course rhetoric allowed Congress to respond to executive inertia 
in social welfare. Seemingly expansive regulations of the late eighties and early nineties 
were aimed primarily at ameliorating the scars inflicted during the early eighties. By the 
1990 budget, states were required to cover significantly increased numbers of 
categorically needy. This included aU people receiving AFDC and SSI. Legislation also 
mandated Medicaid coverage for various periods for families who lost AFDC benefits as 
a result of increased employment income or work hours or because of child or spousal 
support payments. Thirty-nine states provided coverage to the medically needy, defined 
as having income which exceeds state standards for cash assistance but who meet a states 
34 Hughes, 75. 
35 Public Papers of the Presidents. 1988-1989. 1698. 
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criteria in other ways. These may include age, disability, dependent children or 
qualifying for aid after incurring medical expenses are deducted from income and 
resources - a process known as "spenddown". 
The effort to use Medicaid as a preventative against illness was expressed in 
legislation requiring Early Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) for the 
categorically needy. States, by the late 1980s, were ordered to create outreach programs 
to inform eligibles of these services mandated in the late 1960's. This came largely in 
response to the revelation that of the 10 million children eligible for EPDST only 1 
million received any continuous care. A little over 3.2 million of these children had 
initial or periodic screening exams.36 Even with expanded efforts, moving aid to the 
needy was an issue. 
The Bush administration offered a mixture of proposals in the 1989 budget. In 
general, the president sought to expand Medicaid coverage to more pregnant women and 
their children. Practically every health care proposal had as its target these two 
populations. Faced with the reality of health care costs, the administration saw no choice 
other than to ask for increased Medicaid funding over the next fiscal year. Some of these 
requests in 1988 and 1989 included: 
~ Increasing by 374,000 the number of pregnant women and eligible children. 
~ Encouraging states to outreach in efforts to decrease infant mortality including the 
extension of Medicaid to (pregnant) women. 
~ Entitling all children under 6 who receive food stamps to Medicaid coverage. 
36 Hughes, 149. 
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~ Removing the per capita formula to change the state matching rate to a flat 50% 
~ Creating Demonstration Programs to coordinate WTC, Medicaid and Maternal Health. 
~ A 9.6 percent increase over FY 1989 Medicaid budget. Typically Medicaid increases 9 
percent annually. 
~ Requesting an additional $40 million for Center for Disease Control immunization 
program. 
With the exception of changing the matching formula to 50 percent, all of these 
proposals were accepted in somewhat altered forms. Still, the result was an 
administration no more committed to social welfare meeting the needs of the poor than 
was its' predecessor. It was, however, forced to acknowledge the damaging effects of 
restrictive policies on the growing numbers of poor appearing on the American landscape. 
Women. Infants and Children’s Program 
The Special Supplemental Food Program was created in 1972 as an amendment to 
the Child Nutrition Act of 1966. Its goal is to supplement nutrition for infants, children, 
pregnant and postpartum women who are determined to be at nutritional risks because of 
inadequate nutrition and income. At the federal level WIC is administered by the Food 
and Nutrition Service (FNS) of the Department of Agriculture (USDA). Locally, though, 
WIC is housed and administered by county health departments. 
It is a formula based categorical grant provided to each state which disperses 
funds to local agencies. Unlike Medicaid, these agencies may vary. Some are private and 
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some public human service organizations. Often WIC is administered through clinics and 
hospitals certified to determine program eligibility and provide services to participants. 
To qualify for the program, participants must be certified by the appropriate 
professional, doctor, nurse or dietician, to be nutritionally at risk for an inadequate diet. 
Applicants must also meet income requirements which cannot exceed 185 percent of the 
federal poverty threshold. While state WIC agencies may set more stringent eligibility, 
their income requirements may not be set below 100 percent of the federal poverty level 
and must correspond with the state's income standards for free or reduced price school 
lunches. Recertification is a condition and must occur every 6 months except for 
pregnant women and infants under 6 months who may be certified for up to one year of 
age. 
WIC now costs the federal government over $2 billion per year to operate. 
Because it is not an entitlement program there are very definite spending caps. Eligibles 
are served on a funds available basis. When money is depleted, the program ends for that 
fiscal year. To determine funding levels the national average cost per participant is 
applied to the number of participants expected to be served in a program year. Often 
states and localities contribute in-kind services and space to this program. This 
arrangement makes WIC a federally funded program with much less state direction than 
the jointly funded policies like Medicaid. Annual funding levels are calculated by factors 
such as the number of eligible women and children being served and the amount of the 
WIC appropriation of food packages to each family. While WIC dollars have increased 
most states still do not supplement its budget. 
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Beneficiaries get supplemental food as specified by USDA regulations either in 
the form of actual food or food vouchers redeemable at authorized retail stores. Typically 
this package includes infant formula, milk, or milk products, cereals, juice, eggs, dried 
beans or peanut butter. WIC foods are meant to be supplemented with foodstuffs that a 
recipient might purchase through other welfare food programs. Nutritional education and 
advice is also disseminated among participants with the aim to ensure the continuation of 
healthy dietary habits. 
Administration of the program is conducted locally, but guidelines are set on the 
national level. State and local bureaucrats have the important job of confirming clients in 
accordance with federally set eligibility standards and of informing populations of WTCs 
availability. Funding, though, is out of state control. Each jurisdiction receives roughly 
the same increase or decrease in funding which severely diminishes the influence of local 
and state elites over program operation and service delivery. Consistently, the main 
criticism of the WIC program is its inability to reach many of the people who most 
desperately need it. Conservative estimates suggest that 40 percent of those eligible for 
supplemental food do not receive it. In North Carolina in 1988 an estimated 216,277 
women were eligible for the program and only 113,491 received its benefits. 
Table 2 illustrates WIC funding levels and participation rates through 1992. 
WIC is a prime example of centralized federalism. The role of local and state 
administrators is essential to the operation of the program yet its funding comes entirely 
at the behest of federal authority. Generally, this has allowed for the more uniform 
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delivery of the supplemental foods. The agricultural interests which support the 
maintenance of this policy represent organizations whose lobbying efforts are national in 
TABLE 2 
WOMEN, INFANTS AND CHILDREN’S PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS AND 
EXPENDITURES, 1980-1992 
Year Program Participants Program Expenditures 
1980 2,210,344 707,937,617 
1981 2,034,443 888,009,688 
1982 2,421,409 947,970,253 
1983 2,536,966 1,123,440,301 
1984 3,044,772 1,386,005,151 
1985 3,137,986 1,487,200,764 
1986 3,311,670 1,580,720257 
1987 3,429,412 1,677,819,441 
1988 3,592,843 1,795,408,955 
1989 4,118,586 1,905,996,110 
1990 4,516,883 2,115,592,800 
1991 4,892,846 2,295,597,294 
1992 5,403,308 2,591,312,689 
Source: Department of Agriculture, “WIC Local Agency Participation.,.” unpublished 
data 
scope. The retail, agriculture, and dairy industries are three such interests. While state 
politics play some role in program implementation, the amount, content, and quality of 
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the food distributed follows national rather than local standards. Important to note is that 
vendor and manufacturer participation is determined locally. 
History of American Food Aid 
Food aid in the U.S. stands noticeably apart from the other social welfare 
programs directed at the poor. As such its status among politicians and lobbyists often 
departs from those personalities and ideologies launched at the other poverty programs. 
Other significant differences with food aid policy are seen in the federal agency which 
most often administers these programs, United States Department of Agriculture 
(USD A) as opposed to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
administrator of the bulk of income maintenance efforts. 
The place which food aid holds in American poverty programming goes far 
toward explaining the distinguishing features of WIC as well as other food programs. In 
many ways WIC like food stamps is an anachronism in federal relief policy. This modem 
day equivalent of in-kind relief bears close resemblance to the old locally administered 
programs where people lined up monthly to receive surplus farm commodities. 
The similarities between these locally initiated programs and federal food 
distribution are not accidental. Food stamps and the child nutrition programs, including 
WIC are administered by the Department of Agriculture and were designed to support 
farm income - just as the surplus commodities programs were. Still, there was a lack of 
consensus on how best to support the farm belt. For instance, many in this debate sought 
policy which highly targeted purchase for specific foods to the needy whenever those 
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foods were in oversupply. In this way political interests within the agricultural 
community (e.g. dairy, potatoes, peanuts) could maintain their influence with the 
appropriate Congress members, the president and the USDA.37 
Another scheme favored by some economists proposed a demand-side approach 
where consumer purchases could be subsidized by the government and the poor could use 
vouchers to shop for food like everyone else. This would allow the government an end to 
its practice of buying surplus food. This plan was dominated by the 1970's. 
Federal food aid began during the economic upheaval of the Great Depression. 
Even then that thousands of Americans were hungry in no way suggested to officials that 
food delivery systems should reflect any priorities outside of agriculture. Farmers were 
cited in policy after policy as the primary beneficiaries. In fact, during the 1930's no 
policy records or analysis even worked out how many poor people might benefit, or at 
what level, from food relief.38 
The nation's first food aid project began in 1933 in response to vast amounts of 
agricultural surplus accumulated by the federal government during the Great Depression. 
The accumulations themselves were the result of price controls, supports and production 
goals begun by Congress in 1933 with the creation of the Federal Surplus Relief 
Corporation (FSRC). 
37 Ardith L. Maney, Still Hungary After All These Years: Food Assistance Policy from Kennedy to 
Reagan (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 3. 
38 Ibid., 9. 
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The USDA pilot food stamp program began in 1939 and continued until 1942. It 
reached about 6 million people - about 35 -40 percent of the needy. In this effort the 
federal government bankrolled the program administration rules and eligibility 
requirements but payment levels were left to local elites. This demonstrated Roosevelt's 
plan to keep the loyalty of state and local politicians. Decentralization was considered at 
every conceivable juncture. Local administration variations and economic realities 
permitted a no-cash system in many states, especially in the South. Where cash payments 
were conducted, they were so low that recipients often could not afford to purchase the 
stamps with which to buy food. Many relief agencies in considering this, distributed 
grocery vouchers rather than cash. Again, recipient need was not considered because the 
policy was a temporary adjunct to farm policy. Its social benefits were, at best, a 
secondary consideration.39 
The food stamp program was reintroduced in 1959 by Leonore Sullivan (D-Mo). 
Sullivan crafted a bill to appeal to urban and rural interests alike. For the urban interests 
he promoted the social welfare component while to rural supporters, the traditional 
surplus commodity drew backing. Even though the Eisenhower administration did little 
to implement the program, this represented a legislative victory for food aid. 
Complaints from grocery retailers that direct food relief hindered their trade 
altered the policy of direct commodity giveaways to one where stores acted as points of 
surplus disposal efforts. Specifically, the government responded with a two-tier 
commodity distribution system. Recipients were required to pay for a set of orange 
39 Ibid., 17. 
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stamps. The amount to be paid for stamps was determined by local relief workers but 
was to reflect that family's normal out of pocket food budget. Orange stamps were really 
government subsidies (to retailers) for those on relief. Relief clients could with the 
orange stamps become eligible for a free category of blue stamps foods. The blue stamp 
or free foods were those which were in surplus at any given time. What this system 
ensured was that families would continue to purchase in patterns as they had always done, 
thereby satisfying retailers while at same time taking advantage of food surpluses. The 
second tier was a guarantee for agricultural interests. This system discouraged the 
substitution of free foods, say lard, and peanut butter, for a family's customary 
consumption habits yet it still allowed surplus disposal.40 
Section 32 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act authorized funds to operate the 
nation's food aid programs. Section 32 as it came to be known, gave the agriculture 
secretary and others within the department's hierarchy considerable power in the 
construction of food aid. Given the states' beneficiaries of the first federal food programs, 
it should come as no surprise that federal food aid continues to shape political and 
constituent interests unlike those involved with other poverty programs. Some within 
agriculture saw this as the opportune time to forge coalitions with urban interests 
concerned with feeding those in the nation's cities. 
The legislative language of Section 32 was notable. This section set aside 30 
percent of U.S. custom funds each year for the Department of Agriculture. The 
department secretary was given wide discretionary authority with spending the funds. 
40 Ibid., 15. 
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Among its' purposes was one designed to "encourage the domestic consumption of 
(agricultural) commodities by diverting them by the payment of benefits and indemnities 
or by other means, from the normal channels of trade and commerce".41 This language 
allowed the secretary to proceed with surplus disposal without applying to Congress for 
additional legislative authority. 
The legislative formula used to determine when and how distribution would take 
place considered a variety of issues. Ardith Maney writing on federal food aid offered the 
following observations: 
...They based their decisions on an eclectic mix of factors: Their technical 
expertise about particular market conditions; judgements about how to benefit the 
agricultural economy generally; and, specific political pressures from farm groups 
directly; on other occasions they received pressure indirectly from Congress or the 
White House.42 
Questions about who might be served by surplus food and food 
stamps programs rested with local administrators who determined eligibility and 
management to meet local needs into the 1970s. Aid rarely depended upon objective and 
measurable need but rather the availability of resources, state and local methods of 
program implementation and certification of need practices. Local gatekeeper power was 
pivotal in the delivery of food aid. Maney observed: 
In short, since implementation was so thoroughly entrusted to local officials the 
answer to the question of who got what food aid benefits was extremely 
contingent. Some food was available to some people some of the time as long as 
41 Administrative Procedure Act, Statutes at Large 49, sec. 641, 774 (1933). 
42 Maney, 15. 
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recipients behaved themselves according to norms of political behavior set and 
enforced locally.43 
Congress has gradually responded to the uneven application of federal policy by 
creating stringent guidelines to lessen the impact of local arbitrary behavior. What has 
emerged, however, is the competition for the appropriate relief administration model - 
one whose political domination rests locally or federally. 
Interestingly, critics and proponents of food aid joined though for entirely 
different reasons in calling for less local administration discretion in service delivery. 
Predictably, liberals thought program administration to be too restrictive in its eligibility 
determinations while conservatives judged the same process too lenient in that it 
encouraged low-income people to apply for aid. Their differences, no doubt, laid much 
more in ideology than in quantifiable measures of food need, hunger and malnutrition. 
The 1970s marked several new food assistance programs, a number of which were 
created under the child nutrition category. These included WIC, and free and reduced 
lunch and breakfast programs for school children. Hunger lobbyists like the Food 
Research and Action Center (FRAC) joined with anti-poverty lawyers to challenge the 
state of hunger in America. 
Food aid programs operating under a hostile administration during the early 
1970's were difficult to maintain. A case in point is the WTC program which the Nixon 
administration argued was unnecessary. Still, WIC was authorized in 1972 and allocated 
$25 million for each of its first 2 years in operation. White House officials, it seemed, 
43 Ibid., 9. 
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were unwilling to stand firmly against vulnerable populations such as children and 
infants. The strategy instead was to impound program funds, implement presidential 
vetoes, and apply unfavorable administrative rules to hunger policies. 
Nixon's tenure in office did oversee the expansion of nutrition programs like food 
stamps, but his administration added the controversial workfare provision as a 
precondition for receiving aid. All adults were mandated to register for and accept any 
available employment. 
Another White House scheme was the attempt to form a Child Nutrition Block 
Grant in 1973 in an effort to blunt Congress' aggression in food aid funding. Nixon's 
agricultural secretary, Earl Butz, had worked under Eisenhower and appreciated the old 
agriculture/producer bias in food aid policy. He had little sympathy for the new social 
welfare mission which appeared to drive many of the new food relief projects.44 
Dissimilar agendas propelled partisan responses to food aid. Liberal and 
antihunger activists were the newest arrivals into the coalition of forces which saw to 
food or voucher distribution, but there is no evidence to show that program 
administration was significantly altered from the old programs. It could be argued that 
the expansion which took place was solely the outcome of stricter federal guidelines 
which allowed greater inclusion of the needy people previously omitted by local agencies. 
This, however, still allowed the USDA administration of the program and with that the 
input of its most vocal constituent base, agriculture. 
44 Ibid., 123. 
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Under successive presidents food aid vacillated depending upon the political 
acumen of the Congress, White House, USDA, and lobbyists. Carter, for example, 
assembled energy in the direction of further increasing food aid, primarily by eliminating 
the purchase of stamps requirement. Bipartisan support was won on this issue because of 
charges of fraud and abuse with the food stamps program. Democrats accused the 
vendors of fraud while Republicans saw recipients as the primary culprits. 
Congressional conservatives, though, won important advances. One was the 
tightening of eligibility at the upper end of the income scale. This move alone threatened 
to remove 1.3 million from the rolls. Another was the cap placed on program 
expenditures. The Carter administration opposed the cap as it represented a break from 
the open-ended authorizations of the past. It also suggested that food stamps was not an 
entitlement program but, similar to WIC, answered applications on a first come, first 
serve basis. Even with this, the program continued to grow. Economic downturns which 
plagued the entire Carter presidency forced Congress to lift spending caps and to restore 
food stamps to its entitlement status. 
WIC was similarly threatened in 1978 when Congress considered reallocation for 
an additional 5 years. The administration found reducing WIC benefits for children aged 
3 to 5, eliminating the Special Milk program45 and increasing the school breakfast 
program would shift emphasis away from the middle class subsidies toward the poor.46 
While WIC was to be reduced, the larger breakfast and lunch programs have income 
45 Special Milk Program subsidized milk for all school children. 
46 Maney, 132. 
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thresholds significantly below WIC and those beneficiaries of Special Milk. A stalemate 
ensued based on funding levels and which classes would benefit most from federal food 
aid spending. 
This strategy was eventually adopted by Congress but not without a price. The 
result was that no child nutrition legislation was passed in two years, 1978 and 1979. In 
1980 on the eve of the Reagan presidency, House Education and Labor Committee chair 
Carl Perkins (D-Ky) realized the danger of continuing the standoff with a Republican 
coming into office. In compromise he agreed to the program cuts in return for 
reauthorization in the budget reconciliation process.47 In many ways the battle to expand 
food aid during the 1970s was a signal of what could be expected under the new 
conservative White House leadership. 
Media messages that the Great Society programs had worked ironically helped the 
conservative cause by suggesting that poverty policy was no longer needed. The fact that 
those poverty programs expanded during the 1970's were almost solely responsible for 
keeping millions of Americans out of complete penury during a decade characterized by 
high unemployment and double digit inflation went largely unarticulated. 
The fate of food management policy takes a number of political actors in account. 
Many arranged the national level supporters into three categories: 1) a few key mavericks 
in USDA; 2) supporters in Congress like Bob Dole, George McGovern, and George 
Aiken; 3) USDA officials under successive presidents; and, 4) on occasion spokes 
47 Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1980,96th Cong., 2d sess., (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly Inc.), 411-412. 
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people from lobby organizations like National Fanners Union or the Grange Union and 
producer interests48. 
Food Aid Under Reagan 
Reagan campaign promises centered around lower taxes, spending cuts, and 
balancing the budget. In this vein he wanted to cut agricultural subsidies but feared 
losing farm support won during the election. The divided Congress featured Republicans 
intent on helping the president with budget reduction as long as it did not interfere with 
their districts, many of which were in the farm belt.49 Democrats on the other hand, 
continued their support of social welfare even if it meant forging coalitions with farm 
commodity and subsidy-minded members. The common ground often emptied into 
programs like WIC, School Lunch and Special Milk. 
The precipitous rise in food aid recipiency during the 1970s had some affect on 
farm income, though many experts consider it minimal. One economist calculated that 
the additional food purchased by lower income Americans in 1985 totaled about $2.2 
billion. While this accounts significantly for food retailers, the value to farmers is much 
less.50 
Still Clifton Luttrell in The High Cost of Farm Policy maintains that agricultures 
role in food aid policy cannot be overstated. 
48 Clifton B. Luttrell, The High Cost of Farm Welfare (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 1989), 65. 
49 Wayne H. Moyer and Timothy Josling, Agricultural Policy Reform: Politics and Process in the E.C. 
and the USA. (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1990), 141. 
50 Luttrell, 68. 
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... but despite rhetoric or moral responsibility for feeding the Hungry, the 
dominant objective of the proponents of these programs during most of their 
existence has been higher returns to farmers. Evidence of this can be seen in the 
sources of the programs' support, the specific commodities included in the gifts, 
and the fact that distributions have been made through the Department of 
Agriculture, an agency designed primarily to aid farmers...51 
Reagan cheese", as it came to be known, represents the attempt to return to the 
surplus food distribution programs of the 1930's. Created in 1981, the Surplus Dairy 
Distribution Program (SDDP) implemented the White House's answer to hunger while it 
simultaneously allowed administrative support to American Dairy farmers. Table 3 
chronicles the relationship between dairy producers and the USD A between 1949 and 
1985 to demonstrate the favorable consideration given to this agricultural sector during 
the Reagan years. States were instructed to be liberal and broad in defining eligibility 
guidelines, as there is a great deal of surplus food that needs to be distributed across the 
U.S. Unfortunate for SDDP was the public specter which accompanied cheese 
distribution. Disbursement centers complained about the poor distribution schemes and 
compared the program to soup lines during the Great Depression. 
In 1983, the Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program was passed after the 
Senate subcommittee report won bipartisan support by demonstrating that the safety net 
was not working. Specifically, the report linked poor nutrition to both urban and rural 
communities and suggested that Congress' increasing response to demands for food aid 
was necessary. Despite the report, the administration continued to minimize the 
51 Ibid., 62. 
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existence of hunger in America. It touted instead, the Edwin Meese report which raised 
doubts as to the extent of hunger and malnutrition. 
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TABLE 3 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DAIRY INDUSTRY AND FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT, 1966-1985 
Year Milk Equivalent % of Production Net Government 
Billions of (lb.) Cost ($ Millions) 
1966 0.6 0.5 317.4 
1967 7.4 6.2 364.2 
1968 5.1 4.4 327.3 
1969 4.5 3.9 290.9 
1970 5.8 5.0 421.8 
1971 7.3 6.2 338.2 
1972 5.3 4.4 152.8 
1973 2.2 1.9 70.9 
1974 1.3 1.1 496.1 
1975 2.0 1.7 76.5 
1976 1.2 1.0 714.3 
1977 6.1 5.0 451.4 
1978 2.7 2.2 250.6 
1979 2.1 1.7 1,279.9 
1980 8.8 6.9 1,974.7 
1981 12.9 9.7 2,239.2 
1982 14.3 10.6 2,600.4 
1983 16.8 12.0 1,594.6 
1984 8.6 6.3 2,185.0 
1985 13.2 9.2 2,200.3 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Dairy Situation and Outlook Yearbook. July 
1986. 
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Because so few social programs are indexed to cost of living increases, the 
incidence of hunger in the U.S. was actually growing. The 1984 benefit was in actual 
value only $240 over its' 1960 level52. Under Ronald Reagan, as inflation moderated, 
program cuts became part and parcel of his campaign to rollback the nation's welfare 
state. 
The Reagan administration tried, relatively unsuccessfully, to cripple the child 
nutrition programs. During his first term in office the call for private aid agencies and 
food pantries increased by 2,000 percent. Women, Infants and Children was maintained 
over executive proposals to abolish it. In 1981 budget proposals reduced Child Nutrition 
outlays by $2 billion in 1982 and by $7.3 billion over the next two years - a 43.4 percent 
reduction. It also proposed modifying the USD A basis for updating poverty guidelines to 
make it more consistent with other government agencies. WIC appropriations were to be 
cut by 20 percent. The administration justified this cut by urging a refocus of the program 
only to applicants with high nutritional risks. Robert Greenstein, executive director of the 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities described the early proposals: 
In 1981 Ronald Reagan proposed to cut WIC by $180 million. In September 1981 
Stockman suggested a further 12 % across-the-board cut in domestic and 
discretionary programs... would have the effect on removing 700,000 from the 
WIC program.53 
52 Katz, 33. 
53 House, Select Committee on Hunger and Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 
National WIC Evaluation: Reporting and Followup Issues. 100th Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 1990, 6. 
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In 1982, Reagan sought to consolidate WIC into a Maternal and Child Health 
block grant. Congress instead increased WIC funding by $100 million in the Emergency 
Jobs Supplemental Act of 1983. In 1984, WIC was increased again by $300 million in an 
agricultural appropriations act.54 
Understanding the president's lack of success in cutting WIC should be seen as a 
challenge to the program's food aid base; its agricultural backing; and, its target 
populations, women and children. As significant is WIC's stretch beyond the AFDC 
populations well into the middle class. While social welfare scapegoats the poor WIC 
offers benefits to those living well above the poverty standard. WICs 185 percent of 
federal poverty, compared with other poverty programs, moves this program well into the 
relative safety of the American middle class. 
Infant and maternal mortality in the U.S. are a national embarrassment. In this 
area Americans remain at the greatest risk of all of the western industrial nations as well 
as among significant numbers of third world nations. Infant mortality, prenatal care and 
low-birthweights throughout the 1980s improved at a rate considerably slower than in the 
previous years55. 
Low birthweights alone are responsible for two-thirds of the deaths in babies 
during the first month of life. Among Black and nonwhite infants the rate of low 
54 G. William Hoagland, “The Reagan Domestic Food Assistance Policies: Proposals, Accomplishments 
and Issues,” presented at the American Enterprise Public Policy Week, Washington D.C. (6 December 
1983), 9. 
55 Hughes, 45. 
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birthrates actually increased during the eighties.56 For Blacks the infant mortality rates 
declined during the 1970s by an average of 3.44 percent compared with 2.65 percent 
during the 1980s.57 Table 4 is a dramatic comparison of infant mortality rates between 
1950 and 1980. It also elucidates the heightened role of race as a determinant in infant 
mortality. 
TABLE 4 
INFANT MORTALITY BY RACE, SELECTED YEARS PERCENTAGE 
CHANGES 
1950 1970 1980 1983 1984 0/ /o 
Decline 
1950-84 
Total 29.2 20.0 12.6 11.2 10.8 63.0 
White 26.8 17.8 11.0 9.7 9.4 64.9 
Black 43.9 32.6 21.4 19.2 18.4 58.1 
B/W 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 
Ratio 
Source: Wegman, M.E. “Annual Summary of VitalStatistics” Pediatrics 78:983, Dec. 
1986. 
The Children's Defense Fund conducted a study which attempted to measure the 
impact of race on the survival of babies. In what they termed "excess Black infant 
deaths", comparisons were made between White and Black infant deaths. Stated simply, 
the study measured the infant deaths that would not have occurred if the Black infant 
56 Ibid. 
Ibid., 5. 57 
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mortality rate were as low as the rate for Whites. What was discovered was some periods 
of decline in Black infant deaths followed by eras of dramatic increases. The 1980’s 
serves as an example in this case when there was some drop during the middle of the 
decade only to rise again at the end.58 Mickey Leland, former congressman from Texas, 
summed it up well when he complained in a House of Representatives hearing of the 
discrepancies between Black and White infant survival rates. 
Aggregate statistics hide the following facts: the infant mortality rate 
among blacks is twice that among whites; infant mortality rate among 
infants of all races in poor rural counties has increased significantly in 
recent years.59 
Maternal mortality has been a similar disappointment. Again, race is the deciding 
factor when looking at the incidence of this type of mortality. In 1986 maternal mortality 
rates were 18.8 and 16.0 per 1,000 live births for Black and nonwhite women, 
respectively. This is compared with 4.9 per 1,000 live births for White women.60 
Improved nutrition and access to health care have been linked with decreased mortality 
for all groups. That these rates remain high for all nonwhite women testifies to their 
places on the margins of the government sponsored program supposedly geared for these 
very populations. 
The process of policy implementation is continuous since the decision making 
process is always open for change or modification. Moving key actors into positions 
where issues are even addressed often requires challenge to entrenched interests or what 
58 Ibid., 14. 
59 House hearing, Role of Federal Food Assistance Programs..., 3. 
Hughes, 10. 60 
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Bachrach and Baratz call the "mobilization of bias" within the political system.61 In this 
way non-decisions and inactivity on policy questions deemed unpopular has become a 
major dynamic in the policy process. Such describes many of the political assumptions 
associated with federal food aid. 
Agricultural, producer, and retail interests were dominant during the earliest 
discussions on feeding the Hungry. The gradual inclusion of social welfare activists into 
this debate acknowledged the validity of positions outside of those traditionally 
considered. The Special Supplemental Food Program for Women Infants and Children 
takes a unique place among proponents of food aid. Its relatively favorable location 
among food programs has given it some degree of prestige especially when viewed in 
light of the budget axes inflicted on other programs which serve indigent. 
WIC’s Success 
WICs' genius in avoiding many of the harsh cuts experienced by other social 
welfare programs is attributable to a tapestry of factors, not least among which is its 
undisputed success in meeting program objectives. Early findings of the program were 
positive, but inconclusive. It took several years to verify the affects that WIC has on its 
intented population. A Center for Disease Control study showed a mortality decrease by 
almost two-thirds among children enrolled in WIC between 1972 and 1985.62 
61
 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review 56 
(1962): 947-52. 
62 Lela B. Costin, Cynthia J. Bell and Susan W. Downs, Child Welfare Policies and Practices. 4th ed. 
(New York: Longman, 1991), 209. 
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Another Department of Agriculture study demonstrated how appropriately funded 
WIC programs have reduced fetal and early infant deaths as well as ensured normal birth 
weights. Similarly, a GAO report credited that program with reducing the number of 
infants at risk because of low birthweights by as much as 20 percent.63 While WIC enjoys 
prestige among food aid programs, its detractors are vigilant in including it in criticisms 
of fraud and abuse which are aimed at most American poverty policies. This tactic, 
though, seemed less successful with WIC than with other programs, perhaps due to the 
narrow populations served by WIC and popular perceptions which give more support to 
pregnant women and their children than to clients of the Food Stamp or Free and Reduced 
Lunch programs. 
The Congress in 1978 authorized a two and a half year comprehensive evaluation 
of the WIC program. Six years later and well beyond the study's budget authorizations 
the controversial report was released. The USDA, president and program foes were 
equally culpable in attempting to orchestrate a report which raised serious questions as to 
WICs effectiveness. In contrast, Dr. David Rush, the report's primary author, found the 
program quite successful in improving the health of participants. 
The dispute, though, was traced to antipoverty designs well before this study was 
commissioned. Interestingly, prior to the study's authorization Sen. Jesse Helms (R- NC), 
knowing of Dr. Rush's skepticism about the WIC program, requested that he testify 
before the Senate Agriculture committee on the WIC program. At that hearing the doctor 
63 Lawrence D. Maloney, "Welfare in America: Is it a Flop?," in The Welfare Debate 65:5, ed. Emmet 
Long (New York: H.H. Wilson Co. 1989), 57. 
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stated that a positive assessment of the program was impossible to determine.64 Rush's 
early reticence to endorse the program suggested to some that having him head the 
evaluation was a deliberate attempt by program foes to produce a report which would 
threaten WICs reauthorization. Given this, the sudden shift in Dr. Rush's analysis of the 
program was disconcerting to administration officials prepared to ask for decreases in 
WIC funding. 
The study was sent to the appropriate congressional committees with protest from 
Dr. Rush who complained that the executive summary and the report compendium had 
been severely altered and reflected conclusions entirely different from those reached by 
program evaluators. Dr. Rush was able to identify the exact incongruencies between his 
report and that "edited" by USDA officials. A GAO investigation ensued which 
supported Dr. Rush's protests and, as notably, revealed how vulnerable WIC was to 
partisan politics. Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) in a Senate hearing on this controversy 
and the subsequently conducted GAO report berated the USDA. 
The report reviewer at USDA without benefit of peer or technical review, 
wrote and published a compendium for study which GAO found 
inaccurate and misleading.65 
The Women Infant and Children food program improved the health of those it 
reached. But, to underscore a point made earlier, it does not go far enough. National 
64 National WIC Evaluation : An Evaluation of the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women. 
Infants and Children, by David Rush, M.D., chairman, submitted to the Department of Agriculture, Food 
and Nutrition Service, Office of Analysis and Evaluation (Research Triangle, N.C.: Research Triangle 
Institute, 1987). 
65 House, Select Committee on Hunger, National WIC Evaluation:.., 6. 
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estimates indicate that WIC reaches only 39 percent of those eligible for its assistance. A 
team of physicians, prompted largely by Reagan's insistence that "hungry people were 
simply too ignorant to know were to get food", assembled in 1985 to document the extent 
of hunger in the nation. These physicians toured the counties conducting site based 
studies. Two North Carolina visits were especially compelling. 
In Madison Co. (in Appalachia), 20 % of the children served by the WIC program 
were anemic. In Durham the figure was over 60 %.66 
At Wake Co. Health Department staff talked about 1 year old children being taken 
off the WIC program because they appear healthy only to be returned in poor 
nutritional health because their parents cannot provide enough food.67 
These physicians and others who have studied the effects of WIC agree that even 
with the health related problems they see among WIC children, recipients are far and 
away at less nutritional risk than their uncovered counterparts. A physician studying WIC 
mothers and their children in a rural Alabama county had this to say: 
...while WIC mothers and babies tend to be better off than those 
impoverished not being served by the program, typically poor mothers and 
their children have higher rates of anemia and malnutrition often requiring 
blood transfusions before delivery.68 
The national evaluation of WIC concluded that the programs' most important effects 
were: 
66 Larry Brown, 85. 
67 Ibid., 94. 
Ibid., 102. 68 
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~ For Pregnant Women: more frequent enrollment in early prenatal care; more 
prenatal visits to doctors; markedly improved diet; significantly increased weight gain 
during pregnancy; lower fat stores in late pregnancy suggesting that every (calorie) stored 
as fat had been utilized better among WIC women. 
~ For Fetus: significantly longer gestational period and fewer premature births; higher 
birth weight; lower fetal death; significantly greater head (and presumably brain) size 
among newborns. 
~ For Infants and Young Children: Greater receipt of medical care; greater likelihood of 
adequate immunizations and better diet; preliminary tests suggest better cognitive 
functioning in preschool age children. 
~ WIC Subpopulations: Most dramatic affects are seen among Black women, teenagers, 
women with poor weight gain during pregnancy or with low prepartum weights and 
histories of poor pregnancy outcome. 
Overall the National WIC evaluation team found a decrease of 2.3 deaths per 1,000 
attributable to the program.69 
Factors which allowed WICs survival through the 1980s' can be distilled into 
administrative ideology, interest group influence, congressional disposition toward the 
program and populations served. In light of the last variable, populations served, it is 
useful to note that WIC moves well into the middle classes. WICs program threshold is 
significantly higher than that for food stamps. North Carolina, at this writing, sets WIC 
eligibility up to $28,000- $10,00 beyond the state median income. Program income limits 
are particularly ironic in consideration of criticisms that the program does not reach those 
who need it most, the indigent. Those commodity and retail interests which stand to 
benefit from federal food policy also play significantly in WIC as they have in other food 
aid policies. 
69 House , Select Committee on Hunger, National WIC Evaluation:.., 174. 
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Federal food aid stands apart from other welfare policies in that it is only 
minimally encumbered by state and local interests bent on exhibiting their own political 
stances to shape indigent policy. Stated differently, it is the nature and administration of 
the WIC program which helps to explain its largely unfettered existence during the 
1980s'. 
States forced to respond to federal health policy used a variety of measures. 
Popularity, such as those upper tier programs, tend to keep afloat. Others, serving the 
very poor find greater difficulty in maintaining adequate funding levels. Cutting monies 
from projects which, while useful, do not always reach eligible and needy populations 
becomes critical when budget slashes threaten even its short outreach. Patricia Jakobi 
comments on the American propensity to punish the poor where health policy is 
concerned. 
The States pattern of substituting economic eligibility for health related 
criteria parallels but does not replicate trends at the federal level where 
American attitudes and valuations concerning dependency, self-reliance 
and social worth tend to marginalize all dependent poor populations.70 
Combinations of state and local administration and funding created large 
inequities between as well as within states. For example about half of the states in 1981 
denied aid to low income families with both parents present. Grant sizes varied widely 
often reflecting local political values more than the costs of living. For instance, in 1980 
a mother heading a household with 2 children living in California could have expected 
70Patricia Jakobi, “American Attitudes Toward the Dependent Poor: Impediments to an Equitable 
American Health Care System” (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Galveston, 1992), ii. 
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about $399 per month in cash to supplement rent, food, clothing and medical expenses. 
Her Mississippi counterpart could have looked forward to $88 per month to subsidize the 
same expenses.71 That housing and food costs reflect regional characteristics much more 
than do medical costs, places the poor living in states with less generous grants at severe 
disadvantage. 
States generally taxed higher, shifted funds from other programs, or shifted within 
the Medicaid budget.72 Specific spending patterns and strategies could be correlated with 
a states attitude about medical coverage for the poor. Among these were: The political 
clout of welfare recipients and their supporters within the state; medical costs; a states 
ability to raise revenues; political acumen of provider/vendor interests; and, a states 
ability to implement creative strategies to replace lost federal dollars and increased 
poverty. 
Replacement dollars was key to keeping programs deemed important afloat during 
times of dwindling federal aid. Intertitle transfers and interblock transfers were common. 
These were redirected money from block programs with specific and limited funding to 
entitlement programs with more open-ended funding formulas. Shifts from health block 
grants to Medicaid were customary in this schemata. Between 1980 and 1982 thirty-one 
states made transfers worth $73.6 million to Title XIX.73 
71
 U.S. Census Bureau of Official Statistics. 1981 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of Census), 345. 
72 General Accounting Office, Medicaid Expansions..., 4. 
73 Kimmich, 40. 
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Predictably, states were often hesitant to limit Medicaid because to do so would 
only shift medical costs to other state funded insurance programs, private insurers, or 
public hospitals in each state. AFDC cuts which only affected the recipients were made 
more easily than were those for Medicaid which threatened powerful lobbies at every 
level of government. States could recoup money from the AFDC program by simply 
refusing to index payments with cost of living increases - an option not available with 
payments to health care providers. 
Distributional questions among counties became a major focus of states trying to 
cover rising costs and reduced revenues. Local legislators pressed urban against rural 
interests in efforts to win favorable consideration in grant distribution plans. Some states 
tried devolution to municipal and county units. As they attempted this, matching grant 
formulas often increased a local jurisdictions' share in the grant formula. California 
illustrated this well when the state shifted 30 percent of its health care costs for medically 
indigent patients to its counties74 
The role of local politics in service delivery remained pervasive. Even though 
counties operate in sync with state mandates, local political neutrality is largely a myth. 
When reduced funds couples with local priorities there is a greater likelihood that a 
disparity in service delivery will ensue. 
Federal cutbacks in entitlement programs given their open-ended nature makes it 
difficult to control spending. Medicaid's linkage with the cost inflated medical industry 
made local and state cost control even more impossible. It is fair to say, however, that 
74 Ibid., 58. 
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most of the spending increases were incurred not in the effort to serve more people but 
rather to cover rising health care costs. Table 5 gives federal recipient and expenditure 
levels for Medicaid between 1980 and 1992. 
Moreover, attitude about social welfare spending in the 1980’s were unlike those 
present during the 1960's. Rising costs for indigent programs, no matter who the primary 
beneficiaries, were difficult to defend in political circles. A "blaming the victim" 
mentality had set in to allow the withdrawal of needed aid. That which was given was 
done so in an almost punitive mode. States were free to respond in ways which 
complemented each's political culture, if not budget priorities. Patricia Jakobi determined 
this in her study on state responses to budget cuts: 
A study of eligibility requirements and benefit levels associated with 
AFDC suggests that socioeconomic benefits alone do not explain 
variations in state AFDC policies. These policies are also informed and 
shaped by historical, social, economic, political and cultural attitudes 
buried within the state governments' structure.75 
75 Jakobi, ii. 
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TABLE 5 
FEDERAL MEDICAID RECIPIENTS AND EXPENDITURES, 1980-1992 
Year All Recipients (Millions) Expenditures ($ Billions) 
1980 21.7 23.3 
1981 21.9 27.2 
1982 21.9 30.0 
1983 21.4 32.4 
1984 21.5 34.0 
1985 21.8 37.5 
1986 22.4 41.0 
1987 23.1 45.0 
1988 22.9 48.7 
1989 23.5 54.5 
1990 25.3 64.9 
1991 28.3 77.0 
1992 31.2 91.5 
Source: Data compiled by HCFA in National Social and Economie Data Book. 1994. 
(Washington, D.C.: National Center for Health Statistics, 1994). 
CHAPTER 4 
POVERTY, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1980-1992 
Understanding the relationship between health care and economic status provides 
the rationale for government funded medicine. Mortality and morbidity is consistently 
higher among populations unable to access regular and preventive care. The likelihood of 
poor health is intensified with those conditions associated with indigence. The poor, 
African Americans, single female heads of households living on fixed incomes, and the 
elderly are most vulnerable to the exponential rise in medical costs. 
As is the case in many southern states, North Carolina has significant numbers of 
low-income residents. While this state was spared the most severe effects of recent 
economic downturns, an already low per capita income kept many North Carolinians at 
the mercy of the welfare state. State demographics reveal characteristics which place 
citizens at special risk. 
In 1980, 10 percent of North Carolina Whites and 30 percent of African- 
Americans lived below $7412 for a family of four, the official poverty rate. This is a 
situation all too familiar in other southern states where welfare recipients suffer. North 
Carolina has historically left its most desperate citizens at the mercy of assistance. 
Again , this state like many others has left minorities at greater risk. Additionally, during 
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the 1980's twenty percent of Blacks and 10 percent of Whites lived between 100 and 150 
percent of the poverty mark.1 
By 1989, that threshold had risen to $12,675 but this still left the state in a low 
position where family poverty and personal income were used as indicators. Between 
1979 and 1983 the state poverty rate rose from 14.7 percent to 16.7 percent. National 
figures were 13.0 percent in 1980 and 15.2 percent in 1983.2 Table 6 compares North 
Carolina 1979 and 1989 poverty rates to suggest those groups served by the Medicaid and 
AFDC programs, women and children, experienced increases. 
While this state was spared much of the recession's worst effects there were 
hardships. State unemployment peaked at 9 percent in 1982 and 1983 then declined to 6 
percent by 1985 and 5.3 percent in 1986. In 1986, about 170,000 North Carolinians were 
out of work. Of this number, only 29.5 percent received unemployment benefits. 
In many ways the state exceeded the national crisis due primarily to its traditional 
place as a largely rural, significantly Black and Native American southeastern state. 
...These increases suggest that while North Carolina's child poverty rate for 
income year 1979 had come to a rough convergence with the national rate (16% 
18% N.C.) the rate of increase over the recent 4 year period has been higher than 
the nation as a whole, and that the North Carolina rate may be as much as 10 
percentage points higher for the income year 1982.3 
' Delton Atkinson, "The Health of Minorities in North Carolina," CHES Studies , report series by the 
N.C. Department of Environment, Health, and Natural Resources, 43 (March 1987): 3. 
2 N.C. Department of Human Resources, Division of Health Services, Public Health Statistics Branch, 
North Carolina Vital Statistics. 1985. vol. 1, (Raleigh: 1985), 1-4. 
3 Office of Budget and Management, North Carolina State Data Center Newsletter vol.7, (Raleigh: 
April 1986), 6. 
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By the year 1985, North Carolina was still struggling with poverty - lower than 
earlier in the decade - but still high at 14.2 percent. This translated to close to 900,000 
people, almost one-sixth of the entire population in need of assistance. West Virginia 
TABLE 6 
NORTH CAROLINA POVERTY FOR SELECTED POPULATIONS, 1979-1989 
1979 1989 
Number of Families in 
Poverty 
183,146 179,906 
Family in Poverty with 
Children Under 18 
126,676 128,082 
Female Householder 
Families in Poverty with 
Children Under 18 
62,761 81,111 
Families in Poverty with 
Children under 6 
94,676 102,822 
Families in Poverty with 
Person over 65 
137,237 148,381 
Note: Exceptionally high unemployment in 1979 helps to explain the greater number of 
families in poverty. 
ranked 50th with the nation's highest poverty population but North Carolina was not too 
far behind at 38th. Table 7 identifies those counties in the state which were hit hardest 
during the early 1980s due largely to each's large indigent populations. Listed in 
descending order of poverty increases, these 14 counties will reappear as the study 
continues as locations also in need of improved health care. 
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TABLE 7 
NORTH CAROLINA COUNTIES WITH HIGHEST PERCENTAGE OF POVERTY, 
1979-1983 
County 1979 1983 % increase 
Swain 25.9 35.0 9.1 
Columbus 26.3 31.7 5.4 
Martin 23.9 28.7 4.8 
Yancey 23.2 26.7 3.5 
Hoke 20.6 23.2 2.6 
Greene 25.1 27.6 2.5 
Buncombe 12.8 15.1 2.3 
Robeson 24.7 26.9 2.2 
Halifax 29.3 31.0 1.7 
Warren 30.1 31.6 1.6 
Franklin 20.1 21.7 1.6 
Hertford 24.3 25.7 1.4 
Pitt 23.2 24.6 1.4 
Forsyth 11.4 12.7 1.3 
Source: State Data Center, Office of State Budget and Management, North Carolina State 
Center Newsletter , vol 7 (Raleigh, April 1986), 6. 
Table 8 shows the numbers of people in those counties with the highest populations of 
people below the federal poverty level in 1980. These counties typically have higher 
population density than do those featured in Table 7 which accounts for the larger number 
of people. Numbers also appear high because five of the state's six largest cities are 
located in counties with the highest poverty rates in 1980. These are: Charlotte in 
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Mecklenburg county; Greensboro in Guilford county; Raleigh in Wake county; Winston- 
Salem in Forsyth county and Durham in Durham county. 
The economic situation worsened precipitously during the 1980s. When the 
decade opened 16 counties had more than 100 Medicaid eligibles per 1,000 residents. 
That number by 1985 grew to 20; to 34 by 1988; and, to 88 by 1992.4 The increase in 
pregnant women and their children might account for some of this increase, but the four 
fold growth which took place suggests significant numbers of state citizens slipping into 
penury. 
Poverty took its toll even with the cash assistance available from public sources 
such as AFDC. A North Carolina study conducted on adolescent death reveals the human 
costs associated with life below the poverty line. Table 9 uncovers the linkage between 
health and poverty. Even with Medicaid, social and environmental factors continue to 
claim disproportionate numbers of indigent North Carolinians. Discrepancies along 
racial lines continue to hold within the indigent population. The study examined 
mortality between ages of 28 days to 17 years of AFDC and non-AFDC children. Since 
AFDC children have access to Medicaid, the persistence of higher mortality among this 
population was somewhat surprising. Moreover, the years observed, 1985 to 1988 run 
concurrent with both AFDC and Medicaid program expansions. Table 9 brings evidence 
that these programs, while needed, do not do enough. 
4 State Center for Health and Statistics, North Carolina Chartbook on Population and Health 
(Raleigh, 1993), 43. 
108 
TABLE 8 
NORTH CAROLINA FAMILIES BELOW STATE AND FEDERAL POVERTY 
LEVELS IN 1980, 20 HIGHEST COUNTIES 
County Number of Families % of State Total 
Cumberland 9,024 4.93 
Mecklenburg 8,917 4.87 
Guilford 6,996 3.82 
Forsyth 5,588 3.05 
Wake 5,464 2.98 
Robeson 5,285 2.89 
Buncombe 4,586 2.50 
Pitt 3,767 2.06 
Wayne 3,745 2.04 
Gaston 3,734 2.04 
Onslow 3,718 2.03 
Durham 3,684 2.01 
Halifax 3,558 1.94 
New Hanover 3,283 1.79 
Columbus 2,984 1.63 
Johnston 2,950 1.61 
Nash 2,869 1.57 
Craven 2,869 1.57 
Davidson 2,686 1.47 
Lenoir 2,496 1.36 
STATE TOTAL 183,146 
Source: North Carolina Department of Administration, Indicators of Children’s Needs In 
North Carolina (Raleigh. 1984). 
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TABLE 9 
NORTH CAROLINA AFDC AND NON-AFDC MORTALITY RATES BY AGE 
AND RACE, 1985 TO 1988 











643.29 610.62 620.28 300.08 656.23 383.85 
1-4 yrs. 112.93 170.76 152.15 46.88 70.76 53.28 
5-9 yrs. 58.69 72.01 67.81 23.1 36.09 268.45 
10-14 yrs. 68.06 58.25 61.19 25.68 28.92 26.63 
15-17 yrs. 94.19 48.3 61.65 80.21 62.35 75.83 
Source: M. Nelson, Jr., “North Carolina Child Adolescent Mortality,” CHES Studies 65 
(June 1992): 33. 
Note: Rates indicate deaths per 100,000 population. 
Even with this concentration of poverty in urban areas, there remains a perverse 
effect on the poor living in rural areas. The health outcomes of the rural poor cannot be 
overlooked or understated. They are, even with a higher percentage of Medicaid 
physician participation, still not on par with the health services available in the cities. 
Research on rural poverty has been useful and illustrating the dichotomy which persist 
between rural and urban poverty in the United States. The following statement by 
Thomas Lyson examines this inequity. 
Over 25 years ago the president's National Commission on Rural Poverty noted 
the lack of modem health services in rural America, generally and in the rural 
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south in particular. While some improvement has occurred since that 1964 report 
severe disparities between rural and urban areas persist.5 
An exacerbation of those conditions related to poverty and ultimately to health 
care is the disparity between urban and rural AFDC grants. Generally, the grant in rural 
areas is 31 percent less than that received by AFDC recipients in cities and 37 percent less 
than that received in mid-sized jurisdictions. Predictably, these differentials play out in 
mortality rates. Rural and Black Belt grants overall were lower. In the nation, rural 
residents received about 87.8 percent of the amount received in cities while Black Belt 
residents received roughly 82.6 percent that of Whites.6 Lower cost of living standards in 
rural areas offers some explanation of these differentials. Other keys to understanding 
grant discrepancies returns discussion to those very reasons that public welfare was 
federalized. Among those justifications is the arbitrary and sometimes capricious 
methods employed by state and local welfare administrators in determining funding levels 
and service delivery. 
The publication Holes in the Safety Net chastised the state for its inadequate 
service delivery to those in greatest need. Only two states, it reported, had shorter 
outreach. Of the state's AFDC households only 48,276 or 72.2 percent also received 
Food Stamps.7 Outreach into poor communities is essential in this state where 29 percent 
5 Thomas Lyson, Two Sides to the Sunbelt: The Growing Divergence Between Rural and Urban South 
(New York: Praeger, 1980), 60. 
6 Ibid., 69. 
7 Isaac Shapiro and Robert Greenstein, Holes in the Safety Net: Poverty Programs in the States: 
National Overview (Washington, D.C.: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1989 ), 55. 
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of the children in 1990 used the health department for immunizations8 and 42 percent use 
all of the children's services available at the health clinics.9 
State health experts are quick to acknowledge the correlation between economic 
class and health status. 
Social class has a very strong impact on mortality. Social class gradients of 
mortality and life expectancy have been observed for centuries and a vast body of 
evidence has shown consistently that those in the lower classes have higher 
mortality, morbidity and disability rates.10 
Race and Well-Being in North Carolina 
A race and environmental analysis is added to conclude: 
...Differences between white and nonwhite mortality rates can be attributed largely 
to social class differences. Persons in lower socioeconomic groups live in more 
toxic, hazardous, and non-hygienic environments resulting in a broad array of 
disease consequences. Low education contributes to poor health practices and 
low income effects many aspects of health including proper nutrition. Higher 
stress levels and differences in coping with stress also contributes to higher 
mortality among the poor." 
Currently, in the state's population 22 percent are African Americans; 1 percent 
are Native Americans; and, .5 percent are Hispanic. Roughly 75 percent of the 
population is White. Population increases between 1980 and 1990 were the result of in- 
8 State Center for Health Statistics, North Carolina Chartbook , 14. 
9 North Carolina Department of Human Resources, North Carolina Health Statistics Pocket Guide. 1991 
(Raleigh, 1991). 
10 State Center for Health Statistics, Leading Causes of Mortality: North Carolina Vital Statistics . 1981. 
vol.. 2 (Raleigh, 1981), 1-17. 
" Ibid. 
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migration though natural increases occurred in all of the state's three minority 
populations. Within these communities, African Americans experienced a 10 percent 
natural increase; Native Americans, 22 percent; and, the largest natural population 
increase was 34 percent, among people of Hispanic origin.12 
Over half of the state's Native Americans are clustered in 2 counties, Robeson and 
Halifax. Three other counties house an additional 8 percent of the Native American 
population on reservations. These counties are Graham, Swain and Jackson counties. 
Generally, the state's Native American citizens lives a rural lifestyle. Poverty among 
North Carolina's Native Americans is an issue just as it is nationwide. The 1990 U.S. 
Census confirms that 32 percent of all North Carolina Native American children live 
below the federal poverty line. High school graduation for this group is the lowest at 50 
percent. It is significant to note the status of North Carolina Native Americans even 
though they comprise so small a proportion of the residents because only four states have 
larger Native American populations13. Table 10 allows a comparison between the state's 
three major population groups. This is a 1980 snapshot of the age and poverty rates of 
each population. 
Black North Carolinians in most instances are situated in a position as precarious 
as that of the state's Native Americans. The nation's 6th largest African American 
population finds its Black citizens with earnings, employment, and education severely 
lacking. Black North Carolinians consistently earn at least 25 percent of their White 
12 U.S. Census Bureau of Official Statistics. 1990 (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Bureau of Census, 1990). 
13 Atkinson, 3. 
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counterparts leaving about 40 percent of Black children below the poverty line. In 1980, 
the Black high school graduation rate was 58 percent compared with 63 percent for 
Whites and Black unemployment in the state was 9 percent compared with 3 percent for 
Whites. 
TABLE 10 
AGE, SEX AND ECONOMIC COMPARISONS OF NORTH CAROLINA 
WHITE, BLACK AND NATIVE AMERICAN POPULATIONS, 1980 
Whites Blacks Native Americans 
% Under 18 26 35 38.8 
% Over 65 10.9 8.6 5.3 
% Males 48.8 47.5 49.6 
Median Income of Males $12,135 $8,133 $8,227 
Median Income of Females $7,153 $6,062 $5,825 
% Below 100% of Federal 10 30.4 27.9 
Poverty 
% Below 150% of Federal 38.7 69.5 72.4 
Poverty 
Source: U.S. Census. 1980. 
As Table 11 shows, Black North Carolinians earned in 1980 about one-third less 
than their White counterparts in the 16 largest counties. The counties listed have Black 
populations which exceed the state's Black representation of 22 percent. African- 
American family income shown in Table 11 combines Black male and Black female 
earnings to reach the $13,648 average of these 16 counties. 
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TABLE 11 
NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY INCOME BY RACE, 1980 
County White Black 
Durham $24,984 $15,357 
Forsyth $25,355 $15,101 
Gaston $20,621 $15,951 
Guilford $25,543 $15,902 
Halifax $19.042 $10,065 
Buncombe $19,783 $13,114 
Lenoir $20,842 $11,889 
Mecklenburg $27,209 $15,519 
Nash $21,785 $11,434 
New Hanover $23,146 $12,276 
Northampton $19,964 $12,942 
Onslow $16,683 $11,678 
Pitt $21,841 $12,191 
Robeson $20,150 $11,345 
Sampson $17,511 $11,329 
Wake $26,893 $15,347 
AVERAGES $21,008 $13,648 
Source: North Carolina Department of Administration, Indicators of Children’s Needs.... 
70. 
The role which race and ethnicity plays in health care delivery is no less pervasive 
than its impact on living standards. Race and class combine in North Carolina to create 
increased risk of mortality and morbidity. Medicaid and AFDC are not alone in their 
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uneven distribution of service to the poor. A study found that among Medicare patients, 
race was determinant in service delivered. Whites, it was reported, were more likely to 
receive newer high tech treatments and tests. The report's authors also state that "the 
effect of patient race on physician and institutional decision making may be another 
important cause of our findings".14 
The Medicare program is unable to meet the needs of Black clients in the same 
ways that is does for Whites. Poverty rates among Black elderly make for a condition 
which has more Blacks using Medicaid as a supplement to Medicare than is the case 
among elderly Whites. This is the case in North Carolina as it is nationally.15 
A study which measured the health of minorities in the state offered the following: 
...One quick measure which is suggestive of significant disparities in North 
Carolina is life expectancy, a measure which summarizes the overall 
differences in level of mortality among various groups. Minority females 
bom in 1980 had a life expectancy at birth 5.1 years less than that for 
white females....Minority males had a life expectancy at birth 6.3 years 
less than that for white males in 1986. While improvements have been 
made, minorities, of both sexes, still have life expectancies that were 
reached by whites prior to the mid-1950s, a lag of about 30 years.16 
The same study described racial differences in mortality after controlling for 
socioeconomic status. In each case race emerged as the primary determinant.17 The 
following Tables 12 and 13 give infant and fetal death (stillbirth) rates by race. Increases 
14 Jose Escarce, et al, "Racial Differences in the Elderly's Use of Medical Procedures and Diagnostic 
Tests,” American Journal of Public Health .7 ( July 19931: 951. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Atkinson, 4. 
17 Ibid. 
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in both types of mortality in the early 1980s suggest a reaction to restrictive health 
policies. 
TABLE 12 
NORTH CAROLINA INFANT MORTALITY RATES BY RACE, 1975-1985 
Year White Minorities 
1975 14.7 26.6 
1976 14.9 24 
1977 12.2 23.3 
1978 13.1 23.9 
1979 11.2 23.3 
1980 12.1 19.4 
1981 10.7 18.3 
1882 10.9 19.6 
1983 10.5 19.1 
1984 10 18.2 
1985 9.5 17.5 
Source: North Carolina Department of Human Resources, North Carolina Vital Statistics. 
1975 through 1986. 
In instance after instance the differentials between Black and White North 
Carolinian health are confirmed. For instance, the range in quality of prenatal care 
received by Black and White mothers is quite wide. In 1982, 3.9 percent of all White 
mothers who delivered in the state received inadequate care. The corresponding number 
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for Black mothers was 10.7 percent.18 When state health officials attempted to identify 
sociodemographic variables19 most often associated with infant, fetal and maternal 
mortality, minorities again were about 25 percent more likely to be at risk. Through the 
eighties, the problem with high infant mortality remained a concern for health workers 
because even with racial disparities, in 1990, 49 percent of White and 80 percent of 
African American women had one or more of the risk factors.20 
TABLE 13 
NORTH CAROLINA FETAL DEATHS BY RACE, 1978-1985 
Year Whites All Minorities 
1978 8.5 16.4 
1979 8.9 15.4 
1980 8.2 14.7 
1981 8.1 14.5 
1982 8.4 13.2 
1983 7.8 13.8 
1984 7.7 11.3 
1985 7.2 11.8 
Source: Atkinson, 18. 
18 The Kessner Index is used to measure prenatal care. It is based on 3 variables: trimester in which 1st 
prenatal visit occurred; number of prenatal visits; and, number of weeks of gestation at the time of delivery. 
19 Variables include: Maternal age under 18 or over 34; education under 12 years; single marital status; 
previous fetal death; previous live bom, now dead. 
20 Atkinson, 19. 
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Contrary to popular opinion, race in many instances, surpasses education as a 
variable for health status. To illustrate this point, the North Carolina project noted that 
between 1980 and 1984 Whites had a lower neonatal21 rate than nonwhites regardless of 
education. In fact, the neonatal rate actually widened with increasing education. Stated 
differently, the most educated minorities were at greater risk for neonatal death than the 
least educated whites22 Assumptions that increased education leads to greater income and 
presumably greater access to health care are challenged with this finding. Other 
possibilities may rest with the delivery of health care systems or with the overall health of 
the state's minority populations. In their own examination of this curiosity Paul Buescher 
and Jack Leiss suggest, 
... At the same educational level as whites, blacks may have different occupational 
characteristics which could beassociated with increased worksite risks and with 
less adequate health insurance coverage, affecting access to health care. Several 
authors have suggested that racism and racial discrimination may be a factor in 
higher black mortality in the United States.23 
In an analysis of morbidity, data disaggregated by race marks the victims of 
certain diseases in 1985. Table 14 provides the rates but speculations as to why certain 
diseases are more prevalent among particular populations is often a matter of conjecture. 
For example, that North Carolina Whites smoke cigarettes at a higher rate than Blacks at 
every age level24 goes far in explaining the increased chances of lung cancer among this 
21 Death within 28 days of birth 
22 Atkinson, 6. 
23 Paul A. Buescher and Jack K. Leiss, "Race, Education, and Mortality in North Carolina" CHES 
Studies 82 (April 1994), 9. 
24 North Carolina Department of Human Resources, North Carolina Pocket Guide. 1991. 
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group. Similarly, information about mortality rates for an illness such as cancer may give 
insights into the availability and usage of early diagnoses by various populations. Finally, 
statistics linking medical conditions such as high blood pressure with stroke hints at how 
and if an affected population goes about preempting the one condition before it 
developments into the other. 
TABLE 14 
NORTH CAROLINA ADULTS REPORTING ILLNESS BY RACE, 1985 
Illness Whites All Minorities 
Arthritis 25% 28% 
High Blood Pressure 17% 30% 
Heart Disease 7% 5% 
Kidney Disease 6% 5% 
Lung Disease 4% 2% 
Diabetes 3% 7% 
Cancer 4% 3% 
Stroke 2% 3% 
Source: Atkinson, 9. 
Between 1981 and 1990 all cancers except breast cancer decreased 5 percent. 
However, cancer rates in the state were up by 7 percent between 1981 and 1985 and it has 
remained the state's number two killer for Blacks and Whites alike. Breast cancer for 
White women alone went up 9.8 percent. African American women at 16.4 percent 
between 1981 and 1984 overwhelmingly faced the threat of death from cancer. A 
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contradiction between official state data and the patient reporting which took place in 
Table 14 illuminates a major problem. That is, the likelihood that patients in general and 
cancer patients in particular are not reporting the disease in any way which reflects its true 
incidence in the state. There is the real possibility that failure to get early diagnosis, often 
a fatal mistake, is reflected with the very low numbers of people reporting disease from 
both populations. 
Pneumonia and influenza rose 22 percent from 1984 to 1986 and 43 percent 
between 1982 and 1985. Diabetes rose 24 percent and chronic pulmonary disease 
increased 12 percent. The virus which causes AIDS was first recorded in North Carolina 
in 1984. Since that time to 1992, 700 Black and 425 White cases have been reported.25 
Age adjusted mortality showed wide gaps between males and females as well as 
between Whites and nonwhites. Between 1979 and 1981, 34 percent more males died 
than did females. The male rate for both races was nearly double the female rates and the 
nonwhite mortality incidence for both sexes was 40 percent above that for Whites.26 
Life expectancy rates in 1990 for Black males averaged 6.3 years below their 
White counterparts. For Black and White females the discrepancy was 4.9 years. For 
Black males the range of medical difficulties was and remains wide. This is a pattern 
which continued throughout the entire period studied. The gap only widended at times 
when the state was less willing to devote proper attention to preventive medicine. Major 
25 North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Leading Causes of Mortality in North Carolina. 
1980 through 1992.. 
26 North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Leading Causes of Mortality in North Carolina. 
1981. 1-20. 
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hurdles can be associated with the perinatal period; increasing numbers of homicide; and, 
with rising motor vehicle accidents.27 
Cancers and diabetes emerge as significant medical obstacles, especially for the 
state's minority population. Of all the diabetes cases reported between 1987 and 1991, 
half were Black. Blacks also are less likely to receive the early diagnosis. . 
North Carolina Vital Statistics 1982 confirmed the risk factors associated with 
African American and Native American residents. The incidence of death for minority 
children 0-4 years was 85 percent higher than their White counterparts. Similarly, non¬ 
white adults aged 25-34 and 35-44 were twice as likely to die as White adults of the same 
age. When North Carolina age-specific deaths for 1981 were compared with national 
figures, the state was in excesses of 10 to 30 percent in the following groups: 
~ White males aged 55 -64; 
~ White females aged 5-14; 
~ Nonwhite males in all 10 year age groups over 35 -44; 
~ Nonwhite females ages 0-4 and 45 - 54.28 
The state had the 8th highest premature birth rate in the nation. The percentage of 
North Carolina premature birth rates was 8.1 percent in 1978 and 1979 and 8.0 percent in 
1982. For non-whites the premature rate was twice that for Whites29. 
27 North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Leading Causes of Mortality in North Carolina. 
1991.4-1. 
28 North Carolina Department of Human Resources, North Carolina Vital Statistics. 1982 vol. 1. 
29 Ibid., 1-5. 
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Total numbers of North Carolina deaths increased in 1983, 3.4 percent over the 
1982 figures. Age-sex-race specific death rates for 1983 for the following groups30 are: 
~ Nonwhite males under age 1: 17.9 percent above the U.S. rate; 
~ Nonwhite males aged 1 - 4 : 25.3 percent above the U.S. rate; 
~ Nonwhite males aged 5 - 14: 18.9 percent below the U.S. rate; 
~ Nonwhite males aged 15 -24: 24.2 percent below the U.S. rate; 
~ Nonwhite males aged 55 - 64: 16 percent above the U.S. rate; 
~ Nonwhite males aged 65 - 74: 15 percent below the U.S. rate; 
~ Nonwhite females under age 1: 16.4 percent above the U.S. rate; 
~ Nonwhite females aged 5 - 14: 23.3 percent above the U.S. rate; 
~ Nonwhite females aged 35 - 44: 17.3 percent above the U.S. rate.31 
Table 15 illustrates the disproportionate effects of mortality on North Carolina's primary 
race and ethnic populations. Excluding the over 85 age group, Black and Native 
Americans in every age category die at higher rates than Whites. 
The incidence of selected health indicators over the decade allows health care 
policy makers to target illness in specific populations. By and large even those Black 
rates which improved over the decade did so at an incidence lower than improvements for 
Whites. An uneven health care delivery system may be the culprit as may be the presence 
of economic variables which prevent the regular attention to personal well-being. 
30 The groups indicated are those at least 15 percent above or below U.S. rates. 
31 North Carolina Department of Human Resources, North Carolina Vital Statistics. 1983. 
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TABLE 15 
NORTH CAROLINA MORTALITY RATES BY AGE, RACE AND ETHNICITY, 
1987 TO 1991 
Aee Group Whites Blacks Native Americans 
Under 1 yr. 880.4 1795.4 1174.7 
04 45.7 86.1 98.3 
5 - 14 25 37 51.6 
15-24 92.6 117.6 127.2 
25-34 111 252.2 180.4 
35-44 176.7 448.2 274.3 
45-54 438.6 985 484.5 
55 -64 1,198.4 2,046.9 1,391.4 
65 -74 2,682.4 3,836.5 2,921.3 
75 -84 6,134.8 7,073.3 6,038.3 
Over 85 15,253.5 1,3287 13,530.5 
Source: Atkinson, 19. 
North Carolina Regional Health Characteristics 
Data disaggregated by region reveals two health care (HSA) areas of the state 
particularly problematic where infant death, fetal death neonatal death, postneonatal death 
and low birthweights are concerned. The Capital, Cardinal and Eastern regions all rank 
high in these selected infant health measures throughout the 1980s. In each measure the 
non-white rate is significantly higher than the rates for White infants. Table 16 illustrates 
the lead position that each of these 3 regions takes during selected years. In each of the 
two year increments shown, one of these three regions was prevalent in at least one 
measure of mortality. 
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A distinctive feature of these regions is each's significant Black populations. The 
Cardinal district, for instance had in the early 1980s, 15 counties. Of the 15, 10 had 
Black populations ranging from Richmond county with 27 percent to Robeson county's 
61 percent. Similarly, in both the Capital and Eastern districts three-fourths of the 
counties African Americans comprise at least 23 percent of the citizens.32 
TABLE 16 
PERCENTAGE MEASURES OF INFANT, FETAL, NEONATAL MORTALITY 










White 10.3 8.7 
Non-white 18.7 13 
Capital, 1982 
White 10.5 7.5 
Non-white 23.7 18.9 
Eastern, 1984 
White 8.7 6.6 
Non-white 11.2 12 
Capital, 1984 
White 10.2 6.6 
Non-white 20.8 12 
32 North Carolina Department of Administration, Indicators of Children's Needs .... 29. 
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White 8.4 5.1 




Source: North Carolina Department of Human Resources, North Carolina Vital 
Statistics. 1982 through 1992. 
Note: Rates indicate death per 1,000 births. 
Of the state's six largest cities, only two, Raleigh and Durham are in one of the 
three regions with the highest infant, fetal and neonatal mortality rates. However, an 
observation of the counties serving the largest Medicaid populations turns up five of the 
six cities. Table 17 ranks the 15 counties with the highest numbers of children 
participating in North Carolina Medicaid as well as identifies those counties with the 
state's largest cities. Presumably, a substantial number of those children receiving 
Medicaid are residents of these urban centers. Table 18 similarly ranks counties, this 
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time, though, those with the highest proportion of Medicaid births. In this table it is 
important to consider the overall impact of poverty on the community. High percentages 
of Medicaid births is testament to a high probability of poor health or poor health care 
among residents. 
TABLE 17 
NORTH CAROLINA COUNTIES SERVING LARGEST NUMBER OF 
MEDICAID CHILDREN UNDER 18,1984 
County Number of Children Receiving 
Medicaid 
Mecklenburg (Charlotte) 9,399 
Cumberland 7,443 
Forsyth (Winston-Salem) 5,725 
Guilford (Greensboro) 5,698 
Robeson 5,418 
Wake (Raleigh) 4,288 
Halifax 3,561 








Source: Office of Budget and Management, Statistical Abstract of North Carolina 
Counties. 1984, C-24. 
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TABLE 18 
NORTH CAROLINA COUNTIES WITH HIGHEST PROPORTION OF BIRTHS 
OF MEDICAID MOTHERS, 1989 
County Percentage of Medicaid 
Births 
Number of Total Births 
Tyrell 6.0% 47 
Swain 57.6% 203 
Halifax 57.2% 925 
Hyde 55.4% 74 
Bertie 54.7% 309 
Northampton 52.6% 342 
Scotland 52.3% 568 
Hertford 51.6% 380 
Graham 50.8 118 
Bladen 49.8% 454 
Robeson 49.1% 1890 
Edgecombe 48.8% 986 
Sampson 48.5% 717 
Washington 47.9% 217 
Jackson 47.7% 306 
Source: Kaufman, 11. 
In 1989, 23 of the state's 100 counties had 40 percent or more Medicaid births. In 
an additional 29 counties Medicaid births accounted for over 30 percent of all deliveries 
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so that by 1990 almost one-third of all children bom in North Carolina were Medicaid 
enrollees.33 Table 19 depicts the steady incline in the numbers of Medicaid births 
between 1986 and 1989. State and federal program expansions aimed primarily at 
pregnant women and young children were no doubt responsible for this increase. 
TABLE 19 
NORTH CAROLINA TOTAL MEDICAID BIRTHS AND TOTAL BIRTHS, 1986 
THROUGH 1989 
Year Medicaid Births Total Births Percent of Births 
Under 
Medicaid 
1986 14,855 90,228 16.4 
1987 16,506 93,481 17.7 
1988 22,957 97,560 23.5 
1989 29,972 102,091 29.4 
Source: Kaufman, 11. 
Questions as to the necessity of government funded health care for the poor are 
answered by observing the sheer numbers of people served by this program. Even when 
those receiving benefits do not meet expectations for improved health, consideration of 
the fate of people without the benefit of Medicaid is menacing. Table 20 is instructive in 
that it addresses this very issue - differences between Medicaid and non-Medicaid well¬ 
being. This measure is of birthweights among infants born in 1986. By far, those not 
33 Ibid. 
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receiving Medicaid benefits fare better in almost every weight and care category. The 
White, non-White dichotomy still exists even within the Medicaid, non-Medicaid 
categories, though the differential closes somewhat within the Medicaid population. This 
points, once again to the dominance of race in the delivery of health care. 
TABLE 20 
NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID AND NON-MEDICAID BIRTH WEIGHTS 
AND CARE INDICATORS IN PERCENTAGE, 1988 
ALL STATE RESIDENTS MEDICAID RECIPIENTS 




1 2.7 1.6 2.4 1.9 2.8 
Inadequate 
Prenatal 




0.9 3.1 1.6 1.7 3.3 2.7 
Source: Kaufman, 4. 
The national issue of access to health care insurance comes into clearer focus 
when race and class analyses are employed. Among Whites, 91 percent of all those in the 
highest income brackets are always insured. Figures for Blacks and Hispanics in the 
same income brackets are 87 and 79 percents, respectively34. State regional studies show 
34 Harvey Nelson, "22-25 Million Not Covered, Study Finds," Los Angeles Times. 4 Nov. 1981, Cl. 
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the Health Service Areas, Cardinal, Capital and Eastern overrepresented with uninsured 
citizens. Between the 3 regions over 115,000 residents lived below the federal poverty 
threshold and were without insurance35. In the state 14 percent were, in 1992, uninsured, 
22 percent were publicly insured; and, the remaining 64 percent had private insurance.36 
North Carolina state officials acknowledged this care deficit early in the 1980s in 
a review of state medical facilities. This state identifies "medically underserved" groups 
in the Certificate of Need Law which requires medical facilities to outline plans for 
serving the needs of the state's medically underserved population. The primary groups 
identified as medically underserved are low-income persons, racial and ethnic minorities, 
women, handicapped persons, and those who have traditionally experienced difficulties in 
obtaining equal access to health services..."37 
Community health care workers are especially vigilant in addressing the needs of 
poor residents as it is often they who treat disproportionate numbers of indigent patients. 
State by state analysis of this vulnerable population exposes the extent to which the poor 
are not being served medically. Using 1990 Census data of North Carolina's 6 million 
35 Tom Blakely, et al, Geographic Distribution of the Medically Uninsured Poor and of Inpatient Care 
Patterns in North Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of Chapel Hill Press, 1986), 57. 
36 National Association of Community Health Centers, Access to Community Health Care: A State and 
National Data Book. 1992 (Washington, D.C., 1992), 6. 
37 North Carolina Department of Human Resources, State Facilities Plan 1983 (Raleigh, 1983), 28. 
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plus population an estimated one-sixth are medically underserved38. Of that number only 
15 percent are being treated in community or migrant health centers.39 
A methodology which quantified factors such as the frequency of medical 
treatment, morbidity and mortality and determined "at risk" status defined parameters for 
the "medically underserved" designation. In 1992, among the most vulnerable populations 
were the 345,000 migrant and seasonal workers; the 5,400 infants bom who received no 
or inadequate prenatal care; the 2,085 AIDS patients (cumulative cases); the 65,000 frail 
elderly; and, the 200,000 unemployed persons40. 
A regional analysis of the state's most susceptible sites points to those counties 
and cities where the citizens appear to be most deeply trapped in poverty. Those with the 
highest proportions of residents on Medicaid (see Table 17) and the largest numbers and 
percentages living in poverty (see Tables 7 and 8 ) are likely to have a plethora of citizens 
in danger of poor health. 
An assessment of those counties was undertaken by a group attempting to target 
specific locations which meet this profile. Similar to other efforts, this project used a 
methodology to determine "underserved" which examined not only medical variables but 
which also included social and economic factors, such as per capita, unemployment, 
population density, and racial and ethnic identification. They added service access 
variables such as the ratio of physicians to the population and the number of emergency 
38 North Carolina was one of only 16 states with over 1 million residents at risk for medical under 
service. 
39 National Association of Community Health Centers, Access to Community Health..., 5. 
40 Ibid. 
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room visits, to help construct a picture of the medically underserved community. Finally, 
the medical variables were many of those frequently used by health care statisticians. 
Those particular to this project included low birthweights and high mortality for 
immunizable diseases41. 
Findings from North Carolina were almost alarming. Thirty-five, or over one- 
third, of the state's counties were designated as having severely medically underserved 
populations (MUC). An additional 79 had problematic health care systems: low per 
capitas, and other warning indicators, but not necessarily a combination of all these 
factors42. A focus on the 35 most severe counties revealed the high percentage of 
African-Americans. Remembering the predominance of race as a health status indicator 
brings special significance to this finding. Of the 35 counties, 12 have Blacks represented 
between 30 and 40 percent of the population and in an additional 15, Blacks comprise 
between 40 and 64 percent of county residents. 
Moreover, within the 35 counties the medically underserved residents averaged 28 
percent of the total populations. This was the case across the various population densities 
which characterize North Carolina. Probably most notable, however, was the clustering 
of counties in the 3 health service areas mentioned earlier, Capital, Cardinal and Eastern. 
Thirty-one of the 35 are located in one of these regions. Table 21 considers all of these 
variables as each applies to those counties identified as "medically underserved". 
41 Daniel Hawkins, Jr., et al Lives in Balance: The Health Status of America's Medically Underserved 




NORTH CAROLINA COUNTIES WITH SEVERELY MEDICALLY 
UNDERSERVED POPULATIONS AND THE LARGEST PERCENTAGES OF 
AFRICAN-AMERICANS LOCATIONED IN CARDINAL, CAPITAL OR 
EASTERN HEALTH SERVICE AREAS (HSA) 
County % of African- 
Americans 
% of Medically 
Underserved 
HSA Location 
Anson 47 25 Cardinal 
Beaufort 32 27 Cardinal 
Bertie 60 33 Cardinal 
Bladen 40 30 Cardinal 
Brunswick NA 24 Cardinal 
Columbus 32 21 Cardinal 
Cumberland 38 17 Cardinal 
Duplin 34 28 Eastern 
Edgecombe 52 32 Eastern 
Franklin 41 17 Capital 
Granville 45 22 Capital 
Halifax 50 31 Eastern 
Harnett NA 22 Cardinal 
Hertford 56 29 Eastern 
Hoke 57 24 Cardinal 
Hyde 34 33 Eastern 
Johnston NA NA Capital 
Lenoir 39 25 Eastern 
Martin 45 29 Eastern 
Montgomery NA 21 Cardinal 
Nash 33 23 Eastern 
134 
Table 21 (continued) 
County 
% of African- 
Americans 
% of Medically 
Underserved 
HSA Location 
Northhampton 61 33 Eastern 
Pasquotank 37 21 Eastern 
Person 32 23 Capital 
Pitt 35 22 Eastern 
Richmond 27 22 Cardinal 
Robeson 67 26 Cardinal 
Sampson 36 26 Cardinal 
Scotland 43 21 Cardinal 
Swain 26 26 Eastern 
Tyrell 67 32 Eastern 
Vance 44 25 Capital 
Warren 64 32 Capital 
Washington 44 25 Cardinal 
Wilson 37 23 Eastern 
Source: Hawkins, et al. Lives in Balance.. ,17. 
Health care policies promulgated by the Medicaid and Women, Infants and 
Children's programs had a challenge in addressing the health needs of North Carolinians. 
The extent to which program administrators and state political elites met this challenge 
has much to do with political variables as it does with economic determinants. 
Answering the Reagan call for public welfare contraction placed thousands of state 
residents at even greater risk than many already faced. 
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While some advances took place such as the recognition and subsequent 
implementation of programs geared towards the reduction of infant mortality, for the 
most part, North Carolina health policy authorities clearly needed to articulate policy 
alternatives which challenged the threat to the delivery of quality, affordable medicine. 
Further efforts geared towards diminishing the racial and environmental causes of poor 
health would go far in reducing much of the need for expansive health care systems. 
Otherwise, growing numbers of indigents will continue to suffer from the whims of 
restrictive medical and nutrition policies. 
CHAPTER 5 
NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID, 1980-1992 
... It's all fresh evidence that the Reagan team failed to do its homework in 
some areas. A spokesman for the Office of Management and Budget 
admitted - with a red face. We hope there had been no state-by-state 
analysis of how the Reagan cuts might hit families.1 
...Federal standards (and programs) are strongest for the elderly and 
weakest for single people and childless couples who are neither elderly or 
disabled. The weaker the federal standards, the more important are state 
decisions in determining the nature and extent of government assistance 
for low income households.2 
As in other states, North Carolina public in the popular mind with controlling and 
protecting society from the dangerous cl welfare is linked asses as well as reflecting the 
local culture's interpretation of a Christian ethic. Among the earliest descriptions of the 
state's welfare function is the following portrait of duties and responsible officials of 
those caring for the indigent. 
Beneficent provision for the poor, the unfortunate and orphan, being one of the 
first duties of a civilized and Christian State, the General Assembly shall, at its 
first session, appoint and define the duties of a Board of Public Charities, to 
whom shall be entrusted the supervision of all charitable and penal institutions, 
and who shall annually report to the Governor upon their condition, with 
suggestion for their improvement. 
'"Hasty Budget Cuts", Chicago Sun-Times 23 March 1981, sec. A2 
2 
Shapiro and Greenstein, 6. 
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...At the county level, the commissioners were authorized to levy taxes for the 
maintenance, comfort, and well-ordering of the poor.3 
The state's political culture says everything about its treatment of social welfare 
issues. In this way North Carolina receives a good deal of criticism, even when viewed 
within the context of other southeastern states. What does surface is the 
acknowledgement that compromises on social issues like civil rights and indigent health 
care allows for an environment more amenable to business and economic growth than one 
which gives these matters a high profile confrontational position. 
...Still the extent to which economic growth does or does not 
line up with the interests of the state's poor people speaks to the willingness of 
modernizers to embrace indigent issues. In North Carolina little, if any attention 
has been paid to improving the status of the state's indigent population.4 
For example, in a 1988 General Assembly session discussion to give R.J. 
Reynolds/Nabisco a $20 million tax break few questions were raised about the measure's 
detrimental effects on education and health care reform by routing tax dollars to 
corporations which might otherwise be used to resuscitate the state's anemic health and 
education systems.5 During that same session funds on a health care program for indigent 
North Carolinians was postponed. The personal income tax issue further highlights the 
state's lack of empathy for its poor. North Carolina is among 13 states where a 4-person 
family earning below $10,000 may pay in excess of $100 annually in state taxes. 
3 Ibid., 11. 
4 Luebke, 81 
Ibid., 189. 5 
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Understanding the place of indigent health care in a state which wants to 
experience economic growth but which has traditionally not prioritized poor people's 
issues is a challenge. To repeat a theme mentioned earlier, close attention paid to the 
beneficiaries of particular policies helps to explain the favor with which legislators give 
consideration to state and local interests. A lobby of medical care providers may be in a 
better position to argue for health care expansions affecting the poor than the poor 
themselves. AFDC recipients have had little success asserting the need for increases in 
their grants. For them the impetus has had to come from Washington. 
Knowing this adds insight into the state of North Carolina health care when the 
1980s began. When money for the largest indigent health care policy was about to 
undergo its most dramatic cuts, North Carolina had the nation's 6th highest infant 
mortality rate; was 29th in state and local health care expenditures; and, ranked 46th in 
overall public welfare spending. 
North Carolina Medicaid Spending 
The state Medicaid program is in many ways a reflection of the state political 
culture. North Carolina when compared with its southeastern counterparts has one of the 
more generous programs, but when viewed within a national context, is severely lacking. 
Evidence suggests that at the same time that the need for social services grew, most states 
were slow to answer the call. 
Nationally between 1980 and 1985 the number of children receiving Medicaid 
increases by 2.5%. But during that same period the percentage of children living 
below federal poverty increased by 13%. In real numbers this represents about 1 
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million poor children whose families' incomes fell between the federal poverty 
standard and the states' income eligibility standards.6 
An examination of the state's system between 1980 and 1992 underscores that 
much of the movement came not as the result of state initiative, but rather from federal 
mandates. The state's low per capita income, $7412 in 1980, attests to the need for 
expansive social services, yet legislative discussion did not dwell on this population. A 
public citizen research group observed this about the North Carolina program in 1987. 
North Carolina's Medicaid program is wholly inadequate across the board, with 
narrow eligibility, strict limits on some basic services, a large numbers of patient 
copayment requirements, and other problems. Its particular distinction is that it 
shares with New Jersey the lowest provider (physician and nursing home bed) 
availability in the nation...7 
This same study noted that these problems placed additional burden on an already 
destitute population. Narrow eligibility was cited as a serious problem because state 
administrators included all optional groups within its medically needy program, but were 
quite restrictive with its categorically needy populations like AFDC.8 
North Carolina Medicaid did not reach very far. For every 100 residents below 
the federal poverty level in 1982, the state made Medicaid available to 25. When placed 
6 Susan S. Laudicina and Debra J. Lipson Medicaid and Poor Children: State Variations and Eligibility 
Coverage (Alexandria, Va.: National Association of Children's Hospitals and Related Institutions, 1988), 
8. 
7 Karen Erdman and Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D., Poor Health Care for Poor Americans: A Ranking of 
State Medicaid Programs (Washington, D.C.: Public Citizen Health Research Group, 1987), 172. 
Ibid., 173. 
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in a national context, South Dakota was lowest at 17 per 100 people below federal 
poverty while Hawaii covered all of its citizens living in this income range.9 
The vendor payment aspect of indigent as well as elderly health care programs 
places them in a category unlike those which deliver cash assistance to participants. It is 
difficult to know the exact impact that cash grants, say from a program like AFDC, has 
on the local economy. With Medicaid and Medicare, though, it is possible to know the 
exact proportions each consumes in an economy's health care delivery system. In North 
Carolina, between 1981 and 1985 Medicare lead as the single source for hospital revenue 
with 38 percent of all admissions. Medicaid, was also significant as its clients 
represented 7 percent of all hospital patients.10 
North Carolina between 1980 and 1992 had to decide how it was going to keep its 
Medicaid program afloat. Federal cuts left state and local administrators in a quandary. 
Eligibility restrictions, service reductions and freezes in provider payments combined to 
navigate the state through the early 1980s health care crisis. Table 22 illustrates the 
states' Medicaid expenditures between 1979 and 1992. The slow growth in expenditures 
is not matched with the decline in recipiency demonstrated in Table 23. With the 
exception of 1986, the numbers of people served decreased steadily until 1987. Rising 
health care costs are responsible for the gradual rise in program expenditures. The 
9 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Healthcare Financing Program Statistics: Analysis 
of State Medicaid Program Characteristics. 1984 ('Baltimore: Government Printing Office, 1984), 154. 
10 North Carolina Hospital Association, North Carolina Hospital Facts. 1987 (Raieign, 1987), 14. 
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dramatic expenditure increases during the odd years reflects the allocation years in the 
state's General Assembly. Legislators made large program allowances knowing more 
monies would not be available for two years and also in consideration of the impact of 
rising health care costs on the program's budget. 
TABLE 22 
NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID EXPENDITURES 
(FEDERAL, STATE, COUNTY SPENDING) 
Year Expenditures ($) % Change 
1979 379,769,848 23.8 
1980 410,053,625 8.0 
1981 507,602,694 23.8 
1982 521,462,961 2.7 
1983 570,309,294 9.4 
1984 657,763,927 15.3 
1985 665,526,678 1.2 
1986 758,115,890 13.9 
1987 861,175,819 13.6 
1988 983,464,113 14.2 
1989 1,196,905,351 21.7 
1990 1,427,672,567 19.3 
1991 1,942,016,092 36.0 
1992 2,478,709,587 27.6 




NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID ELIGIBLES AND RECIPIENTS 
1980-1992 
Year Eligibles Recipients 
1979 453,174 388.3 
1980 455,174 376.7 
1981 459,364 382,386 
1982 425,233 353,841 
1983 415,552 349,053 
1984 407,806 345,894 
1985 414,353 343.2 
1986 441,930 378.2 
1987 452,025 259,693 
1988 481,326 404,118 
1989 561,053 468,716 
1990 638,340 544,528 
1991 751,617 633,325 
1992 877,923 759,975 
Source: North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Medicaid Annual Report. 1980 
through 1992. 
Note: Eligibles are persons enrolled in the Medicaid program while recipients are those 
who actually received medical care. 
Between FY 1980 and 1989 total Medicaid cost in North Carolina tripled from 
$410 million to almost $1.2 billion. During the same period the number of state residents 
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eligible for the program increased by roughly 23 percent from 455,700 to 561,053 
persons. 
North Carolina legislation passed in 1981 prohibited counties from increasing 
their financial participation rate to offset reduced or eliminated federal funding to any 
amount greater than the current county proportion of the non-federal share. They were 
also prohibited from transferring matching funds from programs no-longer needed to 
other jointly funded programs." In this vein, Mecklenburg County which houses 
Charlotte, the state's largest city, was allowed to appropriate beyond property tax funding 
for social services for its citizens only when poverty was not a criteria for participation12. 
This measure aimed only at Mecklenburg County speaks to the state's anticipation of 
budget shortfalls for indigent social services in this large urban center. 
The North Carolina General Assembly in the same session created a new state- 
county budgeting process for social welfare programs. The Secretary of the Department 
of Human Resources was to give each county an estimate of federal and state funds 
available to that county for social service and public assistance programs. To be included 
with this report was the percentage of county participation expected for the next fiscal 
year as well as notification of any budgetary changes13. 
11 Ann Sawyer, ed., North Carolina Legislation. 1981 (Chapel Hill: Institute of Government, University 
of North Carolina, 1981), 272. 
12 Ibid., 273. 
13 Ibid., 272. 
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As mentioned earlier, the formula for financing Medicaid varies depending upon a 
states' average per capita. Table 24 shows the federal contribution to North Carolina 
Medicaid between 1979 and 1992. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) 1981 
legislated reductions of 3, 4 and 4.5 percents in the federal contribution for fiscal years 
1982, 1983 and 1984. The numbers shown in the Table 24 indicate the Federal Matching 
Assistance Programs (FMAP) formula without the OBRA reductions. Cuts for 1982 
through 1984 made the actual rates 65.77 in 1982; 65.10 in 1983; and, 66.41 in 1984. To 
arrive at the actual rates, the FMAP formula was used then the 3.4 and 4.5 percent 
reductions in the federal contributions were calculated. 
TABLE 24 
FEDERAL PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTIONS TO NORTH CAROLINA 
MEDICAID IN 1979-1992, BEFORE OBRA 1981 REDUCTIONS 
YEAR FMAP YEAR FMAP 
1979 1986 69.18 
1980 67.64* 1987 
1981 1988 68.68 
1982** 67.81* 1989 68.01 
1983** 1990 67.46 
1984** 69.54* 1991 66.1 
1985 1992 66.52 
Source: North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Medicaid Annual Report. 1980 
through 1992. 
Note: * Incongruencies between federal fiscal year (October 1 to September 30) and state 
fiscal year (July 1 to June 30) leaves a quarter overlap on each funding year. Rates, 
however, are calculated by HCFA which uses the federal fiscal year. 
** Denotes years when OBRA 1981 reduced the federal contribution 
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Decreases in the federal budget did not ensure the shrinkage of Medicaid. 
Medicaid's entitlement status coupled with a sagging economy and rising health care costs 
created rising expenditures even though the dole did not expand to permit entry of many 
in the state's impoverished citizens. Research on the impact of federal matching rates 
demonstrates that fiscal resources has less to do with the extent of Medicaid coverage. 
Poorer states like, North Carolina, with a high FMAP tend to actually spend less than 
states with higher per capita's on Medicaid14. What often is delivered is wide shallow 
coverage to the large numbers of people eligible for a restrictive dole.15 
The percentages spent on each eligibility group in 1980 reveals that North 
Carolina joined the nations spending patterns on each of the major populations served by 
the Medicaid program. The bulk of expenditures go to the elderly and disabled recipients. 
A breakdown of each group in Table 25 aids in clarifying the direction of spending. 
Between 1981 and 1982 inpatient and outpatient hospital spending for Aged, Blind, and 
Disabled beneficiaries consumed 55 percent of all inpatient costs; 39.6 percent of 
outpatient costs; 100 percent of skilled nursing facility (SNF) money; 81.2 percent of 
prescription drugs dollars; 77.6 percent of clinic spending; and, 43.1 percent of the 
14 General Accounting Office, report to Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. Senate, Medicaid:Interstate 
Variations in Benefits and Expenditures . 99th Cong., lstsess., 1987, 2. 
15 Ibid. 
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physician budget.16 Most of remainder of these services went to AFDC children and 
adults. 
TABLE 25 
MEDICAID IN NORTH CAROLINA: EXPENDITURE 
PERCENTAGES BY MAJOR POPULATION GROUPS, 1980 




Source: North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Medicaid Annual Report. 1980 
through 1992. 
Similarly, in 1980 institutional care accounted for over 70 percent of all the state's 
Medicaid expenditures. Hoping to shave money from the institutional care budget, state 
health administrators encourgaged home health care and outpatient services. Within 1 
year the home health budget increased the most dramatically at 87 percent17. 
Because each group utilizes services differently expansions or limitations in 
spending are likely to have uneven effects across the various populations. For example, 
in 1981-1982 aged expenditures for inpatient hospital were 9.2 percent of that group's 
total spending. For AFDC children this same service comprised over 53 percent of their 
16 North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Medicaid Annual Report. 1981- 82. 23. 
17 Ibid., 8. 
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budget18. Given this, reducing hospital expenditures may remove more dollars from the 
elderly's services because they spend more. This would have a striking effect on AFDC 
children because, while their costs are fewer, proportionally they use inpatient services 
more. 
Throughout the 1980's North Carolina's largest proportion of Medicaid spending 
was on long-term care for the elderly and chronically ill rather than on acute care for 
disabled and lower income adults and children. After OBRA 1981, the slow expansion of 
long term spending for the aged, blind and disabled corresponded with the decline of 
spending for other groups.19 In 1982, the North Carolina program spent $531 per AFDC 
enrollee. Only 5 states spent less. The medically needy, an optional group comprised 
more of the elderly and those in need of long term care claimed the lion's share of the 
budget at $6407 per enrollee.20 
A disaggregation of North Carolina Medicaid spending reveals how the state 
allocates according to age, race and gender. Tables 26 and 27 furnish the population 
composition as well as budget allocations for each group between 1980 and 1992. A 
number of trends are observable. First, whites have increased proportionally during the 
twelve years studied. The 8 percentage point rise in the white population on Medicaid is 
matched by roughly the same decrease in the proportion of Black North Carolinians 
enrolled in the program. While this does not necessarily indicate a drop in the real 
18 North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Medicaid Annual Report , 1981-1982. 25. 
19 General Accounting Office, Medicaid: Interstate Variations..., 10. 
20 Ibid. 
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numbers of Blacks served, it does mean that the White rate of growth has outpaced the 
rate for Blacks. 
An enigma is the inverse relationship between White and Black funding levels 
given respective proportional representation. For example, in 1982, the percentage of 
whites in the Medicaid population was, 37.9 percent and was funded at 59.2 percent. 
Their Black counterparts that same year made up 58.2 percent of the population yet were 
funded at 38.5 percent. This leads to a number of concerns arise as to the equity in service 
delivery for the two populations, especially when data indicates the relatively poor health 
of the state's Black residents. 
Additionally, there is a noticeable decline in spending for Native American and 
Hispanic populations which is incongruent with population growth. The years in 
question are 1983 through 1988. A comparable decline in the percentages of elderly 
spending this time after 1988 is likely attributable to the rise in mandates to cover larger 
populations of women, infants and young children. 
Eligibility 
The shift toward growth in North Carolina's Medicaid program which took place 
in the mid to late eighties was largely in response to federal eligibility expansions. The 
addition of new populations was, in some cases, a revisitation to many who had been 
purged from the dole in the early part of the decade. Reagan's devolution scheme would 
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probably have been successful if the fiscal resources had been allocated and the political 
will had existed to ensure the program's success. North Carolina exhibited neither. 
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TABLE 26 
PERCENTAGES OF NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID RECIPIENTS BY AGE, SEX, RACE, 1989-1992 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
UNDER 21 47.3 49.4 47.2 44.5 48.4 47.7 48.4 48.4 48.3 48.1 48.5 50.6 52.0 
21-64 31.2 30.4 31.3 36.3 32.7 33.1 33.3 33.8 34.3 33.1 32.5 32.2 32.1 
OVER 65 21.2 20.2 21.5 19.2 18.2 19.2 18.3 17.8 17.4 18.8 19.3 17.2 15.9 
MALE 33.7 33.6 32.3 32.6 32.6 32.4 32.6 32.7 32.5 32.5 32.5 33.1 34.1 
FEMALE 66.3 66.4 67.7 67.4 67.4 67.6 67.4 67.3 67.5 67.5 67.5 66.9 65.9 
WHITE 38.7 38.9 37.9 38.6 38.0 38.3 39.3 40.1 41.3 42.7 43.9 45.3 46.6 




3.4 3.4 3.9 3.0 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.6 
Note: Sources for this table are: North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Medicaid Annual Reports. 1980 through 1992 and 
Medicaid Source Book. 1993, published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1993. 
TABLE 27 
PERCENTAGES OF NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID EXPENDITURES, BY AGE, SEX, RACE, 1989-1992 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
UNDER 21 18.1 22.2 18.3 15.6 17.8 18.2 19.7 20.7 21.1 22.6 23.7 23.9 25.1 
21-64 42.2 41.5 41.5 45.2 42.0 42.2 43.2 44.8 45.9 43.4 43.3 42.9 43.0 
OVER 65 39.2 36.3 40.2 39.3 40.2 39.6 37.1 34.5 33.0 34.0 33.0 33.2 31.9 
MALE 33.8 33.9 33.6 33.4 33.6 34.3 34.8 35.3 35.5 35.3 35.6 35.5 36.0 
FEMALE 66.2 66.1 66.4 66.6 66.4 65.7 65.2 64.7 64.5 64.7 64.4 64.5 64.0 
WHITE •58.3 57.9 59.5 58.8 58.4 59.2 59.0 59.1 59.0 58.6 58.2 58.7 58.3 




2.2 3.4 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.4 
Note: Sources for this table are: North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Medicaid Annual Reports. 1980 through 1992, and 
Medicaid SP Data System: Characteristics of Medicaid State Programs, vol 11, published by the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 1993. 
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Keeping program expenditures down was a major goal of North Carolina 
legislators and administrators concerned with fiscal austerity. Figures 5 and 6 graph the 
state's Medicaid and AFDC recipiency rates during the 1980s. Incremental increases 
until the new populations of women and children were added in the late 1980s, 
characterize each program. 
Probably the most effective way to decrease budgets was to discourage 
applications. Medicaid's entitlement status makes controlling costs near impossible once 
a person has enrolled in the program. If, however, people can be discouraged or 
prohibited from the application process, there is a real opportunity to effect the program 




shrinkage so desired by the new federalists. 
The application process itself has been studied for its dampening effects on 
obtaining aid. Deciphering the application as well as determining one's own eligibility 
are concrete obstacles for many seeking a place on the dole.21 A study conducted by 
Shuptrine and Associates confirms that prior to the mid 1980's when federal officials 
mandated that states move to simplify and coordinate their application processes, the 
primary way to access Medicaid was through a categorically needy program like AFDC22. 
In an effort to decrease the administrative hours spent with reapplications, Congress 
21 Eligibility barriers are discussed in Bevond Rhetoric: A New American Agenda For Children 
(Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Children, 1991). 
22 Sarah C. Shuptrine, Vicki C. Grant and Genny G. McKenzie, A Study of the Relationship of Health 
Coverage to Welfare Dependency (Columbia, S.C.: Southern Institute of Children and Families, 1994). 
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created Transitional Medicaid benefits for families leaving AFDC due to earnings 
increases. For this category Medicaid remains available for 6 months beyond AFDC 
termination. 
Understanding eligibility rules is another hurdle preventing eligibles from 
applying for aid. A study conducted of Charlotte, North Carolina welfare recipients 
showed that among the largest programs serving the poor, Medicaid was the least 
understood by recipients. Only 36 percent of those questioned indicated correct 
knowledge of Medicaid eligibility.23 
...Most recipients demonstrated a lack of understanding on specific eligibility 
rules related to Medicaid income levels and family composition. Medicaid 
allowances such as full time work were unknown to significant numbers of 
recipients. At least one quarter of those surveyed were unaware of Transitional 
Medicaid.24 
Of surprise to researchers was the lack of Medicaid information on the part of welfare 
advocates such as staff with JOBS, JTPA and Urban League programs. By and large 
these staffers were surprised to leam of Medicaid's more liberal income rules for pregnant 
women and children under l.*25 
The courts entered the fray when the case Alexander v Hill was heard in a federal 




* In 1992: Pregnant women and infants were allowed $22,792 annual income. 
Pregnant women and children 1-5 were allowed $16,386 annual income. 
Pregnant women and children 6-17 were allowed $12,320 annual income. 
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failed to process AFDC and Medicaid applications in a timely fashion. In 1980, the 
plaintiffs filed motion for further relief alleging the county's continued failure to process 
applications. In addition, the county was accused of discouraging prospective applicants 
from filing applications and of requiring excessive verification requirements. All of this, 
they maintained, was a violation of due process as expressed in the 14th amendment. The 
result was a favorable ruling from the courts. Counties if found in violation were to pay a 
fiscal penalty of 7.5 percent of its federal and state share of AFDC and Medicaid 
administrative costs. The penalty for each successive year of non-compliance increased 5 
percent. Between November 1982 and February 1989 the state's counties and state paid 
penalties totaling $576,650. This did not include losses in federal financial 
participation26. 
A different report conducted by the same group in 1982 assesses the readability 
of the North Carolina Medicaid application "rights and responsibilities" section. Its 13.6 
grade level language far exceeds the average Medicaid 6.8 grade level.27 
When compared with other southeastern states, North Carolina fared well with 
respect to the actual application and interview process in that it was one of the few with 
trained interviewers to aid with application completion. Additionally, worker caseload is 
26 Joseph Ferrell, ed., North Carolina Legislation. 1989,226. 
27 Sarah C. Shuptrine, Access to Medicaid Impeded in 19 States for Aged and Disabled Supplemental 
Security Income Recipients (Columbia. South Carolina: Sarah Shuptrine and Associates, 1990), 9. 
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lowest in North Carolina though it does have one of the longest application determination 
periods of 35 days28. 
In 1986, when Texas denied 50 percent of all its applications, North Carolina 
denied only 7.6 percent. The average for southeastern states was 34.3 percent and 26.7 
percent for the nation. During that same year 45 percent of all the nation's Medicaid 
denials were in this quadrant of the country even though it rendered only 35 percent of all 
applications.29 Even though there is a higher probability that a person living in the 
southeast will be poor, the likelihood is that they will be denied welfare benefits. 
Income eligibility places thousands of the poor out of reach of state social 
services. Federal authorities are not responsible for setting state income limits. Low state 
per capita almost always guarantees low state eligibility and need standards. Table 28 
catalogs the North Carolina annual income levels allowed for AFDC related groups from 
1980 to 1992. Typically, income falls below the federal poverty level but above a state 
standard of need. States establish a standard of need but are under no obligation to set 
payment levels at those amounts. For example, in 1987 the North Carolina Department 
of Human Resources set the need standard for a family of 3 at $518 per month. The 
actual AFDC payment for that family was set at $259 per month.30 The need standard in 
North Carolina is generally twice the payment standard. 
28 North Carolina has maintained the number one position in fraud detection which may account for the 
longer application process time. 
29 Shuptrine, Access Impeded in 19 States..., 8. 
30 North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Medicaid Annual Report .1987 . 19. 
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In 1980, North Carolina ranked 47 out of 50 states by its AFDC payment standard. 
When AFDC is inaccessible to the poor there is a guaranteed negative effect on the 
attainment of Medicaid to these same populations. This was especially true during the 
early 1980's when state Medicaid was hardly extended beyond the AFDC population. 
Even as Medicaid grew, the AFDC/Medicaid eligibility levels were, in 1988, 33.44 
percent of the federal poverty level. An intrarégional comparison showed Alabama, the 
lowest at 15.2 percent and South Carolina at 50.1 percent of federal poverty.31 
Disabled and elderly residents who under federal regulations would qualify for 
SSI and Medicaid programs are considered differently in North Carolina along with 13 
other states. These states have instead adopted a 209(b) status, named in reference to the 
section in the federal code which defines it. Potential aged or disabled applicants of this 
category must apply for the state disability program which uses more restrictive income 
and resource standards than those used by the Social Security Administration. Couples 
who applied for SSI benefits in North Carolina found as late as 1992 the lowest eligibility 
in the nation - 42.5 percent of federal poverty. Only 2 states, North Carolina and 
Virginia, place resource limits on contiguous property surrounding the home.32 
Most states cite spending control as the reason for choosing a 209(b) status and all 
have the option of moving to accept federal income standards as the basis for serving 
these populations. To do so would change the designation to "automatic" or "1634", 
31 Ibid. 
32 Shuptrine, Access Impeded in 19 States... ,11. 
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again named for the federal code which describes it. The strain to those in need of these 
services is familiar to those involved with program administration. 
TABLE 28 
NORTH CAROLINA ANNUAL ELIGIBILITY INCOME LEVELS 
FOR AFDC AND MEDICAID RECIPIENTS, 1979-1992 
FAMILY OF 4 MEDICALLY NEEDY 
YEAR CATEGORICALLY NEEDY PROTECTED INCOME 
1979 $2520/YR. S210/MO. $3400/YR. S383/MO. 
1980 S2520/YR. $3400/YR. 
1981 $2520/YR. S3400/YR. 
1982 Î2652/YR. S221/MO. S3600/YR. $300/MO. 
1983 S2652/YR. $3600/YR. 
1984 S2928/YR. S244/MO. $4000/YR S333/MO. 
1985 S2928/YR. $4000/YR. 
1986 Î3228/YR. S269/MO. S4400/YR. S366/MO. 
1987 S3396/YR. S283/MO. S4600/YR. Î383/MO. 
1988 S3492/YR. $291/MO. S4700/YR. S391/MO. 
1989 S3492/YR. Î4700/YR. 
1990 S3564/YR. $297/MO. $4800/YR. S400/MO. 
1991 S3564/YR. S4800/YR. 
1992 S3564/YR. $4800/YR. 
Source: North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Medicaid Annual Reports. 
1979 through 1992. 
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In all states, with the exception of Alaska, SSI aged and disabled recipients have 
incomes below the poverty level...Placing obstacles in their path simply makes it 
harder for them to obtain medical care. As a result, many SSI recipients in 
nonautomatic states do not receive Medicaid benefits because they never apply or 
they are denied.1 
North Carolina at the time of this writing has elected to switch to a 1634 status beginning 
July 1995. Prior to this, however, federal SSI as well as Medicaid benefits eluded large 
numbers of elderly and disabled patients. 
North Carolina learned that using maintaining a 209(b) status was not producing 
the desired money saving results. It appears that not having Medicaid access to primary 
care givers has increased the cost of the long term institutional care associated with aged 
and disabled health care.33 Most important to state interests may be those dollars forfeited 
out of the federal matching grant formula for Medicaid when indigent persons are 
ineligible for Medicaid and must rely on other state programs. By 1990 the state had 
approximately 30,000 SSI recipients not enrolled in Medicaid34. 
This states large elderly population makes having a nonautomatic status 
particularly significant. In 1988, a Shuptrine study which assessed differences between 
states with and without 209(b) found that North Carolina received more SSI applications 
than any other nonautomatic state. Of those elderly applications received about 23 
percent were denied. Fifty-seven percent were denied in the blind and disabled 
categories. Federal dollars lost increases with each percentage increase in denials. An 
Ibid., 37. 
34 Ibid., 42. 
estimated $1.8 million was lost by the state in 1988 alone.35 Table 29 illustrates the 
funding differences between the North Carolina programs. 
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When consideration of service quality is brought to bear again the state's 209(b) 
recipients were funded below the non-automatic average in every population group. The 
North Carolina Aged were lowest when compared with 209(b) and 1634 as well. 
TABLE 29 
COMPARISON OF EXPENDITURES FOR SSI RECIPIENTS IN 
NORTH CAROLINA, 209(b) and 1634 
SSI Aged SSI Blind SSI Disabled 
North Carolina $2390 $3471 $4327 
209 (b) average $2936 $4429 $5494 
1634 average $2619 $2985 $4321 
Source: Shuptrine, Access Impeded in 19 States. A-l 1. 
Other eligibility restrictions during the Reagan years included the elimination of 
people between 18 and 21. Purging this population from the role would certainly have 
affected access to affordable health care, yet probably had a minimal affect on overall 
health care spending since their use of Medicaid is relatively small. 
States generally exercise a different type of caution where elderly Medicaid 
patients are concerned. There is a greater likelihood that this population, unlike their 
younger indigent counterparts, will without Medicaid, seek treatment in public hospitals - 
a cost passed directly on to local taxpayers. Private hospitals on the other hand redirect 
35 Ibid., 41. 
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costs to private insurers and patients. Typically, it is fiscal conservatism rather than 
concern with the quality of care which guides health policy. 
Beyond these exclusions, in 1982 North Carolina opted not to cover: Individuals 
eligible but living in institutions and AFDC-UP (unemployed parent). The federal rule 
for AFDC-UP limited an eligible working parent's hours to fewer than 100 per month. So 
a 2- parent family that is as poor as a single parent but working full-time was not eligible 
for AFDC and Medicaid in 1982. North Carolina did, though, continue coverage for 18 
year olds attending school and pregnant women with no other eligible children. The last 
category, pregnant women, was undoubtedly in response to the state's high infant 
mortality rate - at that time among the nation's ten highest. 
The General Assistance program that exists in many states and grants cash and 
medical assistance to unemployed men and others usually found outside the traditional 
safety net. Federal law mandates no such program and, though a need may exist, North 
Carolina has not opted to create one. 
While most of the state Medicaid changes have come as the result of federal 
mandates, the North Carolina General Assembly has periodically not been satisfied to 
leave all changes within the purview of federal authorities or state administrators. In 
1981, for instance, the legislature rewrote G.S. 108A-60 to disallow Medicaid eligibility 
to anyone who transfers property for the purposes of acquiring public assistance. In a 
similar action, anyone disposing of personal property within one year of application for 
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public assistance is also found ineligible.36 This rule change was aimed at the medically 
needy seeking relief from the rapid rises in health care costs. 
"Deeming" was another provision passed by the legislature in 1981 to affect 
eligibility. This statute resulted from the United States Supreme Court case Schweiker. 
Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services v Grey Panthers and said simply 
that eligibility for Medicaid could consider a spouse's income.37 
Issues of cost containment continued to dominate when in HCFA compiled a set 
of administrative rules affecting access to Medicaid. Passed in 1981 to become effective 
in 1983, the following restrictions were introduced to the states: 
1) States were prevented from making pregnant women (not already 
AFDC recipients) eligible for AFDC before 6 months of pregnancy; 
2) Illegal aliens were ineligible; 
3) Persons participating in labor strikes were not AFDC eligible; 
4) Asset limitations may not exceed $1,000 excluding a home, reasonably priced car and 
at the state's option other items determined to be essential.38 
Some of these federal rules may have had little effect in North Carolina while 
others, like the 6 month waiting period, imposed on pregnant women threatened a 
devastating effect on infant and fetal mortality rates. The near 50,000 drop in recipiency 
36 Sawyer, North Carolina Legislation. 1981 ,238. 
37 Ibid., 282. 
38 
'Guide to Some Developments," Medical Care Review. 38 (Winter 1981): 3. 
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between 1981 and 1984 may also be attributed to some of these efforts taken outside of 
the state. 
Modest but important expansions began in 1984 and continued through the 
decade. In 1984 a 10 percent increase in the income threshold made more people eligible 
for the AFDC and Medicaid programs. Additionally, the state Department of Human 
Resources opened service to both married couples and pregnant women and their children 
whose incomes met the medically needy standard, at that time $3600 annually. Both 
provisions were enacted in 1985. 
During a 1985 General Assembly session legislators extended coverage to intact 
two-parent families. In an unprecedented move, the legislature made all new eligibility 
rules subject to the Governors approval. North Carolina, by this time, experienced 
dramatic increases in its Medicaid expenditures without the wide coverage of additional 
populations that came later in the decade. Careful scrutiny of those accepted into the 
state's program illustrates the role of caution in Medicaid program operation. 
Nineteen eighty-six brought in SOBRA (Sixth Omnibus Budget and 
Reconciliation Act). To be phased in between July 1988 and January 1989, this package 
granted states the opportunity to reconstruct those Medicaid safety nets damaged in the 
early 1980's. Pregnant women and their young children were probably the largest 
beneficiaries. Income levels that fell below federal poverty but above state thresholds 
were added as a new optional group. 
Federal law in 1986 also mandated that medically needy standards be raised to 
meet an income standard set at 133 percent of the AFDC payment level. State legislators 
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answered by appropriating $107,440 to raise this income scale by 5 percent. The counties 
were called on to match. Their contribution was $18,960.39 
The following year recipiency was up 4.8 percent Although expenditures growth 
tripled this at 13.7 percent. State officials attributed the growth to relaxed eligibility. 
During fiscal year 1987, the number of people who were determined eligible 
exceeded 450,000 for the first time since FY 1980-81. A 5% increase in income 
eligibility levels in January 1987 contributed to this growth. The increase in total 
eligibles over the previous year was 2.3%, but the increase in the number of 
elderly and disabled was 5.0%, and these two groups are by far the most 
expensive consumers of Medicaid services.40 
Another round of federally mandated state expansions during 1987 broadened 
coverage to 19, 20 and 21 year olds. For this the state allocated just under $500,000 over 
a 2 year period. Services to pregnant women and children up to 5 years of age with 
incomes below federal poverty were considered by the General Assembly. It was 1991 
before state legislators allocated the money to meet these income standards set in 1987. 
By the end of 1987 North Carolina had added all of the SOBRA 1986 options and 1) 
widened the Medicaid pool by: 
1) widening income to 100 percent of the federal poverty level; 
2) including children under 3 years old; 
3) dropping the assets test; 
4) allowing continuous and presumptive eligibility41. 
39 Ferrell, North Carolina Legislation 1986.91. 
40 North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Medicaid Annual Report. 1986-1987 , 1. 
41 Continuous eligibility allows a family six months of Medicaid coverage after termination from the 
AFDC program. Presumptive eligibility allows a caseworker to certify a Medicaid applicant once that 
person has been approved for AFDC or programs with similar means tested criteria. 
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In 1988 North Carolina included pregnant women and children under 2 into the 
SOBRA plan. Family income thresholds ranged from $5,770 for a family of one to 
$13,610 for a five person household. Comparable standards for AFDC families were 
$2,124 and $3,804 for one and five person families. These income eligibility expansions 
indicate Medicaid's efforts to move beyond the most severely impoverished populations. 
Between 1988 and 1989, expenditure and recipient rates increased by 22 and 16 
percents, respectively. The North Carolina Division of Medical Assistance revealed that 
one-third of expenditure increases were due to eligibility expansions. The remaining two- 
thirds resulted from rising costs. 
By 1989, the age of this state's SOBRA children reached 3 years though income 
levels remained at their 1988 rates. Another group of beneficiaries that received some 
relief was the elderly who challenged those provisions which permitted states to consider 
a spouses income in long term patient care and an intermediate care facility or skilled 
nursing facility.42 Federal regulations sided with recipients and the state Medicaid budget 
was adjusted to comply with the new rule which began in September 1989. 
Federal expansions were recognized by the General Assembly in its 1989 seesion 
and were scheduled for implementation that year as well as in 1990. These included: 
1) SOBRA to be implemented in 1989, the provision for children under 6 (previously 
under 3) with incomes below 100% of federal poverty; 
2) to be implemented in 1990, children under 7 with family incomes below 100 of 
federal poverty; 
42 Ferrell, North Carolina Legislation. 1989 , 220. 
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3) to be implemented in 1990, pregnant women and infants under lin families with 
incomes below 150 percent of federal poverty.43 
The Medicare-Aid program, a state initiative was enacted in 1989 partially in 
response to the federal Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of (MCCA) of 1988. Even 
though MCCA was repealed in 1989, Medicare-Aid remained a viable state program. It 
allowed Medicaid to subsidize low income Medicare patient expenses such as 
deductibles, premiums and co-payments. Almost 30,000 North Carolinian elderly are 
enrolled in the program. Federal regulations required that the income limit for Medicare- 
Aid be raised from 85 to 95 percent of the federal poverty standard by January 1991. The 
state maintained those income limits set by federal government. 
State health department rules followed federal mandates again in 1991. SOBRA 
children were raised to age 8 and children in custody of private adoption agencies were 
included among program eligibles. 
While eligibility widened during the late 1980's, increasing access to government 
sponsored medicine, thousands of North Carolinians were still left outside the medical 
safety net. One study estimated that in 1992 after all of the Medicaid expansions over 
96,000 children were eligible but not enrolled in the program. Of these 86,000 had 
incomes equal to or below the federal poverty standard.44 
43
Ibid. 
44 Shuptrine, Grant and McKenzie, Uninsured Children in the South (Columbia, S.C. : Southern 
Institute on Children and Families, November 1992), 30. 
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North Carolina Medicaid Services 
Limiting services is another technique used to decrease costs. For many indigents, 
gaining access to services is an obstacle difficult to hurdle. State rankings on service 
delivery to the impoverished again places North Carolina among those southeastern states 
who fall below the nation's average in this category. Criteria such as the number of 
optional services provided by a state helped to determine each states effectiveness in 
delivering this important social service.45 
The North Carolina program, has, by and large stayed close to federal mandates. 
It has taken few opportunities to delve into particulars which might better answer its 
population, especially when provision of these services might call for funding 
significantly beyond federal dollars. Table 30 outlines those optional services the state 
provided between 1980 and 1992. 
45 
Shapiro and Greenstein, Holes in the Safety Net:.., 22. 
TABLE 30 
NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID OPTIONAL SERVICES DELIVERED BETWEEN 1980 AND 1992 1989-1992 
OPTIONAL SERVICES 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
PODIATRIST X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
OPTOMETRIST X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
CHIROPRACTOR X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
PRIVATE DUTY 
NURSING 
X X X X 
CLINICS X X X X X X X X X X X X X 




PRESCRIBED DRUGS X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
DENTURES X X X X X X X X X X 
PROSTHETIC DEVICES 
EYEGLASSES X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
REHABILITATIVE 
SERVICES 
X X X X X X X X 
INTERMEDIATE CARE 
FACILITY 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
TABLE 30 (continued) 
NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID OPTIONAL SERVICES DELIVERED BETWEEN 1980 AND 1992 1989-1992 
OPTIONAL SERVICES 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
INPATIENT X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
PSYCHIATRIC 
(CHILDREN) 
SKILLED NURSING X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
(CHILDREN) 
PERSONAL CARE X X X X X X X 
HOSPICE CARE X X X X 
Source: U. S. Department of Health and Human services, Medicaid Source Book. 1993. 
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Documentation of state coverage over time is precarious in that some services once 
allowed as options were later made mandatory. An example of this is clinic service listed 
in the 1980-1981 Annual Report as an optional service. By 1992 it was mandatory. To its 
credit, North Carolina maintained clinics when they were given the option. In 1981 North 
Carolina provided 16 out of 32 optional services which ranked the state in the bottom 
one-third of the nation. By 1992, 21 optional services were offered. 
The populations covered by North Carolina Medicaid underwent a similar 
expansion. Table 31 shows when various populations were added by the state health 
department. Notice the influx of new populations during the mid to late eighties. With the 
exception of the medically needy population, all of those groups added come as a result of 
federal mandates. 
Service in the early eighties in North Carolina is characterized by cost saving 
measures which often compromised the quality of health care. The "lock-in" strategy 
mentioned earlier serves as a case in point. Designed to curtail use by those judged as 
"overutilizers", this eliminated the freedom to choose provision previously enjoyed by 
Medicaid recipients. Commentary on its affects from a state publication offers an insider 
view: 
Another proposal change with the Medicaid program, generally regarded as the 
most controversial, would let states do away with the right of Medicaid patients to 
choose their own doctors and hospitals. This credit card approach to health care 
for the poor has been a basic ingredient of Medicaid since its 'Great Society' 
beginnings in the mid-1960's.46 
46 Guide to Some Developments,” Medical Care Review , 38 (Summer 1981): 61. 
TABLE 31 
OPTIONAL GROUPS SERVED BY NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID, 1980 - 1992 




BELOW 100% FPL 
LOW INCOME DISABLED X X X X 
MEDICALLY NEEDY X X X X 
CHILDREN 18-20 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
PREGNANT WOMEN 









X X X X X X X X 
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Medicaid spData System 
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... Physicians are ready to battle any cutback in freedom of choice for their 
patients. The American Medical Association remains violently opposed' to such a 
move says Dr. James Sammons, executive vice president ....Such a change would 
lead the country back to the two-class system of medicine that Medicaid cuts 
intended to eliminate, Dr. Sammons contends....47 
The waivers provision in the Medicaid program is another way states are allowed 
departure from standard services in favor of approaches more tailored to local population 
needs. It also encourages for creative measures aimed at cost reduction. States apply to 
HCFA for specific waivers and wait for approval or denial. 
In 1981, North Carolina Department of Human Resources applied for a waiver to 
reduce need for development of large numbers of ICF/MR (Intermediate Care Facility- 
Mentally Retarded) beds while also serving more patients using community based 
services rather than long term facility beds.48 The plan for community based care was 
approved in 1983. The Community Alternatives Program (CAP) for aged and disabled 
(adults and children) and mentally retarded patients was a result. 
By 1982, North Carolina's Medicaid budget had dropped by $2.6 million as a 
result of OBRA 1981-82. Along with the community based care project adopted in 1983 
was a state provision which promoted pre-paid primary care to physicians. In this way a 
physician or group prearranges with the state for health care received by an individual. 
While the state saves money and physicians are guaranteed particular Medicaid patients, 
the choice of health care provider is again taken away from the recipient. In a similar 
47 Ibid. 
48 North Carolina Department of Human Resources, State Facilities Plan 1983. 107. 
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practice, Medicaid patients are more often referred to teaching hospitals than their 
counterparts who have private insurance. Over 15 percent of all patients seen in North 
Carolina teaching hospitals are enrolled in Medicaid.49 
Federal officials in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (P.L. 97-248) 
signed in September 1982 offered states options and incentives to help realize the 
spending cuts ($1.4 billion over the next 3 years) in the Medicaid program. North 
Carolina used the option to, among other measures: increase co-payments; take liens on 
homes of nursing home residents who were still alive (Previous law permitted such 
action only after death); and, improve their Medicaid error tolerance rate which was 
reduced from 4 to 3 percent in 1983.50 
The state Department of Human Resources looked intensely for other cost cutting 
measures. Services limitations implemented in 1984 were physical and speech therapies 
for children were limited to only those enrolled in the EPSDT program. In each case 
rates were to be negotiated with the Department of Human Resources.51 
Nineteen eighty-three saw the creation of the Division of Medical Assistance with 
DHR. Its initial primary function was to create co-payment amounts as allowed by 
federal law. It also allowed the purchase of health care service on a prepaid basis. The 
Division was charged with implementing waivers in service limitations, eligibility 
49 North Carolina Medical Database Commission, Primary Paver Summary Statistics By Hospital 
(Raleigh, 1987). 
50 "Guide to Some Developments,” Medical Care Review 39 (Winter 1982): 240. 
51 
L. Joyce, North Carolina Legislation. 1984,49. 
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requirements, and payments basis. It planned and carried out volume purchase plans, 
single source procurement and similar procedures aimed at cost containment.52 
Each of the mentioned cases had the effect of diminishing choices of health care and/or 
health care equipment providers for recipients53. 
Preadmissions was an initiative implemented by the Division of Medicaid 
Assistance. A North Carolina Annual Report explained how all non-emergency hospital 
admissions required notification prior to admissions. This alone saved almost $6 million 
in inpatient hospital costs.54 
By the late 1980's North Carolina had developed a number of initiatives aimed at 
improving outreach to already covered populations. High infant mortality statistics, for 
instance, gave impetus for the state's BABY LOVE program. Essentially, this effort 
coordinated medical with parenting skills to improve the life chances of infants bom into 
low income homes. Support services for these women was garnered from a plethora of 
state agencies equipped to offer needed assistance. 
Rising administrative costs had by 1990 became a concern of state legislators who 
authorized the use of Medicaid funds budgeted from program services to support the 
52 Sawyer, North Carolina Legislation. 1983 ,. 266. 
53 North Carolina had to apply for a waiver which allowed the state to contract with providers for care. 
Federal regulations regarding choice of health care provider were waived in order to exercise this option. 
54 North Carolina Department of Human Resoources Medicaid Annual Report 1985-86 , 17. 
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costs of administrative activities to the extent that those activities produced net savings in 
service requirements.55 
A comparison of service delivery to vendor payment illustrates a utilization of 
costs analysis. It is possible to see where the state program spends most of its vendor 
dollars as well as trace any increases or decreases in payments to particular health care 
providers. Table 32 and 33 juxtaposes usage with payments to vendors in North Carolina 
between 1982 and 1992 for selected services. Trends such as the decrease in dental 
payments (not usage) speaks to the imposition of restrictions resulting from OBRA 1981. 
That physician visits decreased twice by 1985 speaks to a drop in a needed service. In 
addition, North Carolina experienced a 2,1 percent reduction in the number of hospital 
beds per 1,000 population between 1980 and 1990.56 
Provider or Vendor Payments 
Closely related to services available to Medicaid is provider payments.57 The 
level and enthusiasm that a state reimburses health care providers often has direct 
repercussions on the quality of care delivered. The triage of recipient, health care 
provider and program administrators, at the provider payment stage, solicits minimal 
input from recipients since payments move between the other two parties. Even though it 
55 Ferrell, North Carolina Legislation. 1990,94. 
56 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Center for Disease Control, Healthy People 2000: 
Statistics and Surveillance ( Hyattsville, Md.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 26. 
57 Almost all of Medicaids' budget goes to provider payment. Five 5% goes for program administration. 
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is the patients are ultimately affected, political pressure to increase fees and 
reimbursements usually omits client input. Reimbursement schedules are essential to the 
operation of a quality program, but observed alone does not predict whether a state places 
poor people's and their health in a high priority position. 
North Carolina ranks higher in this category of provider payments than either 
eligibility or service coverage. "Nationally, Medicaid payments to medical providers rose 
at an annual rate of 15.5 percent between FY 1973 and FY 1979."58 North Carolina 
during that period increased beyond the national average at (20.9%). In 1986 the state 
had the following maximums for physician fees for selected procedures. Office visit- 
$11.40; appendectomy- $378; obstetrical care- $454 (includes antepartum, vaginal 
delivery and postpartum care). National averages for the same procedures is $11.93, 
$341.31 and $473.11.59 
58
 Bovbjerg, 3. 
59 General Accounting Office, Medicaid: Interstate Variations .... 35. 
TABLE 32 
PERCENTAGE OF NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID RECIPIENTS 
BY SERVICE TYPE 1982-1992 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
GENERAL HOSPITAL 56.9 64.3 65.0 64.1 64.0 67.7 67.0 73.0 74.0 75.0 76.0 
SKILLED NURSING 
FACILITY 
3.5 4.0 4.2 4.2 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.4 3.1 3.0 2.9 
INTERMEDIATE CARE 
FACILITY (ICF) 
3.6 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.4 
ICF-MR 
MENTALLY RETARDED 
0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 
PHYSICIANS 70.1 68.0 70.2 69.9 70.6 74.6 76.6 77.9 77.4 80.5 81.5 
DENTAL 25.9 25.8 25.4 25.7 26.0 25.8 24.1 22.9 21.5 23.0 23.0 
CLINIC SERVICES 8.5 9.6 8.3 6.4 9.1 9.3 10.9 12.6 13.8 15.3 13.7 
PRESCRIBED DRUGS 67.2 70.0 70.3 70.1 69.5 69.5 70.7 69.4 68.3 69.1 69.7 
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Medicaid SP Data System: Characteristics of Medicaid 
State Programs. Vol. 1 
TABLE 33 
PERCENTAGE OF NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID PAYMENTS 
BY SERVICE TYPE 1982-1992 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
GENERAL HOSPITAL 28.0 31.3 30.0 28.0 26.0 28.0 28.0 31.0 31.0 30.0 31.5 
SKILLED NURSING 
FACILITY 
17.0 17.0 17.4 17.2 17.0 15.0 14.0 13.1 12.4 13.2 12.6 
INTERMEDIATE CARE 
FACILITY (ICF) 
17.8 16.2 15.0 15.1 14.0 13.0 12.0 11.0 11.0 10.7 10.9 
ICF-MR 
MENTALLY RETARDED 
16.4 15.0 17.0 17.3 14.0 17.0 17.0 15.2 14.6 14.3 12.9 
PHYSICIANS 6.8 6.7 6.8 6.3 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.8 9.2 9.3 9.6 
DENTAL 2.5 2.1 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 
CLINIC SERVICES 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.7 
PRESCRIBED DRUGS 6.0 6.3 6.9 7.0 6.9 8.0 8.0 7.4 7.3 7.0 7.3 
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Medicaid SP Data System: Characteristics of Medicaid 
State Programs. Vol. 1 
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Physician services to Medicaid patients was in most states, including North 
Carolina, lower than those allowed in private care or with Medicare reimbursement. Low 
physician participation is a problem. Patients are not able to access them and costs of 
care are raised dramatically when clients substitute hospital care. 
Hospitals and physicians complain of Medicaid's slow reimbursement, low 
payment rates and extensive paperwork. Between 1984 and 1988 nationwide physician 
participation in the program dropped from 77.2 to 74.7 percent.60 
A study conducted on physician participation in Medicaid found nationally, 
between 1978 and 1987 there was a 7 percent increase in pediatricians not serving 
Medicaid patients. During the same period those who limited the numbers of Medicaid 
children rose 13 percent. In North Carolina, one-third of the state's under 5 year old 
population is Medicaid eligible. In this population, one-third use clinics for preventive 
care. When sick, however, these families must use emergency rooms since participating 
doctors are becoming less available. 
Pediatricians inactive in Medicaid cited the Medicaid bureaucracy characteristics 
of Medicaid patients and the economics of accepting Medicaid patients as important to 
their decision to limit or withdraw participation. The questionaire solicited the following 
responses: "Patients are too difficult to work with"; "Didn't want too many Medicaid 
patients in the office"; and, "Might affect paying patients perceptions of my practice"61. 
60 Kaufman, 2. 
61 Peter Margolis, et al, "Factors Associated with Pediatricians Participation in Medicaid in North 
Carolina." Journal of American Medical Association 14 ( 8 Apr. 1992): 1942-6. 
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Care in the state was found to be more restricted in the cities where 62% in cities, 
13% in medium sized town and 12% in rural areas of all physicians restricted treatment of 
Medicaid patients. This was overall case even though cities varied widely with respect to 
the treatment of Medicaid patients.62 That rural physicians appear more likely to see 
Medicaid enrollees suggests that they know themselves to be the only place where 
children may receive medical attention. Conversely, population density and perceived 
availability of medical care in urban centers possibly creates the illusion that poor have 
many options where health care is concerned. 
Differentials between rural and urban physician participation in North Carolina 
was confirmed in a 1993 article in the Journal of Rural Health63 on obstetrician 
involvement in Medicaid. Overall, the number North Carolina of obstetricians delivering 
Medicaid babies dropped from 305 to 115 between 1985 and 1989. There were no 
obstetricians willing to deliver babies in 35 of the states 100 counties; no family 
physicians providing obstetrical care in 54 counties; and, no obstetrical providers at all in 
24 counties, all but 3 of which were rural. Thirty-two midwives officially practiced in the 
state and all of them were located in metropolitan areas. Almost twice as many urban as 
rural physicians had Medicaid caseloads of 5 percent or less in 1988. 
62 The five largest cities restricting access were in descending order of population: 1) Charlotte- 87% 
2) Raleigh- 22% 3) Greensboro - 67% 4) Winston-Salem- 86% 5) Durham- 42%. 
63 Lise K. Fondran and Thomas C. Ricketts, "N.C. Obstetrics Access and Professional Liability Study: 
A Rural- Urban Analysis." Journal of Rural Health (Spring 1993): 129-37. 
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Between 1986 and 1988 Medicaid caseloads were not large but the number of 
rural physicians indicating a caseload of 60 percent or above doubled from 3.9 percent to 
8.3 percent. In contrast, urban physicians went from 5 to 7.4 percent.64 
There has also been a decline in the participation of pediatric dentist in North 
Carolina Medicaid. The top reason cited were low reimbursement rates; broken or 
canceled appointments, and the need for prior authorization of medical treatment plans.65 
The Division of Dental Health, a section within state Medicaid, had as of 1992 only 43 
dental hygienists and 43 dentists to cover 94 counties. Two of the state's 100 counties66 
have their own dental programs. 
Table 34 chronicles North Carolina Medicaid providers from 1980 to 1992. In 
most areas a steady incline has been the case, but during the early 1980’s decreases in 
physician participation, pharmacy, dentist, radiologists, podiatrists, optometrist, mental 
health clinics, and optical suppliers may all be attributed to provider dissatisfaction with 
the program. 
Any number of factors may help to explain the low participation rate. A series of 
limitations on reimbursement rates as well as rate freezes had a dampening affect on 
service delivery. Table 35 and 36 show in detail the restrictions imposed by the state 
between 1980 and 1992. An example involving hospitals was the states movement in 
64 Ibid, 134. 
65 R.D. Venezie and W.F. Vann, Jr, "Pediatric Dentists' Participation in North Carolina Medicaid," 
Pediatric Dentistry 15 (May-June 1993): 175-81. 
66 These counties are Buncombe and Forsyth counties. Both contain relatively large cities, Asheville in 
Buncombe and Winston-Salem in Forsyth. 
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1981 to a prospective payment system. With this method rates are set in advance. The 
facility may keep all or part of the difference between the rate and the actual cost. If cost 
exceeds the payment rate as is typically the case, the provider realizes a loss. 
An important controversy between state and federal authorities came to a head in 
North Carolina between 1985 and 1987. This had to do with provider assessments or 
contributions or taxes paid to the states from medical providers. North Carolina along 
with other states viewed provider assessments as a legitimate scheme to raise the federal 
Medicaid share while limiting the state's commitment. HCFA discouraged states from 
provider contributions but Congress intervened on behalf of the states and allowed the 
rule to stand. 
Provider payments permit states to derive monies from a tax or contributions form 
medical providers. The state uses this money to pay its share of the Medicaid match. 
This in turn results in a higher federal contribution. Both state and federal outlays are 
returned to the medical care providers though the federal dollars account for the 
additional spending. North Carolina argues that federal mandates and inflated health care 
costs justify this financing alternative. Provider contributions and taxes continued in this 
way until 1991 when Congress again intervened, this time to set limits on the states. 
Congress passed legislation banning voluntary contributions and severely limiting 
provider taxes and intergovemment transfers. The 1991 legislation placed severe 
limitations on states from obtaining matching grant funds on dollars obtained from 
provider donations. Even though states were allowed to continue receiving matching 
payments for taxes levied on providers, a 25% cap was placed on the amount of 
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Medicaid expenditures which could come from this source. States were also restricted to 
12% on expenditures that went to hospitals serving a 'disproportionate share’ of Medicaid 
and other low income patients.67 
Eleven states, including North Carolina had voluntary contribution programs. 
North Carolina donations amounted to about $67 million. That, it would appear, was a 
median given Maryland's $1 million and Pennsylvania's $565 million. 
North Carolina legislative responses to OBRA 1981 both rejected and recognized 
the imminent crises in health care financing. In a 1981 state House session, counties were 
disallowed from increasing their budgets if federal funding of a joint program were 
reduced and from redirecting money from one program to another. Yet that same year in 
a joint session legislators adopted a resolution "urging the president and Congress to 
consider the detrimental effect of a 5% federal limit on Medicaid increases on the state's 
ability to provide medical services to the poor and elderly."68 
67
 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Medicaid Intergovernmental Trends and 
Options (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 18. 
68 
Sawyer, North Carolina Legislation. 1981 , 282. 
TABLE 34 NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID PROVIDERS 1980-1985 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
PHYSICIANS 6,623 6,333 6,716 6,160 6,883 8665 
RADIOLOGISTS 546 577 621 286 331 499 
DENTISTS 2,275 2,350 1,616 1,844 1,977 2082 
PHARMACISTS 1,608 1,615 2,454 1,583 1,977 1729 
OPTOMETRISTS 539 547 583 484 513 563 
CHIROPRATORS 363 379 422 206 530 305 
PODIATRISTS 104 107 122 109 127 146 
AMBULANCE SERVICE 155 166 177 144 137 148 
HOME HEALTH AGENCIES 88 91 92 97 100 111 
INTERMEDIATE CARE 159 167 171 180 193 196 
INTERMEDIATE CARE 
MENTALLY RETARDED 
8 10 13 16 17 29 
HOSPITALS 149 150 152 152 170 178 
MENTAL HEALTH CLINICS 66 71 72 70 75 75 
OPTICAL SUPPLIERS 148 156 161 123 139 146 
SKILLED NURSING 
FACILITY 
148 150 153 166 188 192 
OTHER 4,188 4,313 4,655 690 995 815 
TOTAL 16,767 17,182 18,180 12,130 13,752 15879 oo 
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Medicaid spData System: Characteristics of Medicaid State Programs, Vol. 1 
TABLE 35 
NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID CHANGES FOR SELECTED SERVICES, 1980-1985 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
PHYSICIANS Costs not to 
exceed Medicare 
18 visits per year 
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TABLE 35 (continued) 
NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID CHANGES FOR SELECTED SERVICES, 1980-1985 
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NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID CHANGES FOR SELECTED SERVICES, 1986-1992 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
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TABLE 36 (continued) 
NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID CHANGES FOR SELECTED SERVICES, 1986-1992 















e.g. delivery up 
20% 
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Medicaid spDATA System: Characteristics of Medicaid State Programs. Vol. 11. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE IMPACT OF NEW FEDERALISM ON THE WOMEN, INFANTS AND 
CHILDREN’S PROGRAM IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1980-1992 
Regression results indicate that government policies have an impact on lowering 
high-risks births. Medicaid coverage and Maternal and Infant Care projects are 
most responsible for lowering black and white teenage births....1 
The Women, Infant and Childrens (WIC) program was the fastest growing of all 
food assistance projects during the 1970s and 1980s. Surviving the onslaught of budget 
reductions throughout the 1980s implies a favorable view among political elites unlike 
the consideration given other lower tier programs. While WIC is a program with a 
proven track record, this alone is insufficient as an explanation of how this project 
managed to expand while similar ones shrank. 
Some insight is gained when considering the coalitions which comprise the food 
aid lobbyists. As discussed in Chapter 3, agricultural, manufacturing and food retail 
interests discovered an avenue for serving their interests by coalescing with anti-hunger 
advocates to promote food distribution policies. These often powerful legislative actors 
offer the nutrition based programs a political sanctuary unavailable to the cash assistance 
programs which have become the scapegoats for political conservatives. 
1 Renee Goldberg,, "The Effect of Public Policy on High Risk Births" ( Ph.D. diss., City University of New 
York, 1987), i. 
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That women and children are the primary constituents served is given as another 
reason for the program's protected status. Americans, it is argued, are uncomfortable 
allowing hunger and poor nutrition among these populations.2 While this may be true of 
many Americans, there is strong evidence to support the position that simply being a 
women or child is insufficient as a guarantee of favorable standing where social welfare is 
the issue. The AFDC program, for example, and its predecessor Aid to Dependent 
Children (ADC) programs all target children and their mothers. 
An historical consideration of the children's welfare programs shows how widows 
with children were to be the primary beneficiaries of the nationalized ADC program in 
1935. When the program's demography changed after WWII, hostility toward the 
program mounted. Its new constituents became women who were divorced, separated, or 
never married. Increasing numbers of women of color joined the rolls to further alienate 
public sentiment for recipients.3 
Current images of poor women as lazy, poorly educated, unmotivated and 
opportunistic - Ronald Reagan's "welfare queens", came to dominate as it put in jeopardy 
any and all welfare programs which have "these" women among its beneficiaries. Black 
women were especially targeted as abusers of the nation's generosity. Not surprising, 
negative images depicting African-American women have long had a place in the 
articulation of American culture.4 
2
 Read Katz's The Underserving Poor for a discussion of the perceptions Americans have of the poor. 
3 See Michael B. Katz The Underserving Poor and Katz's In The Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social 
History of Welfare in America fNew York: Basic Books, 1986). 
4 For a discussion of the images of African-American women see Morton, Disfigured Images. . 
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While women and their children have received a relatively favorable status in 
welfare policy, the reconstruction and dissemination of negative stereotypes raises doubts 
as to how long this will remain the case. This is especially true where the children in the 
household are older. Given this, programs like WIC have an advantage in that they serve 
children under five years of age who are, at least, perceived as not having yet entered the 
"culture of poverty".5 This fact is even more pertinent when considering the diversified 
populations served by Medicaid and AFDC and the peril conservative budget cuts place 
on these program's children. Whatever disadvantages older children have pales next to 
the low consideration of women in the welfare equation. Michael Katz in observing this 
offers the following: 
...Public sympathy extends more unconditionally to children than to their mothers, 
who must earn respect and an entitlement to social benefits not only through good 
behavior, but increasingly by selling their labor in the marketplace. In fact, poor 
women, like poor blacks, have received relatively little as a consequence of 
greater formal equality. 
The generous income threshold of the Women, Infants and Childrens program 
moves it well into the middle class, especially in states with low per capita incomes like 
North Carolina. WIC, unlike most middle class and even elite subsidies, serves two 
economic classes simultaneously. This means that while it is vulnerable to cuts aimed at 
punishing the "undeserving poor", it enjoys the security of having among its clients many 
in the middle class. In 1995, in North Carolina a recipient may have an annual income of 
just over $27,000 - almost $10,000 over the state median income. This factors heavily 
5 Daniel P. Moynihan in On Understanding Poverty: Perspectives From the Social Sciences (New York: 
Basic Books, 1969). 
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into an understanding of WICs expansions amidst poverty policies threatened with 
extinction. 
A final clue to understanding WICs survival through the eighties may rest with its 
political jurisdiction. Unlike AFDC and Medicaid which get near equal input from 
federal, state and local authorities, WIC leaves much less to state and local discretion. 
Guidelines for operations are specific about eligibility requirements. They also spell out 
the nutritional criteria for foods allowed on the WIC menu. State and local officials are 
responsible for considering applications from food manufacturers. Beyond this, outreach 
and program delivery are the primary functions of state and local administrators. Rule 
changes or local applications of federal rules, as is often the case in Medicaid 
administration, is much less likely the case with Women, Infants and Children's Program. 
Outreach is important. It alone answers whether the project reaches its targeted 
populations. The methods employed by local project administrators has much to do with 
whether needy populations are informed about available services. Service accessibility, 
especially for the indigent, also weighs heavily into the delivery of benefits. Ultimately, 
this affects those health determinants which predict mortality and morbidity. Given this, 
the type of centralized federalism which omits many of the state and local political elites 
unsympathetic to social welfare also goes far in explaining the program's success. 
WIC funding is almost entirely federal. While states may contribute, most do not, 
choosing rather to donate administrative staff and space. This is a fact to be taken 
seriously because when state political leaders complain of budget shortfalls and look to 
make cuts among the most vulnerable populations, Women, Infants and Children is 
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excluded because its budget is out of reach. This program is, for all intents and purposes, 
a cost-free opportunity for states to address the effects of poverty on child and maternal 
health. 
North Carolina Nutrition Policy 
North Carolina's attention to nutrition issues came during the 1930s from private 
funding sources. Rockefeller money was initially used to direct physician services toward 
nutrition. In 1939, this money created the School Health Coordinating Service whose 
purpose was to "train teachers to assume more responsibility for health instruction..."6 
Funds were employed to create a biochemistry department in Duke University whose 
initial charge was "to determine the cause, incidence, severity and distribution of 
malnutrition in statistically significant groups of the population."7 
During the 1950s public health nutritionists were hired in Guilford and 
Mecklenburg counties. This project in child nutrition was continued in 2 of the 3 largest 
counties, Mecklenburg and Guilford, until 1968 when the Expanded Food and Nutrition 
Education Program (EFNEP) was funded at $10 million. By 1969, 12 North Carolina 
counties created nutrition education programs whose primary function was to "help low 
income families, especially those with young children to acquire knowledge, skills and 
changes in behavior to achieve adequate diets providing normal nutrition."8 
6 Child Nutrition and Health in North Carolina; An Overview (Chapel Hill: The Institute of Nutrition, 




In 1975, the state gave the Women, Infants and Children's program permanent 
status and the state's public health department in a study conducted on WIC children in 
1977 and 1978 found 30 percent of North Carolina's children to be anemic. The state's 
provision of medical personnel for WIC in 1979 allowed 66,000 children to be reached in 
66 of the state's 100 counties. The North Carolina nutrition initiatives begun in the 1930s 
laid a framework for the a program like WIC. 
Hunger and nutrition plagues North Carolina as it does other states, especially 
during economic downturns. Government responses vary depending upon the political 
agenda dominating state and national legislative arenas. Food distribution programs, as 
discussed earlier, take various forms and do not always give first consideration to the 
welfare of the poor. Be that as it is, the specter of hunger and poverty leaves thousands 
ready to receive the free food made available through these temporary relief policies. 
In 1981, Congress created the Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program in 
response to reductions in social programs. Farm belt politicians were able to capitalize 
on the government purchases and distribution of dairy and grain surplus products. All 
except six North Carolina Social Service Departments served as Emergency Food 
Organizations (EFO). Quarterly allotments were made on "county-by-county" basis 
according to a weighted formula devised by the North Carolina Department of Human 
Resources (DHR). The formula considered the percentage of people living below poverty 
as well as the numbers of unemployed. Stockpiles of cheese, rice and milk were depleted 
at many EFOs.9 
9 Lois Gray Myers, How We Feed the Poor (Greensboro: North Carolina Poverty Project, 1989), 15. 
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In 1988, the Hunger Prevention Act authorized the purchase of $120 million 
worth of food in consumer packages. By the end of that year, $16 million in food had 
been distributed in North Carolina serving about 180,000 households or 300,000 
individuals at or below 130 percent of federal poverty.10 
Still, feeding the poor is controversial. Child and maternal nutrition, however, has 
found friendly outposts among national legislators so that, despite the "Reagan 
Revolution", the federal dollars spent on WIC have increased steadily since the program's 
inception. Table 37 demonstrates the increases in the WIC budget between 1980 and 
1992. 
TABLE 37 
FEDERAL EXPENDITURES OF SPECIAL SUPPLEMENTAL FOOD 
PROGRAM FOR WOMEN, INFANTS AND CHILDREN’S PROGRAM, 
1980-1992 
Year Expenditure  Percent Increase 
1980 $725 million 
1981 $869 million 20% 
1982 $948 million 9% 
1983 $1,123 billion 18% 
1984 $1,386 billion 23% 
1985 $1,488 billion 7% 
1986 $1,581 billion 6% 
1987 $1,681 billion 6% 
1988 $1,802 billion 7% 
10 Ibid. 
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TABLE 37 (continued) 
FEDERAL EXPENDITURES OF SPECIAL SUPPLEMENTAL FOOD 
PROGRAM FOR WOMEN, INFANTS AND CHILDREN’S PROGRAM, 
1980-1992 
Year Expenditure Percent Increase 
1989 $1.929 billion 7% 
1990 $2.126 billion 10% 
1991 $2.3 billion 8% 
1992 $2.6 billion 13% 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Special Supplemental Food Program...,” 
Unpublished 
The dramatic increase during the early part of the 1980s reflects an end to the two year 
congressional stalemate where no nutrition legislation was passed. 
Expenditures rose, but in the early 1980s participation rates remained somewhat 
stagnant and throughout the remainder of the decade incremental increases characterize 
WICs population growth. Generally, the rate of growth during the Reagan years, 1980- 
1988, was slower than during Bush's administration. Table 38 provides national 
participation levels during the 12 years under consideration. 
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TABLE 38 
FEDERAL PARTICIPATION RATES FOR THE SPECIAL 
SUPPLEMENTAL WOMEN, INFANTS AND CHILDREN’S PROGRAM, 
1980-1992 
Year Participants Percent Change 
1980 2,210,344 
1981 2,034,443 - 9.6% 
1982 2,421,409 +19% 
1983 2,536,966 +5% 
1984 3,044,772 +20% 
1985 3,137,986 +3% 
1986 3,311,670 +6% 
1987 3,429,412 +4% 
1988 3,592,843 +5% 
1989 4,118,586 +14% 
1990 4,516,883 +10% 
1991 4,892.846 +8.0% 
1992 5,403,308 +10.0% 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Special Supplemental Food Program...,” 
unpuplished data. 
Federal funds for WIC come in the form, of grants-in-aid to state health agencies 
and/or Native American group administrative programs. To determine funding levels, the 
national average cost per participant is applied to the number of participants expected to 
be served in a program for the upcoming year. 
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Stability grants and residual funds have become important features of the WIC 
funding design. Because WIC is not an entitlement, estimates determine the amounts 
each state will receive for the fiscal year. Stability grants consider prior years total food 
grant, adjusted for inflation. It also sets aside monies for migrant populations depending 
upon the representation of migrant workers in each state. Residual funds are calculated 
after stability grants are depleted and are dispersed on a growth basis. That is, funds are 
set aside for states who receive less than their needed share given their income eligible 
populations. Prior to 1993, states were limited to residual funding 15 percent beyond 
their stability grants. In this scenario, states needed to respond quickly and effectively to 
receive more federal funds to feed targeted populations. Often states unable to reach 
eligibles had to return money to federal coffers while states without adequate grants left 
needy populations to their own devices. This was ironic given the growing numbers of 
poor people during the 1980's. 
Unsuccessful attempts to reach those in greatest need raised questions about the 
effectiveness of WICs outreach efforts. Most states allow presumptive eligibility which 
allows WIC enrollment to occur with Medicaid and AFDC enrollment. Problems arose, 
though, given the income eligibility threshold differences between the two programs. 
The underreporting of income which came was a predictable result since WICs income 
threshold far exceeds that for both Medicaid and AFDC. Throughout the eighties, the 
WIC median income was 80 percent of the federal poverty level and 63 percent of WIC 
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households had wage or salary earnings. This is the case for only 26 percent of those 
receiving AFDC benefits.11 
The need for the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and 
Children is well documented in North Carolina where infant mortality among poor and 
minority women and children was 8th highest in the nation in 1981. Four years later the 
state improved only slightly with the move to 10th highest. North Carolina ranked 10th 
in infant mortality and 8th for low birthweights for all races.12 States with higher 
percentages of births to teens also have higher proportions of low birthweights. Among 
births to mothers under 20 years old, North Carolina ranked 8th highest.13 
The need for WIC’s services intensifies among this population when 
acknowledging the likelihood that infants bom to teenaged mothers are also more prone 
to be indigent. That so many teenaged mothers are not receiving the full range of WIC 
benefits is evidenced in the perpetuation of low birthweights among North Carolina 
infants through the 1980s. Further, a Children's Defense Fund state trend analysis 
included North Carolina with 22 states least likely to meet 1990 national infant mortality 
objectives for African-Americans.14 In fact, the analysis speculated that North Carolina 
was moving in the wrong direction.15 
11 Department of Agriculture, Food andNutrition Service, WIC Income Verification Study: Final Report 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 10. 
12 Hughes, 2. 
13 Ibid., 26. 
14 House, hearing, The Role of Federal Food Assistance Programs. 64. 
Ibid., 68. 15 
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Dr. Ronald Levin in a state Public Health Study Commission report judged a 
number of causes for the rise in North Carolina infant mortality. Increased funding for 
family planning services during the 1970s correlates with decreases in infant death. 
Conversely, during the 1980s when funding decreased for family planning, infant 
mortality increased. He also cited the rise in the numbers of North Carolinians with 
inadequate health insurance as having a part of the 1980s rise in infant deaths. Finally, 
the shortage of obstetrical physicians16 was cited as a cause. 
Prenatal care is a major determinant of early child health. WIC, in addition to 
food supplements, offers a maternal care component aimed specifically at encouraging 
behavior which will result in the delivery of healthy infants. This means that 
participation in the WIC program will likely translate into sound prenatal habits. In the 
nation, the rate of late or no prenatal care for African-American women rose 20 percent 
between 1980 and 1986. When interviewed, women cited financial barriers as most 
significant in preventing prenatal care. Large majorities of women surveyed said that 
they sought care but were unsuccessful.17 
A North Carolina study showed similar trends. In this case race coupled with 
education to predict the incidence of women receiving adequate prenatal care. Since WIC 
is more often than not an indicator of prenatal care, it is reasonable to assume that women 
who do not receive adequate prenatal care are also not enrolled in WIC. Table 39 shows 
16 In 21 North Carolina counties during 1988 at least one physician who provided maternity care 
withdrew from providing this service. Recommendations of the Infant Mortality Task Force ,11. 
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differentials between whites and minorities as well as between various educational 
attainment levels. The lower the education level, the greater chance there is of receiving 
inadequate care. Certainly, money factors heavily in this equation. At every level of 
education, race or ethnicity weighs prominently into the incidence of prenatal care. 
TABLE 39 
PERCENTAGES OF NORTH CAROLINA MOTHERS RECEIVING 
INADEQUATE PRENATAL CARE BY RACE AND EDUCATION, 1988 
Education White Minority 
Under 12 years 9.4 17.3 
12 years 3.2 9.6 
13-15 years 2.1 5.8 
Over 16 years 0.6 3 
Source: Atkinson, 19. 
State records show significant declines in infant mortality rates between 1970 
when the rate was 24.1 per 1,000 births and 1986 when it was 11.6. The state's perinatal 
care18 program is given credit for helping this drop with doubling the number of babies 
bom in newborn intensive care units.19 This practice also increased the prenatal care 
needed to reduce infant mortality. Ultimately, however, the program's goals should be to 
decrease the need for newborn intensive care with the availability of sound health care 
during pregnancy. 
18 Perinatal refers to the time between 28 weeks gestation and infant ages up to 28 days. 
19 North Carolina Vital Statistics. 1989. 
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Before the rate fell to its low of 11.5 in 1989, it rose two consecutive years, 1987 
and 1988, to 12.1 and 12.6, respectively. During the same years the U.S. infant death rate 
was 9.9 per 1000 births. Only Washington D.C. had a higher rate.20 
Trends in the beginning of the nineties demonstrated the need for vigorous 
outreach to needy populations. Neonatal rates rose some for Whites and nonwhites alike. 
Postneonatal mortality for nonwhites rose to 22.5 per 1000 after two years of decline. 
While white infant mortality rates decreased, the nonwhite rate rose by 6 percent.21 By 
1992, infant death for whites and nonwhites decreased to the lowest ever - 9.9 percent, a 
12 percent rise in the non-white fetal death rate underscores the need for vigilance if ever 
these deaths are to be avoided.22 
National data suggests that Black infants during the 1980s were likely to die from 
congenital anomalies at a rate comparable to Whites. However, when measuring those 
illnesses related to inadequate health care for mothers and infants, Black babies stood at 
considerable greater risk. Data showed how Black babies were four times as likely to die 
as a result of prematurity and low birthweights; 2.5 times more apt to die from pneumonia 
and influenza; and, twice as likely to die from infectious diseases, accidents and maternal 
20 Ibid. 
North Carolina Citizen Survey Highlights. 1991 (Raleigh: Office of Budget and Management, 1991), 
22 North Carolina Highlights. 1992,80. 
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complications.23 Moreover,low birthweight infants who survive are at increased risk of 
lifelong disabilities such as "mental retardation, blindness, cerebral palsy...."24 
Between 1987 and 1991, the numbers and rates of race identifiable infant deaths 
rose in North Carolina. This was especially true in counties with significant Black 
populations. In Union, Moore, Halifax, Lee and Mecklenburg counties, for instance, the 
incidence of Black infant death was 3-4 times those of White infants.25 Native Americans 
during the same 4 year period also experienced low birthweight rates, though not as low 
as those in the African-American community. While White infants weighed low at a 6.0 
percent rate, numbers for Blacks and Native Americans were 13.0 and 8.2 percents, 
respectively.26 
While North Carolina administers many programs to improve the health of 
pregnant women and infants, WIC is among the most important. Evaluations of WICs 
impact on infant birthweight has shown that in North Carolina not being on WIC is the 
fourth strongest predictor of low birthweight. The first 3 are being nonwhite, smoking, 
and having more than one medical risk.27 Despite some increases in maternal and child 
health spending, North Carolina maintained high levels of morbidity and mortality within 
these populations. Ranked 6th highest in infant deaths in 1982, the state was unable to 
23 Hughes, 9. 
24 Joseph Tiang-Yau Liu, et al, The Health of America’s Children 1992: Maternal and Child Health Data 
Book ( Washington, D.C.: Children’s Defense Fund, 1992), 6. 
25 North Carolina Highlights. 1991 , 80-81. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Lee A. Sullivan "North Carolina Surveillance of Birth Defects" CHES Studies 52 (September 1989): 
2. 
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significantly improve its national standing through 1986 even though the 1985 rate went 
to 10th. Physician shortages and, Medicaid vendor payments notwithstanding, low per 
capita health care expenditures combined to work against the positive policy advances 
such as relatively high WIC per capita expenditures to hinder the state's showing at 
improving the life chances of poor women, infants and children.28 
North Carolina WIC Administration 
USDA allows state health department officials a wide berth where income 
eligibility is concerned. Setting limits up to 185 percent of federal poverty is the main 
vehicle local health department officials, typically the directors, have to influence the 
reach of this program. Directors also dictate where community WIC staff will be posted. 
Closing community (especially in rural areas) clinics could have devastating effects on 
those without the transportation necessary to come to the central offices. In these ways 
local officials are able to exercise considerable influence over the dissemination of food 
aid, nutritional counseling and medical testing paid for almost entirely from the federal 
treasury. 
Setting income limits, for instance, potentially stretches or limits aid to thousands 
of people who in other jurisdictions would be eligible. North Carolina's Buncombe 
county which houses, Asheville, the largest city in the state's western region was in 1994 
the last county to raise the income threshold to the 185 percent maximum.29 In this state, 
28 Erdman and Wolfe, Poor Health Care for Poor Americans ,173. 
29 Janet Trulove, Buncombe County WIC Director, interview by author, 7 February 1995, Asheveille, 
North Carolina. 
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almost a $5,000 income differential existed between Buncombe county WIC eligibles and 
those living in any other county. 
Getting vendor participation in the Women, Infants and Children program is also 
a staff function. Nutritionist take applications from both retailers who carry WIC 
approved items as well as from manufacturers interested in having particular products 
added to the WIC approved list. Typically, infant foods, formulas, juices and dairy goods 
are chief among WIC subsidies. 
USDA equips states with specific nutritional content requirements and state 
authorities are left to validate that those products approved by the state WIC office do in 
fact meet USDA standards. This is, for the most part, an objective process which does 
not lend itself to excessive local exercises of power. 
Retail participation in food distribution programs assumes a level of integrity 
among vendors not often extended to program recipients. It requires cooperation among 
retailers to ensure that foods are rotated regularly to avoid spoilage among perishable 
items. Another retailer responsibility related to controlling fraud is that they accurately 
represent their food stamp or voucher sales to the government. WIC vendors are also 
Food Stamp certified. To be approved for one program allows participation in the other. 
In this same way, removal from one results in denial to participate in the other. This 
ultimately gives protection to the smaller Women, Infants and Children program. By 
connecting the two policies, grocers who may be willing to sacrifice sales in the smaller 
of the two programs, may be reluctant, if doing so means losing federal Food Stamp 
dollars as well. 
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States are taking advantage of mass purchases from manufacturers interested in 
cornering the entire market on WIC foods. Competitive food bids from various 
manufacturers opens the state's opportunity to save money but severely limits food 
choices for recipients, especially when compared with those allowed in the Food Stamps 
program. Infant formula producer, Mead Johnson, for instance offered North Carolina 
the lowest bid on infant formula for WIC babies. With each purchase the company will 
pay a rebate which officials estimate will provide the state with upwards of $3 million. 
Mead Johnsons part is to insure that its formula will meet USDA nutritional standards as 
well as cost ceilings. Federal dollars will pay for the formula, but the state as purchasing 
agents, will get the manufacturer rebate dollars. State officials propose putting these 
dollars into maternal and child health programs 30. 
While the intersection points for local and state influence into WIC administration 
are less, they are by no means absent. Keeping consistent with national legislative intent 
is a challenge even with policies organized to take advantage of centralized federalism. 
One was WICs placement in only 66 of the states 100 counties even though the need for a 
broader delivery was evident. Methods of food distribution also fall to state authorities. 
North Carolina chose the voucher system. With this vouchers which are redeemable a 
local grocery stores are issued. This plan gives recipients a wider choice than does the 
delivery method used in other states. In the delivery distribution scheme, state officials 
deliver the food to the homes of program enrollees thereby ensuring that each family has 
30 Paul A. Buescher, et al, "An Evaluation of the Impact of Prenatal WIC Participation on Birth 
Outcomes and Medicaid Costs in North Carolina," CHES Studies 55 (March 1991): 2. 
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possession of the food packages. Clients are left with far fewer options than those 
available in local grocery stores. What is sacrificed in consumer choice is compensated 
for in the assurance that recipients actually receive the foodstuffs. 
Typically, federal authorities have been more predictable with WIC policy 
formulation and funding. There have, however, been some difficult times. When in 
1972, the agriculture secretary Earl Butz impounded WIC funds the case Durham v Butz 
ensued. This North Carolina case featured the city of Durham suing Secretary Butz to 
release funds for the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and 
Children. 
State WIC participation rates through the 1980s showed steady increases. The 
obvious exception to this was 1980-1981 when an 11,000 recipient reduction occurred. A 
disaggregated by population analysis shows a decrease of 6,000 women and infants and 
5,000 children. Table 40 illustrates the North Carolina WIC participation rates between 
1980 and 1992. 
These increases which occurred over the decade in no way matched swelling 
expenditures during the same period which suggest that funds were directed to 
administrative rather than client outreach efforts. That the number of clinics rose rapidly 
in the early 1980s and then leveled off after 1984 verifies the heavy placement of program 
dollars into administration. Increases and declines in food costs speaks to the outcomes 
of state bidding practices between food manufacturers. Table 41 allows an analysis of the 
costs associated with operation of North Carolina WIC throughout the Reagan and Bush 
administrations. Comparisons between participant and expenditures rates provides some 
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sense of how well the state made use of federal funds in seeing to the health of its 
women, infants and children. 
A county by county analysis of the WIC program reveals trends similar to those 
found among Medicaid recipients. Urban counties and those with the highest numbers 
and percentages of African-Americans reappear as prominent among WICs clients. Table 
42 list 20 North Carolina counties who in 1984 had the most children under five years 
TABLE 40 
NORTH CAROLINA PARTICIPATION RATES FOR THE WOMEN, 
INFANTS AND CHILDREN’S PROGRAM, 1980-1992 
Year Participation Percent Change 
1980 88.090 
1981 77,132 -12.44% 
1982 83,835 +8.69 
1983 84,326 +0.59 
1984 94,248 + 11.77 
1985 99,530 +5.60 
1986 103,120 +3.61 
1987 106.425 +3.21 
1988 109,540 +2.93 
1989 122,473 +11.81 
1990 133,876 +9.31 
1991 134,642 +0.57 
1992 153,961 + 14.35 




NORTH CAROLINA EXPENDITURES AND CLINICS FOR WOMEN, 
INFANTS AND CHILDREN, 1980-1992 







1980 $29,977,401 $25.67 177 
1981 $33,675,506 12.34 $27.70 197 
1982 $34,130,217 1.35 $28.60 250 
1983 $35,782,699 4.84 $28.83 186 
1984 $41,531,409 16.07 $29.65 186 
1985 $45,061,282 8.5 $30.42 198 
1986 $45,948,848 1.97 $29.89 198 
1987 $48,448,116 5.44 $30.46 179 
1988 $50,652,276 4.55 $30.83 196 
1989 $54,053,837 6.72 $28.56 202 
1990 $62,338,244 15.33 $30.38 193 
1991 $62,533,619 0.31 $30.38 190 
1992 $66,879,695 6.95 $26.87 190 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture. “WIC Local Agency Participation by 
Category,” 1980 through 1992, unpubished data. 
receiving WIC dietary supplements. Of the counties listed eight of the state's 10 largest 
counties appear prominently. 
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A look ahead at these same counties in 1989 show the proportions of people 
served by WIC compared with the numbers of eligible in that same year. Table 43 lists 
the largest WIC counties and gives the numbers of WIC eligible residents living below 
185 percent of federal poverty standards. A further analysis offers the racial populations 
of those eligible in each county. This is especially noteworthy given the dominant place 
race takes as a determinant of infant and fetal health and mortality. Overall, the state 
served roughly 51 percent of those eligible to receive WIC benefits. 
Poverty levels remain a factor when noting selected indicators of child health, 
fetal and infant mortality. In the 10 North Carolina counties with the highest percentages 
of births to women receiving Medicaid, the infant and fetal deaths almost always exceeds 
the 1987 state averages of 12.2 and 8.6, respectively. Table 44 looks at those counties 
with the highest percentages of Medicaid births in 1989 to find a correlation between 
indigence and above average fetal and infant death rates. 
It is important to keep fetal and infant death rates in a national context. North 
Carolina suffered with incidences of death well beyond those experienced by most of the 
nation's jurisdictions so that rates which match the state average are likely to be far 
beyond the national average. 
In some cases counties have low (or no) fetal deaths, but more than the state and 
national level in the other category. Northampton County is a case in point. In 1987, it 
experienced no fetal mortality. Its problem rested with extremely high infant death rate. 
In these instances, as with those counties which experience excessive deaths in both 
categories, any number of explanations beyond poverty rates might be considered. The 
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effects of environmental racism or the systemic pollution of communities based on the 
race of its members may well be the culprit. Tyrell County with a 42.3 infant death rate 
among its nearly 70 percent Black population raises suspicion regarding the applicability 
of this condition. Other clues may rest with the even administration of the WIC program. 
TABLE 42 
NORTH CAROLINA COUNTIES WITH THE HIGHEST NUMBER AND 
PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN RECEIVING BENEFITS FROM THE 
WOMEN, INFANTS AND CHILDREN’S PROGRAM IN 1984 




Guilford* 1,969 3.55 
Wayne 1,694 3.05 
Cumberland* 1,595 2.87 
Durham* 1,531 2.76 
Robeson 1,514 2.73 
Wake* 1,480 2.67 
Buncombe* 1,303 2.35 
Wilson 1,130 2.04 
Forsyth* 1,089 1.96 
Onslow* 1,074 1.94 
Mecklenburg* 1,011 1.82 
Scotland 982 1.8 
Alamance 982 1.77 
Duplin 905 1.63 
Cleveland 891 1.61 
Craven 804 1.45 
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TABLE 42 (continued) 
NORTH CAROLINA COUNTIES WITH THE HIGHEST NUMBER AND 
PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN RECEIVING BENEFITS FROM THE 
WOMEN, INFANTS AND CHILDREN’S PROGRAM IN 1984 
County Total Number of 
Participants 
Percentage of State Total 
Moore 769 1.39 
Wilkes 761 1.37 
Halifax 707 1.27 
State Totals 23775 42.85 
Department of Administration, Indicators of Children’s Needs.... 74. 
Note: * Indicates placement within the state’s most heavily populated areas. 
TABLE 43 
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF POPULATIONS ELIGIIBLE FOR WOMEN, 
INFANTS AND CHILDREN’S PROGRAM AND NUMBERS AND 
PERCENTAGES OF ELIGIBLES SERVED IN NORTH CAROLINA’S 
LARGEST WICK COUNTIES IN 1989 











Alamance 3,042 W-1,646 1,988 65% 
B-1,304 
Buncombe 5,343 W-4,234 2,670 49% 
B-1,035 
Craven 4,632 W-2,323 2,103 63% 
B-1,869 
Cumberland 16,949 W-7,348 5,377 31% 
B-7,361 
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TABLE 43 (continued) 
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF POPULATIONS ELIGIBLE FOR WOMEN, 
INFANTS AND CHILDREN’S PROGRAM AND NUMBERS AND 
PERCENTAGES OF ELIGIBLES SERVED IN NORTH CAROLINA’S 
LARGEST WIC COUNTIES IN 1989 












Durham 5,433 W-1,204 
B-424 
4,034 74% 
Forsyth 7,263 W-2,566 
B-4,505 
3,454 47% 
Gaston 5,587 W-3,572 
B-1,858 
1,749 31% 
Guilford 9,667 W-3,312 
B-5,968 
4,988 51% 
Mecklenburg 14,075 W-4,264 
B-9,271 
5,049 36% 
New Hanover 4,306 W-2,025 
B-2,203 
2,690 62% 
Onslow 9,941 W-6,486 
B-2,351 
3,941 40% 
Pitt 4,647 W-1,321 
B-3,217 
3,169 68% 
Robeson 6,891 W-1,336 
B-2,730 
3,276 48% 
Wake 9,018 W-3,416 
B-5,038 
4,533 50% 
Watauga 1,071 W-1,034 
B-23 
3,410 32% 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service. WIC Local Participation bv Category 
Women. Infants. Children CFNS 191) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19891 and Estimates 
of Persons Income Eligible for the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women. Infants and Children 
(WIC1 in 1989: County Tables (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989). 
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That is, do these health departments expend the same level of energy during the prenatal 
and postpartum periods? Efforts to provide more substantive links between WIC and 
Medicaid may also provide solutions to combatting the unacceptable frequency of 
mortality found in all but a few of these counties. 
TABLE 44 
1987 FETAL AND INFANT DEATH RATES IN 10 NORTH CAROLINA 
COUNTIES WITH THE HIGHEST PERCENTAGES OF MEDICAID 
SUBSIDIZED BIRTHS 
County Infant Mortality Fetal Mortality 
Bertie 12.2 12 
Bladen 27.4 10.8 
Halifax 12.5 8.7 
Hertford 12.7 6.3 
Hyde 15.6 30.3 
Jackson 15.1 14.9 
Northampton 28.2 0 
Robeson 10.6 13.2 
Swain 12.2 12 
Tyrell 42.3 13.9 
State Average 12.2 8.6 
Source: Table 31 and North Carolina Vital Statistics. 1987. 
Note: * Deaths per 1,000 births 
As race is unrelenting as a health determinant, attention to infant and fetal death 
rates among counties with the highest percentages of African-Americans is instructive. 
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Table 45 measures these health indicators again to reveal the insidious role race plays in 
the health of North Carolina health indicators. Figures confirm the heightened need for 
WIC in those counties with disproportionate number of African-Americans. Percentages 
of the population earning below the WIC income threshold is further reason for expanded 
program coverage in these counties. Many of those counties listed in the previous Table 
44 which noted the highest percentages of Medicaid births are ones heavily populated by 
the state's Black population. 
TABLE 45 
NORTH CAROLINA INFANT, FETAL MORTALITY AND WIC 
ELIGIBILITY IN COUNTIES WITH THE LARGEST PERCENTAGES OF 
AFRICAN-AMERICANS IN 1987. 








Anson 47 5.8 19.9 40% 
Bertie 60 12.2 12 52% 
Bladen 40 27.4 10.8 45% 
Edgecombe 52 14.2 10.8 40% 
Granville 45 11.5 5.7 33% 
Halifax 50 12.5 8.7 48% 
Hertford 56 12.7 6.3 49% 
Hoke 57 7.8 2.6 44% 
Martin 45 13.2 2.6 42% 
Northampton 61 0 28.2 49% 
Robeson 61 10.6 13.2 45% 
Scotland 43 9.7 5.8 38% 
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TABLE 45 (continued) 
NORTH CAROLINA INFANT, FETAL MORTALITY AND WIC 
ELIGIBILITY IN COUNTIES WITH THE LARGEST PERCENTAGES OF 
AFRICAN-AMERICANS IN 1987. 








Tyrell 67 42.3 13.9 57% 
Vance 44 12.5 14.1 41% 
Warren 64 16.7 8.3 52% 
Source: North Carolina Vital Statistics. 1987. 
Further analysis shows that WIC participation among eligibles in those 10 
counties with the highest infant death rates is actually higher than the state level of 51 
percent during 1989. Table 46 list the 10 highest rates in 1989 along with the rate of 
eligibles served. That many of these counties has populations below 50,000 may help to 
explain the effectiveness in reaching income eligibles for the program. Concerns, 
however, as to the persistence of high mortality rates speaks to the program need for the 
further intensification of outreach and medical tracking. 
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TABLE 46 
NORTH CAROLINA COUNTIES WITH 10 HIGHEST INFANT MORTALITY 
RATES IN 1989, TOTAL POPULATION AND PERCENTAGES OF 
WOMEN, INFANTS, CHILDREN ELIGIBLES REACHED 
Percentage Reached 
County Total Population Infant Mortality by WIC 
Bladen 26,663 27.4 50% 
Edgecombe 56,558 14.2 62% 
Hyde 5,411 15.6 88% 
Jackson 26,846 15.1 79% 
Martin 25,078 13.2 39% 
Northampton 20,798 28.2 79% 
Pitt 107,927 16.2 68% 
Robeson 105,179 13.2 48% 
Tyrell* 3,856 42.3 NA 
Warren 17,265 16.7 77% 
Source: North Carolina Vital Statistics. 1987. 
Note: Tyrell county was served by a tri-county health center. 
WIC and Medicaid Coordinated 
High infant and fetal death rates occurred even though the state increased 
spending for maternal and child health.31 Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) officials 
mandated by 1989 that states actively coordinate WIC and Medicaid programs and 
31 North Carolina in 1985 ranked 10th highest in infant mortality and 6th highest for maternal and child 
health spending programs at $28.00 per person. 
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efforts. To this end, all WIC agencies were required to refer children who appeared 
Medicaid eligible to the appropriate offices. In December 1990, HCFA reciprocated and 
issued regulations concerning Medicaid to WIC referrals. Under these new rules, 
Medicaid workers were to inform applicants about the WIC program as soon as the 
agency learned about pregnant, postpartum women (up to six months after delivery or any 
child under 5 receiving Medicaid benefits.32 
Geographic proximity between WIC and Medicaid offices was often a barrier in 
program coordination - one that seriously impedes health goals and monetary savings. 
Analysis has shown that WIC enrollment offers substantive Medicaid savings, especially 
during the first 60 days after birth. The range is $277 in Minnesota to $598 in North 
Carolina.33 
Answering the federal mandate put forth in OBRA 1989 takes many forms. In 
North Carolina, for instance, Medicaid transportation was also extended to WIC 
recipients. The state also houses WIC workers in the Medicaid clinics so that clients may 
meet both caseworkers during the same visit. 
North Carolina has specifically defined WIC certification, nutrition 
education and food voucher pick-up as 'needed medical services'... As part 
of a five year plan to combat infant mortality in the state. The North 
Carolina legislature appropriated $800,000 in fiscal year 1990 to 
supplement Medicaid funds to provide transportation servicesto Medicaid 
beneficiaries.34 
32
 Laura Summer, Working Together: A Guide to Coordinating WIC and Medicaid Services 
Washington, D.C.: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1991), 19. 
33 B. Devaney , L. Bilheimer and J. Schore, Journal of Policy Analysis - Management 11 (Fall 1992 ): 
580. 
34 Summer, 35. 
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Moreover, North Carolina has presumptive eligibility which allows health 
department officials to make temporary determinations of Medicaid eligibility at the site 
where pregnant women receive health care.35 This coupled with the 'outstationing' of 
WIC personnel in Medicaid clinics are among the efforts undertaken in attempts to lower 
the incidence of infant death. 
In 1987, North Carolina began its "Baby Love" program - an expansion of 
Medicaid for low-income pregnant women, infants and children. Its joint administration 
includes the state Medicaid agency, Division of Medical Assistance (DMA); Title V also 
known as the Division of Maternal and Child Health; the state WIC agency; and, the state 
Office of Rural Health and Resource Development which oversees the community and 
rural health clinics.36 
In an effort to assess how Medicaid and WIC clients are being reached, recent 
studies tracked the state's success in providing recipients of both programs the benefits of 
the other. A study which considered the race of clients showed the incremental 
improvements being made by North Carolina social services agencies in this area. Table 
47 gives the results of four years of tracking the percentage of Medicaid births where the 
mother also received WIC benefits. 
35 Most states have been reluctant to practice presumptive eligibility because state Medicaid is penalized 
for errors in eligibility determinations. Congress, however, in 1989 addressed this by not counting errors 
made in determination in women and infants whose income falls below 133 percent or 185 percent of 
federal poverty. 
36 Department of Agriculture, Quality Nutrition Services in the Special Supplemental Food Program for 
Women. Infants and Children (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), 46. 
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TABLE 47 
PERCENTAGES OF RACE IDENTIFIABLE BIRTHS TO NORTH CAROLINA 
WOMEN RECEVING BOTH MEDICAID AND WOMEN, INFANTS 
AND CHILDREN’S BENEFITS 
1988 1989 1990 1991 
White 69.2 72.4 70.2 70.4 
Minority 72 74.8 74.5 75.3 
Source: Kathryn B.Surles, Karen T.Graham and Delton Atkinson, “Health Status of 
Blacks in North Carolina,” CHES Studies 76 (Oct. 1993): 68. 
The political influences which inform health care efforts are in North Carolina, 
like in other states, a function of political culture and fiscal reality. That North Carolina 
is a state which maintains a dominant rural and conservative interest goes far in 
explaining policy priorities. Aid to women and children, typically acknowledges a 
concern for aiding what appears to be vulnerable populations. These were, after all, the 
original social welfare recipients and while Medicaid somewhat distorts this population 
because its children may be as old as 21 years (if they are enrolled in school), the WIC 
program does not. Its clients are all women either pregnant or with very young children. 
Allowing them space on the dole seems most appropriate in a state where conservative 
politics defines debate. 
Data shows the large numbers of needy people in the state's fast-growing urban 
centers. It also demonstrates the need for health care in poor and African-American 
dominated counties. However, these criteria are not necessarily those used to allocate 
public health aid to North Carolina jurisdictions. The states urban centers receive small 
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per capita grants, $15.84, even though their need is certainly pressing. Medium size 
jurisdictions fare best with $23.75 per capita. The smallest allocations, $8.54, went to 
small rural areas.37 
The same was the case with Medicaid per capita expenditures. Urban areas 
received the least and medium jurisdictions were funded highest. Large rural counties 
were funded behind medium jurisdictions. Again, the small rural regions were left to 
their own devices, though not nearly to the extent as were the urban centers.38 
The connection between funding and WIC participation in the various size 
jurisdictions revealed somewhat predictable results. Table 48 shows that large rural areas 
with populations under 30,000 had the best WIC outreach rates. Small rural areas 
competed with medium size areas and the state’s cities only reached 24 percent of their 
eligible populations. This was disappointing given the need in urban areas. However, the 
rates reached in the small rural areas are encouraging, given their low funding levels and 
small populations. 
The need for intensified services to the state's urban centers goes without saying. 
Twenty-four percent of WIC recipients live in the 8 largest cities in North Carolina in 
1989. Another 31 percent, 41,481 eligibles not receiving benefits also reside in 
these cities. That the state spends proportionately less in these areas helps to explain the 
persistence of service and delivery inequities. Table 49 isolated those counties which 
^Legislative Research Commission, report to 1993 North Carolina General Assembly, Public Health 




NORTH CAROLINA PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN, INFANTS AND 
CHILDREN’S PROGRAM AMONG VARIOUS SIZE JURISDICTIONS 
Jurisdiction Women Participants 
(of all eligibles) 
Infant and Children 
Participants 
(of all eligibles) 
Rural - small 7,195 to 62% 80% 
9,407 52% 57% 
Rural- large 26,844 80% 68% 
29,022 61% 68% 
Metro - medium 66,145 67% 71% 
175,173 54% 47% 
Urban 266,443 24% 26% 
Source: Legislative Research Commission, Public Health System Issues. E-3. 
house the state's largest 8 cities. In each case the percentages of WIC eligibles served is 
smaller than is the case in the state's smaller geographies. Two columns show the 
numbers and percentages of each county's urban residents living below 185 percent of the 
federal poverty standard. This number includes men, the elderly and women who are not 
pregnant. Morbidity and mortality issues are almost always outcomes when health care 
providers leave unchecked those conditions which breed urban poverty. The fact that 
WIC, high among nationally funded programs, does not reach deep into these 
communities leads easily to assume that Medicaid and other more politically vulnerable 
programs during the 1980's had an even shallower impact on clients as well as on 
potential clients in these areas. 
TABLE 49 
LARGEST NORTH CAROLINA COUNTIES BELOW FEDERAL POVERTY LEVELS AND 
















Mecklenburg 109,234 21% 14,075 5,049 36% 
Cumberland 95,740 35% 16,949 5,377 31% 
Guilford 86,051 25% 9,667 4,988 51% 
Wake 82,798 20% 9,018 4,533 50% 
Forsyth 62,572 24% 7,263 3,454 47% 
Buncombe 50,057 28% 5,343 2,670 49% 
Durham 47,669 26% 5,433 4,034 74% 
Gaston 44,016 25% 5,587 1,749 31% 
Totals 73,335 31,854 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Estimates of Persons Income Eligible.... 
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WIC has aided in the state's efforts to lower infant and fetal mortality. Similarly, 
low birth weights have been affected positively with enrollment in this program. 
However, this state's concentration in its challenge to improve the health of pregnant 
women and children should be geared toward targeting those populations whose mortality 
rates remain high. The Reagan administration was unsuccessful in its bid to decrease 
funding for WIC even though all social welfare spending underwent or was threatened 
with draconian budget cuts. State administrators understanding the implications of these 
threats increased WIC enrolles but failed to direct resources toward those populations 
with the greatest need. Those counties with the highest percentages and numbers of poor 
families whose unacceptable medical indicators persisted provide evidence of the 
program's deficiency. This suggests the need for a variation from those service delivery 
methods used to reach the population where mortality rates have decreased dramatically 
due to WICs effective outreach. 
Recent proposals to track all health care projects aimed at pregnant women and 
their children seem most palatable. Since analysis shows that technological advances and 
the availability of public health care funding only reach as far into poor and often 
minority communities as administrators and staff facilitate, legal mandates to effect 
coordination between health care providers and program administrators appears to be the 
prudent course. Beyond this, states may employ any number of strategies to affect the life 
chances of those most threatened with mortality in North Carolina- the poor, African- 
Americans, Native Americans, and the growing Hispanic population. 
Clearly, the outreach of both the WIC and Medicaid programs needs 
improvement. The effects of poverty are devastating the most severely impovershed 
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regions of the state. Those are, most notably, the rural communities along with the state's 
largest cities. This trend is likely to continue through the 1990's, even with the increased 
availabilty of services, especially to women and children. A glance forward into the 
Clinton administration does show the increase in health care, yet the specifics which 
might make for the effective utilization of those programs is still lacking. 
CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In North Carolina, the impact of budget reductions on the health of those 
dependent on government sponsored medicine can be devastating. The question posed in 
this study attempted to gauge the severity of the withdrawal of aid on the state's needy. 
The nature of the relationship between medical care and health is anything but constant. 
The variations are almost as great as are the numbers of individuals being considered. It 
is, however, accurate to conjecture based upon trends found within indigent populations 
as well as among those cultures and ethnicities which form even smaller subsets among 
the indigent. This data concludes that the constriction of health care to the needy places 
those on the dole in peril and the those risks increase as particular populations are 
considered. 
A final, more obvious conclusion drawn from this study is the reality of health and 
health care in the state. That is, the disparity between the classes and races where well¬ 
being is concerned, remains a pressing issue. Given that the unrelenting high cost of 
American medicine, has become a permanent feature of the national political landscape 
suggest that this chasm will, without public policy attention, grow. 
Examining North Carolina's treatment of the Medicaid and Women Infants and 
Childrens programs reveals much about the incompatibility between poverty relief and 
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capitalism. This incongruence turns up in policy schizophrenia. More importantly to 
notice is the draconian affect that this ambiguity has on the lives of the poor. Primary 
among those are minorties, women and children. 
On the one hand, a capitalist economy has as one of its mainstays unemployment 
and low wage labor. In this way profits may be increased and markets expanded. 
Unfortunately, this is a major cause of poverty. Public policy has faced the dilemma of 
keeping the poor out of complete destitution while maintaining a vital economy. 
That the costs of medical care continues to rise leaves the indigent at the mercy of 
charity, either private or state-sponsored, to care for their needs. The United States, early 
in its history, left this function to private and/or local sources. However, a number of 
factors converged during the 1930's causing this function to transfer to the national 
government.1 It is this very transferral of aid to the poor that is at the heart of this study. 
Vagueness and imprecise policy objectives characterize many social welfare 
policies. It is this uncertainty which helps to cloud the effectiveness of particular 
programs in meeting the needs of constituents. If the maintenance of a healthy citizenry is 
a goal of national and state governments, a good deal of reorientation on the purposes of 
poverty programs is absolutely necessary. 
This study investigated how service delivery is vulnerable to political dictates 
which threaten already unclear policy objectives. In each program's case, the chief 
1 There are several writers offering explanations for the federalization of poverty programs. The range 
of interpretations range from classical liberal thought calling for a laissez-faire approach to those who se 
government using social welfare as a means of social control. Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward 
pioneered this thesis in their work, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Social Welfare (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1971). 
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executive, attempted to exert influence into program funding. In the case of Medicaid, 
Congress initially granted the president's requests for budget reductions, but later restored 
many of those cuts given early in Reagan's administration. The need for these programs 
is indisputable. The reality of rising poverty, no doubt, more than any shifts in ideology 
which gives favorable consideration to the poor, was responsible for the restoration of 
federal dollars to the Medicaid program. 
Women Infants and Children has enjoyed a status apart from its cohorts which 
service slightly different populations. As the literature makes distinctions between the 
"deserving" and the "undeserving"2 poor, the perception is that the beneficiaries of WIC 
fall into the first category. That WIC serves women well above state and federal poverty 
levels gives it a more respected constituency. In addition, WIC enjoys refuge with the 
food aid projects. This group of programs, while still somewhat vulnerable because of 
popular perceptions which malign poverty policies, has a conservative legislative base in 
Congress which shields them from those onslaughts which come regularly into Health 
and Human Services. 
In North Carolina, indigence is common and makes the need for the services 
provided by programs absolutely imperative. While it is difficult to demonstrate that 
cutbacks in program funding has resulted in poor health, it is certainly reasonable to 
assume that people with little money and no access to health care will be unable to meet 
those needs. Given this, one might assume that a reduction in service delivery will have 
negative effects on the well-being of the population. 
2 See Katz, The Undeserving Poor: 
\ 
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This scenario is especially true among the state's African American, Hispanic, 
Native American and poor women and children. North Carolina also demonstrates for 
the creation of a service delivery system which answers the needs of particular 
populations. Even where Medicaid and WIC do reach into the community, there is the 
persistence of racially identifiable mortality and morbidity. In many communities 
throughout the state, race supersedes income as a health risk factor. Those models of 
caregiving which exclude an understanding of the cultures of those being served are much 
less likely to succeed than those which give full accounts of client needs. All of this 
speaks to the requirement for increased, not reduced health care expenditures. 
Devolution, as prescribed by the Reagan administration, spelled then as it does 
now, a formula for disaster. The states are unable to fund a program as costly as 
Medicaid. Rule creation and interpretation aspects of program administration are left to 
local elites who in turn, expose the poor to inadequate assistance. North Carolina's 
uneven program distribution attest to this phenomena. Even WIC, whose program 
administrators are largely restricted by federal rules, managed to see different income 
levels set from county to county. 
A model of devolution which relies on federal funding and accountability to 
clearly stated objectives, but which uses the expertise of those representative of the 
communities served, may be a more effective use of resources. In this way local elites, 
whose values and experiences, may be out of sync with the poor, are less likely to devise 
strategies which do not give full consideration to the needs of beneficiaries. 
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At this juncture, a word on the funding of these programs is warranted. Capping 
the rising costs of health care is the only solution, if the states are to even consider taking 
over these costs. Medicaid, which reimburses well below the market rates, suffers from 
the rapid inflation of medical services. The low physician participation rates will 
decrease beyond current levels if the gap between government reimbursements and 
private insurer rates continues to grow. While the notion of socialized medicine is an 
anathema to capitalism, the United States stands alone among its industrialized partners 
where this issue is concerned. This suggests the need for costs containment reform if the 
nation expects to see medical care delivered to its populace. 
Conversely, the Women Infants and Children program is an example of a 
relatively inexpensive project, one which the state could afford, and which offers 
effective preventive measures. Even though program administration could be 
strengthened to make outreach and benefits more commensurate with the needs of local 
populations, the framework for a sound state sustainable program is at least plausible. 
The relationship between federal, state and local authorities is finally a pressing 
issue when discussing the impact of Medicaid and WIC on program recipients. This 
study suggests that a centralized federalism model has an important place in the success 
of any poverty program. As mentioned earlier, local elites, given too much freedom, can 
minimize the effects of a program. This is particularly true in consideration of early 
discussions on the disapproving perceptions that people have of the indigent. When race 
is factored in, programs which either serve or are perceived as having disproportionately 
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large numbers of African Americans, are subject to similar expressions of the local 
political culture. 
If, however, a cooperative federalism model, persists, improvements may be 
made. Foremost is the statement of clear program objectives. Since the numbers of poor 
people is attainable, it seems a reasonable next step to mandate some congruence between 
those numbers and the numbers of program recipients. Beyond this, any decentralization 
schemes which emphasize and measure the improvement of health as objectives rather 
than the exposure of recipient fraud might yield the appropriate results - improved health 
of the state's citizens. 
At the core of any effort to revamp the nation's health care policy must be an open 
articulation of the purpose of each program. Until effort is directed toward achieving 
identifiable, attainable goals, the deception and dichotomous movement of policy makers 
and program administrators will endure. That situation will leave the poor entirely at the 
mercy of market forces who are obviously disinterested in the delivery of health care to 
those in greatest need - the poor. 
The Clinton Post Script 
Clearly no real anti-poverty program can rely on a thousand points of light.3 
3 Richard Caplan and John Feffer eds., State of the Union 1994: The Clinton Administration and the 
Nation in Profile ("Bolder. Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 180. 
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Bill Clinton's campaign issued sharp criticisms of his predecessor who called on 
private relief efforts to care for the nation's poor. In defense of the efforts put forth in the 
private sector Clinton said, 
... They know how to deliver goods and services in an integrated manner that 
involves recipients as participants and that generates mechanisms of 
accountability for providers. Their program is, fundamentally, one of scale, and 
only the federal government has the required resources.4 
Bill Clinton's ascent into the White House in 1992 brought a prospect for the 
expansion of those social programs assaulted during the Reagan and Bush years. At the 
very least, Americans expected a change in the punitive rhetoric and neglect towards the 
poor which had come to characterize Republican politicians. Some of this optimism was 
warranted as the Democratic candidate for president campaigned in a way which 
suggested some level of revisitation of themes associated with the 1960s War on Poverty. 
Clinton spoke emphatically about the plight of the nation's poor and was quick to assign 
Republican blame to any worsening of their condition over the past 12 years. He was, 
however, cautious about committing to the social welfare expansion in any way similar to 
those in his party also contending for the presidency or in any way which could be 
associated with the liberal policies of the 1960s. 
Careful to distance himself from the 1960s, Clinton declared himself a new style 
of Democrat. In many ways his rhetoric sounded much like those of his Republican 
predecessors. On federalism, for instance, Clinton saw the states as "laboratories for 
democracy". In welfare policy he sought to extend waivers to states to implement 
4 Ibid. 
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"innovative policies". Among these was the linking of children's school attendance to 
their family's welfare benefits; restricting the time a person may stay on welfare; and, 
imposing workfare requirements on welfare recipients.5 All of this seemed to foreshadow 
policy choices to come during his presidency. 
Clinton's federalism, dubbed "New Age Federalism"6 invites states to take the lead 
in developing new strategies to address persistent problems. He sees the role of national 
government as encouraging and guiding the states, but keeping safe distance from state 
and local autonomy. Ironically, faith that states and localities will operate in the best 
interests of any but their most vocal electorate is implicit in the Clinton prescription. The 
uneven and arbitrary delivery of services, is given scant consideration by the president 
who lambast Republicans for their callous treatment of the poor. 
Clinton positions himself also as a new kind of Democrat - one who believes 
"that government programs could not replace individual initiative or greater personal 
responsibility and empowerment."7 This theme was articulated throughout his campaign 
and first years in office. He, like his Republican predecessors, perceive the poor as either 
deserving or undeserving. Among those deserving are, primarily, children. To this group 
the administration is prepared to give health care and education. Those undeserving were 
given warning, albeit a gentler warning than that issued by the Republicans, to work. 
5 Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey M. Berry and Jerry Goldman The Challenge of Democracy: Government in 
America , 4th edition, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1995), 130. 
6 Ibid, 123. 
7 Charles Kolb, White House Daze: The Unmaking of Domestic Policy in the Bush Years (New York: 
The Free Press, 1994), 216. 
234 
Once in office, the government's role in recognizing and ameliorating the crisis facing 
Americans trying to earn liveable wages was given low priority. 
The new president's position on social welfare issues was no surprise to anyone 
willing to look back into his past as Arkansas governor. Workfare provisions and 
government paternalism best describes this state's welfare programs. At one point during 
Clinton's tenure as governor, welfare applications asked women to state their sexual 
preferences.8 
Judgements on the Clinton Administration's treatment of the poor, however, lies 
more with his incentives to create and ensure jobs for American workers. In June 1993 
he appointed the official inter-agency working Group on Welfare Reform, Family 
Support and Independence and charged them with making recommendations to "end 
welfare as we know it". Its recommendations includes supplements to wages of former 
recipients joining the work force. Another is universal health care since Medicaid 
benefits would be lost. Education and jobs training were among other recommendations 
made. These carrots were linked with two sticks: a 2 year limit on the dole and the call 
for increased efforts to bring non-supportive parents into the equation.9 Beyond the 
nation's desire to have parents take responsibility for their own children, the amount of 
money that would actually be yielded from this plan is questionaable since typically 
8 Sam Smith, Shadows of Hope: A Freethinker's Guide to Politics in the Time of Clinton (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1994), 85. 
9 Caplan, 176. 
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fathers of children on AFDC are themselves unemployed or earners in the low wage 
sector.10 
Key among any plan to end welfare dependency is employment at livable wages. 
Clinton's plan would optimistically place 1.5 to 2 million people into the labor force 
where they would be joined by over 12 million unemployed or involuntarily part-time 
employed workers.11 
These halting steps illustrate Clinton's basic dilemma. Trapped in the neoliberal 
paradigm, the administration moves erratically between fundamentally 
conservative positions such as workfare and essentially progressive proposals 
such as full funding for Head Start. A coherent anti-poverty strategy has yet to 
emerge...12 
This is nowhere more apparent than in state welfare policy which answers federal 
mandates imposed by Heath and Human Services Secretary, Donna Shalala and HCFA 
administrators, but which has developed little political stamina to deflect the barrage of 
Republican attacks which culminated in the November 1994 elections. 
Discussions surrounding health care reform began as an obvious solution to the 
growing inaccessibility of medical attention. The abrupt end, at least publicly, of that 
measure leaves the fate of those dependent on government funded care in a stage of acute 
uncertainty. Speculations that states would, in anticipation of a federally mandated health 
care overhaul, create their own alternatives, has yet to materialize. What has taken place 
10 Ann Nichols-Casebolt and Marieka Klawitter "Child Support Enforcement Reform: Can It Reduce 
Welfare Dependency of Families of Never Married Mothers?" Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 17 
(Sept. 1990): 32. 
11 Caplan, 177. 
12 Ibid. 
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in most states has been the business as usual answering of federal mandates with respect 
to those programs already in place. 
At the time of this writing the 103rd Congress has also agreed to discontinue 
unfunded mandates. The coupling of harsh social welfare policies aimed at devolving to 
states those functions and funding once handled on the national level will most assuredly 
leave states with the option of providing relief only if they are able to muster the fiscal 
resources. Any federal requirements that states simply find a way to deliver services will 
be, with the unfunded mandate rule, nonexistent. 
Moreover, the "Contract with America" brings into focus revitalized attacks on 
the poor. The welfare reform stalemate which polarized Congress following the 1994 
elections were by far, the most severe in three decades. House of Representative 
Republicans dubbed this reform segment of their "contract" the "Personal Responsibilty 
Act". With this, the following is hoped to be accomplished: 
Discourage illegitimacy and teen pregnancy by prohibiting welfare to minor 
mothers and denying increased AFDC for additional children while on welfare, 
cut spending for welfare programs, and enact a tough two years-and-out provision 
with work requirements to promote individual responsibility.13 
Medicaid: 1992 to the Present 
North Carolina Medicaid, for the most part, continued its pre-Clinton trajectory 
through the early Clinton years. Program growth reflected the federal government's 
willingness to include some new populations, primarily young children. For example, 
13 Clyde Wilcox, The Latest American Revolution? The 1994 Elections and Their Implications for 
Governance (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 70. 
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effective October 1993 was service to needy 19 and 20 year olds in medical institutions 
who require continuous care and treatment for more than 12 months. This is available 
without regard for the income of parents.14 Reflective of these increases has been the rise 
in state Medicaid spending from 3.8 percent of the North Carolina budget in 1988 to 5.1 
percent in 1991. 
In a bold eligiblity expansion, HCFA extended Medicaid to all those under 19 
whose families meet income requirements. The North Carolina legislature appropriated 
close to $34 million between 1993 and 1995 to implement this new rule.15 Another 1993 
rule change allowed Medicaid benefits to people terminated from AFDC due to increased 
wages.16 In 1994, the state made Medicaid available to parents of adoptive children with 
special needs, again without regard to parent's income. In this way, the Clinton 
Administration is acknowledging the strain medical expenses places on all income 
households. States, with this measure, are able to win favor from anti-abortion forces by 
providing incentives for adoption.17 
North Carolina, as mentioned earlier, has opted to repeal its 209(b) status with 
respect to Supplemental Security Income (SSI) status. Its decision to move to the less 
restrictive 1634 category will allow many more elderly and disabled onto the SSI rolls. 
14 Ferrell, North Carolina Legislation 1994. 154. 
15 North Carolina General Assembly, House, Committee on Children, Youth and Families, 1993 
Childrens Issues (Raleigh. 1993), 96. 
16 Ibid., 33. 
17 Ibid., 96. 
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As of January 1995 the state appropriated $20 million in anticipation of the swell in the 
rolls.18 
In a cost savings measure, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act or OBRA 1993 
required states to enact legislation aimed at recovering Medicaid benefits from estates of 
deceased Medicaid recipients. North Carolina responded with G.S. 108A-70.5 to 
establish a Medicaid Estate Recovery Plan with the Department of Human Resources 
O(DHR).19 
The state General Assembly increased the AFDC payment level to 50 percent of 
the need standard even though the state had been paying at that standard for at least 5 
years prior to this legislation. Additional appropriations to the state's Medicaid agency, 
Division of Medical Assistance (DMA), were made to cover these increases.20 
While these changes increased the state's welfare rolls, the application and 
payment error rate still remained among the nation's lowest at 3.0 percent. The numbers 
of recipients climbed from 673,478 in 1993 to almost 838,000 in 1995. Predictably, 
service increased in all categories.21 
In the midst of these expansions came a reduction in the Federal Financial 
Participation (FFP) lowering North Carolina's federal contribution by $557,903. In an 
attempt to offset the reduction it has been recommended that the DHR find ways to 
18 Ferrell, North Carolina Legislation. 1994. 41. 
19 Ibid. 
20 1993 Children's Issues... 128. 
21 Office of Budget and Management, North Carolina State Budget vol. 3: Human Resources 1993- 
1995 (Raleigh, 1995), R-3. 
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reduce the AFDC caseload.22 To enact such changes the state welfare administration will 
need to come up with strategies independent of those sent down by HCFA. In a proposed 
budget, Governor James Martin recommended only modest increases in the Medicaid 
payments over the 1993-95 biennium. In fact, with the exception of infants and children, 
every category of Medicaid recipient projected a reduction. The largest reduction was 
assigned to the AFDC population (infants and children excluded) at 50.23 percent in 
1993-94 to 48.83 in 1994-95.23 Exactly how these reductions are to be achieved, 
especially in the wake of program expansions, remains an enigma. 
One possible strategy may be the 1990 federally mandated JOBS program aimed 
at providing skills and training to AFDC recipients. Primary among its enlistees are 
families: where parents did not complete high school; households where the youngest 
child is about to "age-out" of AFDC eligibility; and, familiies receiving assistance for 
over 36 of the last 60 months.24 
Women. Infants and Children’s Program: 1992 to the Present 
The Special Supplemental Foods Program for Women, Infants and Children has 
remained viable under Clinton as it has under the Republican administrations. That 
young children provide the cornerstone of the deserving poor population bodes well for 
programs like WIC. Conservative anti-abortion forces are also able to display their 
22 Office of Budget and Management, Recommended Changes to the 1994-95 State Budget 1993-95 
Biennium (Raleigh, 1995), 49. 
23 North Carolina State Budget vol. 3: Human Resources 1993-95 . R-3. 
24 North Carolina Legislation. 1993 . 
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political handiwork through this type of program, a fact which is critical in explaining its 
bi-partisan support. In the 3 years of the Clinton Administration, North Carolina WIC 
continued its population climb from almost 154,000 in 1992 to an estimated 181,000 in 
1995, a 17 percent increase. Infant mortality in the state has improved, but the racial 
differential continued at a menacing rate. Neonatal nurseries are effective at saving more 
infant lives, but these improvements come at staggering fiscal costs. 
To combat infant death, the state has directed over $1 million each year for 
women's preventive health services and an additional $250 million/year for a 2 year 
period for adolescent pregnancy prevention and health improvement. Other WIC 
legislation authorized under the Current Appropriations Act of 1993 approved $500,000 
in 1993 and $1.2 million in 1994-95 for a number of WIC related projects. Among them 
is Head Start or other non-profit agencies; renovation of facilities; purchase of physician 
prescribed special formulas and nutritional supplements for infants, children and pregnant 
women; and, the WIC farmers market project.25 
Removal of the WIC 15 percent cap which went into effect in October 1993 may 
have aided in the increases in WIC population. States who underestimated needy women, 
infants and children are no longer prevented from applying for and receiving additional 
money from the federal government for these populations. Federal authorities, however, 
moved cautiously when considering this new rule. The effect on local economies of what 
amounts to unlimited WIC foods, was a concern studied by program administrators prior 
25 1993 Children's Issues.... 18. 
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to the rule's enactment. In a section of a WIC program report in the Federal Register 
entitled "Supplementary Information", the following analysis appeared: 
(This new rule) will not result in a major increase in costs or prices for 
consumers, individuals, industries, federal,state or local government agencies, or 
geographic regions. Further this rule will not have a significant adverse effect on 
competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or the ability of 
United States - based enterprises to compete with foreign - based enterprises in 
domestic or export markets.26 
Annual income guidelines for the Women, Infants and Children's program enjoys 
a national rather than state standard. Today in every North Carolina county, the Women, 
Infants and Children's program income threshold invites the majority of the state's 
mothers to receive benefits and the steady climb in the numbers of women choosing this 
option speaks to administrative willingness to see outreach improve. This generous 
guideline which moves well into the state's middle class communities is ironically one of 
the features which currently threatens program expansion. Conservative legislators have 
been quick to point out the cost savings available by moving the project's emphasis away 
from all but the lowest income earners.27 With the current domestic budgetary concerns 
growing, the Republican mandate all but promises fiscal cuts. 
Infant mortality remains a problem also because of environmental and other 
health risk factors as well as administrative failure in moving the program into the most 
vulnerable communities, particularly the state's African-American, Native American, and 
North Carolina's fastest growing, Hispanic community. Finally, linking health risk 
26 Federal Register vol. 58 no. 190 51567 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 4 Oct. 
1993). 
27 Michelle Trudeau on National Public Radio All Things Considered in a story on the current status of 
the Women, Infants and Children's Program, 24 April 1995. 
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factors with the improvement of other socio-economic variables such as education is 
essential if state public health officials are to make any gains in combatting the 
ethnic,income, and education identifiable death statistics which currently characterize 
well-being in North Carolina. 
The fate of all social welfare programs under the Clinton Administration is almost 
as elusive as it was under his Republican predecessors. His unwillingness to embrace the 
philosophical underpinnings of the Great Society programs may be linked to a number of 
political variables, not least among which is the recent domination of an aggressively 
conservative Republican Congress. 
This, coupled with the failure of the Clinton Health Care Reform Package raises 
questions as to the future of social welfare in America. This could not have come at a 
worse time. Health care costs continue to rise with little effort toward abatement, outside 
of low government reimbursememt for the poor and elderly. Increases in the AIDS 
epidemic as well as a plethora of other medical conditions linked with the in poverty must 
all be negatively factored into what can only be viewed as the imminent catastrophe in 
American health care for the poor. 
The state role in this scenario is ominous. The Reagan and Bush years 
demonstrated the inability of state and local governments to deliver health care without 
federal fiscal matches. This reality remains unchanged in the mid-1990s. Conservative 
politics on this issue seems fruitless without creating some means for those currently on 
the dole to care for themselves without government assistance. Since debate on 
employment and sustainable wages is, under the Clinton Administration, not taking this 
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direction, there is cause for concern. State health care administrators threatened with the 
latest round of budgetary reductions and in some cases program eliminations are, if the 
majority has its way, likely to experience increases in mortality and morbidity among all 
but the most privileged sectors of their populations which rival conditions in the years 
before social welfare was federalized. 
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